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2 The best source for the massive media coverage of the phenomenon of sexual abuse byclergy of all faiths is the archive of stories maintained by the Poynter Institute of Journalism. The archive can be accessed at http://poynter.org/column.asp?id=46.   For a detailed assessmentof the media reports of sexual abuse and misconduct in the Catholic Church, seehttp://www.bishopswatch.org/New/SexAbuseChart.htm.
3 The story of supervisory failure is told in the most detail in the reports of the prosecutorswho have considered indicting such supervisors.   See, e.g., The Sexual Abuse of Children in theRoman Catholic Archdiocese of Boston: A Report by the Attorney General (Office of theAttorney General, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, released July 23, 2003) (hereafter“Massachusetts AG Report”).  See additional such reports from New Hampshire and Suffolk1
IntroductionHistory and human nature consistently teach us that leaders will disappoint theirfollowers.  Nowhere is this more likely to be true than in the case of religious leaders, whopurport to speak in the name of God, and who address our deepest longings and fears.  Humans,deeply aware of their own fallibility, will often project unreasonable expectations of perfectionupon those who present themselves as spokespersons and leaders of communities organizedaround such ultimate concerns.  This inevitable tendency to disappoint is amplified in our owntime and place, in which the ubiquitous mass media endlessly parade the flaws, foibles, and fauxpas of the prominent. Even if the world were generous and forgiving towards those in leadership, however, thepast few decades in general, and the past several years in particular, would have produced amassive decline in the status of clergy and those who supervise them.  Episodes of sexualexploitation, and other breaches of trust, by members of the clergy are epidemic.2  The scale ofbetrayal represented by these stories is more massive than most of us can absorb.  And the talesare deeply aggravated by the follow-up accounts of religious supervisors who, having learned ofsuch malfeasance, failed to take the proper steps to prevent recurrence.3   The combination of
County, NY, cited in note xx and Part III, infra.  
4 In addition to the sources cited in notes 2-3, supra, see generally, Peter Steinfels, APeople Adrift: The Crisis of the Roman Catholic Church in America (2003). See also Catholicsfor a Free Choice, Clergy Sexual Abuse: Out of the Shadows: A Shadow Report on the Holy Seeand the Convention on the Rights of the Child(http://www.bishopswatch.org/Links/May_Shadow_report.pdf).  A recent survey by the NationalReview Board, a panel of lay Catholics commissioned by the U.S. Conference of CatholicBishops, reports that nearly 4500 Catholic priests – slightly under 5% of those who have beenserved as priests – have been accused of sexual misconduct over the past 50 years.  AlanCooperman, Nearly 4500 Priests Accused of Abuse, Draft Report Finds, Washington Post, Feb.17, 2004, p. A2.
5 For predictions and concerns about that fallout, see Mark E. Chopko, Shaping theChurch: Overcoming the Twin Challenges of Secularization and Scandal (article based on The2
misbehaving clergy and irresponsible supervision has widely expanded the scope of harmscommitted, the sheer number of victims, and the public outrage that has ensued.Much, but by no means all, of this story has involved the sexual exploitation of children,which of course accentuates its horrors. Despite our cultural ambivalence about youth sexuality –posters of Britney Spears certainly claim as much public notice as accounts of abusive priests –the anger and sense of betrayal are at their headline-screaming strongest when children,especially the pre-pubescent, are the victims of such wrongs.   The nationwide scandal involvingthe Roman Catholic Church, the wrongful behavior of some of its priests, and the repeat offensesfacilitated by the conduct of those in its hierarchy of supervision have been deeply impressedupon the public consciousness.  It will take several generations, a clean record, and a world ofgood deeds for the Church of Rome in the U.S. to regain the full measure of its institutionalreputation.4The legal fallout from the scandal of the Catholic Church may even be more widespreadand enduring than the religious consequences.5  Priests have gone to prison for lengthy terms.6  
Brendan Brown Lecture at the Columbus School of Law, Catholic Univ. of America, Jan. 15,2003) (copy on file with authors).  Mr. Chopko is the General Counsel, United States Conferenceof Catholic Bishops. 
6  Details of such incarcerations are included in the website list posted by Catholics for aFree Choice, see http://www.bishopswatch.org/New/SexAbuseChart.htm.  John Geoghan, one ofthe more notorious of the abusers in the Archdiocese of Boston, was recently murdered in prison,while serving a 9-10 year sentence for sexual assaults on minors.  See Richard Nangle &Kathleen A. Shaw, Geoghan is Killed in Prison, Shirley (Ma) Telegram & Gazette, Aug. 24,2003, archived at http://poynter.org/column.asp?id=46&aid=45500.  Catholic bishops have thusfar escaped indictment in the scandal.  See Alan Cooperman, Bishops Have Eluded Sex AbuseIndictments, Washington Post, June 4, 2003, p. A2.
7 See discussion and cases cited in Part III.A. and III.B, infra. 
8 See discussion and cases cited in Part III.A. and III.B., infra. 
9 The Archdiocese of Boston has recently settled a group of such lawsuits for a total of$85 million, and is financing the settlement in part with proceeds from selling the estate that haslong housed the Archbishop of Boston.   See, e.g., Michael Paulson & Steve Bailey, BC eyesarchdiocese land; loans for church seen, Boston Globe, Dec. 5, 2003 (archived athttp://poynter.org/column.asp?id=46&aid=56645); see also Nancy Meersman, Diocese agrees topay 6.5 million to settle sex-abuse cases, The Union Leader Sunday News, May 23, 2003(reporting on settlement in Manchester, NH); add older news stories on Dallas settlement – seeChopko paper at 9; Add other jurisdictions.
10 See, e.g., Suffolk County Supreme Court Special Grand Jury, May 6, 2002, Grand Juryreport CPL sec. 190.85(1)(c)), transcript released Jan. 17, 2003.  3
Many courts have upheld tort claims against dioceses and their officers.7  In the process, manyFirst Amendment defenses once thought likely to insulate defendants against such claims havebeen aggressively advanced and explicitly rejected.8  Many millions of dollars in legalsettlements have been paid, and substantial church properties have been sold in order to pay thecosts of such settlements.9   In several jurisdictions, prosecutors have empaneled grand juries toinvestigate the possibility of criminal wrongdoing by church leaders.10  Though no indictmentsfor criminally neglectful or otherwise culpable supervision have yet appeared, prosecutors have
11 In addition to the Massachusetts AG Report, see Peter W. Heed, N. William Delker, &James D. Rosenberg, Report on the Investigation of the Diocese of Manchester (NH), March 3,2003 (Office of the New Hampshire Attorney General) (hereafter “New Hampshire AG Report”).
12 Such agreements have been reached in Phoenix, AZ and Manchester, NH.  We discussthe First Amendment questions raised by such agreements in Part III.C., infra.
13 Although the problems of the Catholic Church have dominated the news, the generalphenomenon of sexual abuse by clergy is by no means limited to that faith community.  See, e.g.,Michael Paulson, All faiths question handling of abuse, Boston Globe, March 3/13/02, availableon-line in the Boston Globe archives (referring to sexual abuse by clergy in many faiths,including Hare Krishna, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Roman Catholics, United Church of Christ,Episcopal Diocese of Massachusetts, Unitarian Universalist Association, American BaptistsChurches of Massachusetts, Greek Orthodox Diocese of Massachusetts, and Orthodox Judaism). See also Julie Weiner, Sexual Abuse Case Broke Down Barriers, Canadian Jewish News, Aug.23, 2001 (reporting on pattern of molestation of teenage girls by Orthodox Jewish rabbi);Stephanie Saul, Rabbis and Sex Abuse Accusations: Jewish Leaders Begin Struggle to CombatProblem, Newsday, May 26, 2003; Elizabeth Neff, Mom: Bishop Knew of Pedophile, The SaltLake City tribune, September 6, 2001 (reporting $3 million dollar settlement of suit againstChurch of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints), archived athttp://www.stopmormonsexualabuse.com; Marion Smith, Blame the Victim: Hushing MormonSexual Abuse, April 10, 1996, http://www.affirmation.org/artcle05.htm (describing series ofabuse cases and failure of LDS church authorities to take proper action against perpetrators).  4
filed public reports that suggest criminal behavior of this sort has occurred,11 and settlementswith prosecutors have included terms that deeply involve the state in the process of clergysupervision.12 This problem, however, is not limited to the Roman Catholic Church,13 nor does itinvolve sexual misbehavior only toward minors.  Other stories, made more complicated by theadult status and capacities of those who assert they have been wronged, nevertheless remain asignificant part of the unfolding cultural and legal saga of sexual misconduct by clergy, as well as failures and wrongs by those who supervise these clergy.   A large number of claims of legallyactionable sexual exploitation and abuse, involving a wide variety of religious denominations,have arisen out of relationships between clergy-counselors and adult parishioners seeking
14 See discussion and cases cited in Part III.__, infra.  In one additional (and less well-publicized) context, sexual misbehavior by members of the clergy has resulted in the erosion ofan important and well-recognized legal immunity of religious institutions.  For many years, thecourts have recognized a “ministerial exception” to the law of employment discrimination andother features of the law governing the employment relation. See, e.g., McClure v. SalvationArmy, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972).   As we discuss in Part II, infra, such claims have beenbarred whenever adjudication of them would involve courts in superintending the evaluation ofclergy performance by a faith community.  Recently, however, several courts have recognizedsexual harassment as an exception to this immunity.  Bollard v. California Province of the5
counsel.  Plaintiffs in these cases have asserted a range of theories of tort liability, includingprofessional malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty on the part of the clergy-counselor.  Thesame claims have been pressed up the chain of supervisory responsibility within religiousdenominations, and plaintiffs have asserted that supervisors in these circumstances havecommitted tortious acts of negligent training, supervision, retention, and assignment of clergy, aswell as breaches of fiduciary duty owed by supervisors to members of the religious community.The cases in which an adult is the victim have gotten less public attention than thoseinvolving children, and they typically do not raise the specter of criminal law violations.  Thesecases do raise problems of the collision between tort law and the First Amendment immunities ofclergy, denominational supervisors, and religious entities themselves.  Indeed, the noncriminalquality of the wrongs in the cases involving adult victims may render the constitutional questionsabout immunities even more difficult.  As the public and collective interest in clergy behaviorbecomes weaker, state intervention in the affairs of religious organization may become harder tojustify.  Here, too, however, the past several decades have witnessed a quite remarkable trendaway from recognition of First Amendment defenses, and a judicial willingness to imposeliability upon clergy – and their supervisors – at least as broad as the liability imposed uponanalogous secular enterprises.14
Society of Jesus,196 F.3d 940 (9th Cir. 1999), rehearing denied, 211 F.3d 1331 (2000); McKelveyv. Pierce, 173 N.J. 26, 800 A.2d 840 (2002); Black v. Snyder, 471 N.W. 2d 715 (Minn. Ct. App.1991). Sexual harassment claims, like tort claims against church leaders for misbehavior ofclergy, may represent one more example of the erosion of ecclesiastical immunities under thepressure to make institutions account for sex-related wrongdoing by their agents. 
15 For a broader conception of this immunity, see Douglas Laycock, Toward A GeneralTheory of the Establishment Clause: The Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right toChurch Autonomy, 81 Colum. L. Rev. 1373 (1981), Carl H. Esbeck, Establishment ClauseLimits on Governmental Interference with Religious Organizations, 41 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 347(1984), Kathleen A. Brady, Religious Organizations and Free Exercise: The Surprising Lessonsof Smith, 2004 BYU L. Rev. ____. 6
This paper will critically analyze the possibility and structure of First Amendmentdefenses to actions, both private and public, arising out of sexual misconduct by members of theclergy.   Part I will trace the expansion of relevant theories of tort and criminal liability, and thewaning of immunities, constitutional and statutory, that once applied to such actions.  The legaldevelopments associated with this trend include the general expansion of tort liability beyondprimary wrongdoers to secondary actors and the enterprises for which they act; the erosion ofcharitable immunity once made broadly available by state law; and the changes in law triggeredby heightened social awareness of the vulnerability of children, and of adults in counselingrelationships, to sexual exploitation.  The legal and cultural phenomena that animate these trendsoccur against the backdrop, which Part I also explores, of a comparable decline in theconstitutional distinctiveness of religious institutions.  This legally recognized loss ofdistinctiveness has facilitated the exposure of religious institutions to trends which otherwisemight have bypassed such entities. Part II of the paper suggests a normative theory of the constitutional distinctiveness ofreligion, and ties that theory to a particular conception of ecclesiastical immunity.15  Most
7conceptions of such immunity represent assertions of the liberty of religious organizations, andare grounded in the Constitution’s Free Exercise Clause.  Our approach, however, is grounded inthe Establishment Clause, and proceeds from a vision of jurisdictional limits on civilgovernment.  As we articulate in Part II, and elaborate in Part III, civil government possesses ajurisdiction that is limited to temporal matters; it is constitutionally disabled from addressing orasserting control over ultimate questions.  From this vision we tease out implications for theimmunity of religious institutions in resolving internal disputes and in selecting and training theirleaders and spokespersons.Part III of the paper then brings the lessons of Part II to bear on the particular problems ofsexual abuse by clergy, and the criminal and civil liability of secondary actors and enterprises forsuch misconduct.  Here, we analyze the particulars of tort claims frequently advanced byplaintiffs, and we offer guidelines to courts and criminal prosecutors, faced with such claims,about ways to reconcile the appropriate First Amendment norms with the details of clergymisconduct and theories of liability.  Woven into the fabric of Part III are three major themes.  First, those who perpetratesexual harms against children, or others who lack capacity to consent, have no claim ofecclesiastical immunity.  Second, the religious status of persons, and the religious character ofinstitutions should not give rise to fiduciary duties as a matter of law.  In the application of thelaw of fiduciary duty, courts should take great care to avoid the imposition, by juries and others,of special, religion-distinctive liabilities upon clergy and religious institutions.  The creation ofsuch liabilities violates the constitutional prohibition on discrimination against religion ascompared with its secular counterparts.  Third, adjudication of wrongful acts in the hiring and
16 Scott C. Idleman, Tort Liability, Religious Entities, and the Decline of ConstitutionalProtection, 75 Ind. L.J. 219, 240-242 (2000).  Professor Idleman’s article is the germinal work onthe late 20th century trend to expand the tort liability of religious entities. 8
supervision of clergy must be conducted with sensitivity to constitutional concerns of bothsubstance and process.  The Establishment Clause forbids the state to use adjudication of tortclaims as an instrument to effectively determine the structure of religious organizations. Borrowing from the law concerning First Amendment limitations on the tort liability of the press,we argue that liability of supervising institutions should be limited to cases involving an“intentional failure to supervise,” and that judicial processes should be tailored to maintaincompliance with that standard.
I. The Decline of Ecclesiastical ImmunityAt the beginning of the twentieth century, a person sexually molested by someone actingon behalf of a religious organization would not have contemplated legal action against thereligious organization, and would not have been successful in such an action had she tried.  Bythe beginning of the twenty-first century, however, a person who had suffered such an injurymight well be a successful plaintiff in a suit against the wrongdoer, ecclesiastical officials, andthe religious entity in which the individual defendants served.How can we account for this dramatic change?  As Professor Idleman has discussed, partof the answer rests in changing cultural norms.16  Members of religious communities havebecome increasingly willing to pursue legal claims against their religious community and itsagents.  Moreover, religious institutions, like many institutions, have seen their reputationsdecline, at least partly because of widely publicized scandals, both sexual and financial.
17 Tort Immunity of Nongovernmental Charities--Modern Status, 25 A.L.R.4th 517, 522-23 (1983). The doctrine of charitable immunity in American law originated out of court decisionsapplying two English cases, both of which had been overruled by the time of their adoption intoAmerican law.  McDonald v. Massachusetts General Hosp., 120 Mass. 432 (1876); Perry v.House of Refuge, 63 Md. 20, 26-28 (1884).  The doctrine was eventually adopted by nearly allAmerican jurisdictions, either by judicial decision or statute.  Charitable immunity rested on anumber of policy grounds, including a notion of implied trust limiting the uses of theorganization’s funds to its charitable purposes, and a theory that beneficiaries of such servicesimplicitly waived their right to sue in tort over injuries suffered as a result of receiving theservices.  Bassett, Religious Organizations and the Law, §§ 7.2 - 7.6.
18 Most state courts dealt with these claims by creating an exception to charitableimmunity for injured beneficiaries who paid a fee for the charity’s services. Morton v. SavannahHosp., 148 Ga. 438, 440, 96 S.E. 887, 888 (1918) (holding that the only funds subject to tortjudgments are those received from paying patients); Bougon v. Volunteers of Am., 151 So. 797(La. Ct. App. 1934); Robertson v. Executive Comm. of the Baptist Convention, 55 Ga. App. 469,190 S.E. 432 (1937); Lincoln Memorial Univ. v. Sutton, 163 Tenn. 298, 302, 43 S.W.2d 195,196 (1931).
19 By the beginning of 1986, thirty-three jurisdictions had abrogated the doctrine for somekinds of charities, and sixteen of the thirty-three had abandoned it altogether. See 25 ALR 4th at525-27, 547. 9
These cultural shifts have paralleled, and perhaps even fostered, legal changes that havedramatically increased the exposure of religious organizations to liability.  First, a general declinein the doctrine of charitable immunity has made possible a wide array of tort claims againstreligious organizations.  Under this doctrine, which held sway in American courts from the late19th through the mid-20th centuries, nonprofit organizations were not answerable for torts thatthey or their agents committed against beneficiaries of their services.17  By the early 1960s,charitable immunity was quickly eroding, especially with respect to medical malpractice claimsagainst non-profit hospitals.18  In most states, the erosion had largely eliminated this immunity bythe mid-1980s.19  Policy reasons for the shift are not hard to fathom: the culture had come toexpect a legal remedy for nearly any injury, and institutions seemed better able than the injured
20 Note, The Quality of Mercy: “Charitable Torts” and Their Continuing Immunity, 100Harv. L. Rev. 1382, 1399 n.8 (1987).  President of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d810, 815 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (“The doctrine of immunity of charitable corporations found its wayinto the law . . . through misconception . . . of previously established principles.”)  Though thedoctrine of charitable immunity has certainly waned, special protections for charitableinstitutions remain in many jurisdictions.  Very few states retain blanket immunity for charities,but many place monetary limits on charities’ exposure to tort liability, and even more extendimmunity to individual volunteers of charities, for torts arising out of their work on behalf of thecharity. See, e.g., Connors v. Northeast Hospital Corp., 439 Mass. 469; 789 N.E.2d 129 (Mass.2003) (applying Massachusetts law that imposes a $20,000 cap on charities’ liability for tortdamages, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231, § 85K (2002)). Other states restrict charities’ exposure to thelimits of their liability insurance policy.  See, e.g., [Maryland statute & case law on limitedimmunity] (New Jersey is notable for its maintenance of a strong doctrine of charitableimmunity.  The immunity of charitable institutions in New Jersey, however, does not extend toindividuals who serve such entities.  See, e.g., F.G. MacDonell, 696 A.2d 697 (N.J. 1997)(permitting lawsuit against priests for alleged breach of fiduciary duties owed to parishioner)). For our purposes, however, the rise or fall of charitable immunity is less important than itscharacter as a religion-neutral doctrine.  Where such protections remain, they are enjoyed byreligious and non-religious charities alike; where abrogated, the same burden is borne by bothreligious and non-religious organizations. 
21 W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts 501-02 (5th ed. 1984).
22 See, e.g., Rhett B. Franklin, Comment: Pouring New Wine into an Old Bottle: aRecommendation for Determining Liability of an Employer under Respondeat Superior39 S.D.L. REV. 570, 573-77 (1994) (discussing history of doctrine of respondeat superior).10
parties to absorb – or to purchase insurance to cover – the costs of such injuries.20Second, the past century also witnessed a significant expansion in theories of tort liability,especially in the law’s willingness to hold supervisors and institutions liable for injuries inflictedby their agents.21  The earliest of these developments was the concept of vicarious liability,commonly referred to as respondeat superior, under which the employer is imputed liability forthe tortious acts of its agent, when such acts fall within the scope of employment.22  Laterdevelopments in tort theory have expanded the employer’s non-vicarious liability for injuriescaused by its agent, to include negligence in hiring, training, supervising, or retaining such agents
23 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 317 (Master’s liability for certain acts of servant eventhough acts fall outside the scope of servant’s agency).  For discussion of liability for suchnegligent acts by supervisors employed by religious entities, see Part III B, infra.
24 See generally R. Emerson Dobash & Russell P. Dobash, Women, Violence, and SocialChange at 99-173 (1992) (on increased activism directed toward state responses to domesticsexual violence and abuse).
25 See generally Susan Estrich, Real Rape 80-91 (1987) (discussing the reform of rapelaws under which the scope of the crime is expanded).
26 Fed. R. Evid. 412. 
27 Currently the following states have mandatory reporting statutes. (This list does notinclude those states that only require reporting post mortem.) Alabama, Ala. Code 26-14-3(1975); California, Cal. Pen. Code 11166 (2000); Florida, Fla. Stat. ch. 39.201 (2003); Georgia,Ga. Code Ann. 19-7-5 (2003); Illinois, 325 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/7.19 (2003); Iowa, Iowa Code232.69 (2003); Kansas, Kan. Stat. Ann. 38-1522 (2001); Louisiana, La. Children's Code Ann.609 (1995); Minnesota, Minn. Stat. 626.556 (2002); Montana, Mont. Code Ann., 41-3-101(2000); Nebraska, Neb. Rev. Stat. 28-711 (1995); New Hampshire, 12 RSA 169-C:2 (2002);New York, N.Y. Pub. Health Law 2805-n (1999); North Carolina, N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-301(2001); Oregon, Or. Rev. Stat. 419B.010 (1993); South Carolina, S.C. Code Ann. 20-7-510(1995); Utah, Utah Code Ann. 53A-6-502 (2000); Washington, Wash. Rev. Code 26.44.030(2000).
28 Sec. 703 of Title VII 29 C.F.R. 1604.11 (2000) (sexual harassment in the workplace);Title IX  of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (sexual harassment inschools). See Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, 526 U.S. 629 (1999) (holding that aschool district may be held liable for failure to respond adequately to peer sexual harassment11
– even when the alleged wrong, such as sexual abuse, occurs outside the scope of the agent’semployment but nevertheless is facilitated by the employment relationship.23Third, particularly in the last quarter-century, the law has become especially responsive tosexual violence, abuse, and exploitation24.  Such developments include prosecution of maritalrape and date rape;25 shield laws to protect rape victims in the legal process;26 laws requiring thereporting of abuse of children, including sexual molestation;27 prohibitions against sexualharassment in schools and workplaces;28 and the imposition of tort liability and professional
under Title IX).
29 See, e.g., Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.8(j) (2003) (“A lawyer shall nothave sexual relations with a client unless a consensual sexual relationship existed between themwhen the client-lawyer relationship commenced”); 740 ILCS 140/1 et. seq. (2004) (IllinoisSexual Exploitation in Psychotherapy, Professional Health Services, and Professional MentalHealth Services Act, which imposes criminal liability on mental health professionals for sexualcontact with patients).  See also Scott M. Puglise, Note, “Calling Dr. Love”: The Physician-Patient Sexual Relationship as Grounds for Medical Malpractice - Society Pays While the Doctorand Patient Play,14 J.L. & Health 321 (1999/2000) (discussing malpractice liability of physicianswho engage in sexual relationships with patients).12
discipline on lawyers, physicians, and therapists who sexually exploit their clients or patients.29 Notwithstanding these general developments in the law of tort or crime, one might expectthat the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment would provide constitutional immunities forecclesiastical authorities implicated in the wrongdoing of their agents.  Indeed, if existingdoctrines of church-state separation were generally robust, one would be surprised to see a rapidwaning of such immunities.  These lawsuits, after all, effectively empower judges and juries toevaluate the processes of assignment and supervision of clergy, and may coercively extractsignificant wealth from religious communities if state-empowered decision makers determinethat the leaders of such communities have violated legal duties of care or loyalty.The overarching constitutional regime of Separationism that once grounded FirstAmendment-based immunities for religious entities, however, has been shrinking.   ASeparationist regime depends entirely on a conception of the constitutional distinctiveness ofreligion and religious institutions.  Thirty years ago, in Separationism’s heyday, the SupremeCourt stood firmly behind just such a conception.  The Court’s Separationism was rooted in bothReligion Clauses of the First Amendment.  With respect to the Establishment Clause, norms of
30 Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schemmp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (officially sponsored Biblereading at start of public school day violates Establishment Clause);  Engel v Vitale, 370 U.S.421 (1962) (practice of starting each public school day with Regent’s Prayer violatesEstablishment Clause).
31 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).  The line of decision in which Lemon isprominent begins with Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
32 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (free exercise clause supports exemptionfrom affirmative duty of parents to send children to accredited school until the children reach theage of 16).
33 See, e.g., Watson v Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871); Gonzalez v. Roman CatholicArchbishop, 280 U.S. 1 (1929); Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull MemorialPresbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969); Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426U.S. 696 (1976).  This line of decisions, upon which we build in Part II.A., infra, stretches backin its origins to English common law.  See generally  Kent Greenawalt, Hands Off! Civil CourtInvolvement in Conflicts Over Religious Property, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 1843  (1998).13
Separation included the prohibition on officially sponsored religious speech in public schools,30and a firm bar on direct financial assistance to “pervasively sectarian” institutions,31 includinghouses of worship and religious elementary and secondary schools.  With respect to the FreeExercise Clause, the Court’s decisions suggested that state-imposed burdens on religiousfreedom are subject to strict and searching judicial examination, even if the burdens arise fromlaws of general applicability.32  And a line of decisions precluded the civil courts fromadjudicating disputes concerning both property and personnel, arising from within a particularfaith community.33By the turn of the millennium, several – though by no means all - of the building blocksin the edifice of Separationism had crumbled, and a competing paradigm of Neutrality orevenhandedness between religion and secularity, had taken center stage.  These developmentsbecame manifest in a number of discrete moves in the Supreme Court.  First, and foremost for
34443 U.S. 595 (1979). 
35 Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches UnionFree School Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. ofVirginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 533 U.S. 98 (2001).
36 494 U.S. 872 (1990).  The Supreme Court soon thereafter reaffirmed Smith’scontroversial principle in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520(1993).  Congress attempted to legislatively “overrule” Smith in the Religious FreedomRestoration Act of 1993, but the Supreme Court held the Act unconstitutional as applied to thestates in City of Boerne v. Archbishop Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).  The legislative responses toSmith nevertheless continue.  Congress, for example, has enacted the Religious Land Use andInstitutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000cc (2000), which specially protects thereligious liberty of inmates in state institutions and the uses of land by religious entities. Constitutional challenges to RLUIPA have been working their way through the federal courts. See, e.g., Madison v. Riter, U.S. Court of Appeals, 4th Cir., No. 03-6363, 12/8/03 (upholdingRLUIPA against Establishment Clause attack) contra, Cutter v. Wilkinson, No. 02-3270, 2003WL 22513973 (6th Cir. , 11/7/03).  See also Marci A. Hamilton, Federalism and the Public Good:The True Story Behind the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 78 Ind. L. J.311 (2003). 14
our purposes, the Court’s opinion in Jones v. Wolf34 upheld the authority of lower courts toadjudicate internal church disputes in those situations in which religion-neutral legal principlespermit judicial resolution without involvement in matters of theological principle orecclesiastical structure.  Second, in what has become a lengthy series of decisions, the Court hasrecognized the right of speakers with a religious perspective to have equal access to public forafor speech;35 in these cases, time and again, the Court has rejected defenses based on aSeparationist theory of the Establishment Clause.  Third, in a development that shocked theworld of lawyers and scholars, the decision in Employment Division v. Smith36 narrowed oreliminated the Free Exercise doctrine calling for strict judicial evaluation of burdens imposed onreligious freedom by religion-neutral, generally applicable legal norms.  Fourth, Establishment
37 The ban on direct state funding of services at pervasively sectarian entities has beenreplaced by a considerably narrower (and hotly disputed) prohibition on state support forspecifically religious activities.  See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988); Agostini v.Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000).  For elaboration of thistrend, see Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Government Partnerships with Faith-Based ServiceProviders: The State of the Law 2002 (Roundtable on Religion and Social Welfare Policy,Rockefeller Institute of Government).  The lower courts have begun to notice this change.  SeeFreedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. v. McCallum, 179 F. Supp. 2d 950 (WD Wisc. 2002)(invalidating contract between state and faith-based service provider because the contractfinanced faith-intensive treatment for substance abuse).  And the Cleveland voucher decision hasresolved the permissibility of indirect state financing, through mechanisms of beneficiary choice,of the provision of education by religious institutions, even if religious instruction and worshipactivities are included in such educational programs.  Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639(2002). For earlier incarnations of the beneficiary choice principle, see Zobrest v. CatalinaFoothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993); Witters v. Wash. Dept. of Services for the Blind, 474U.S. 481 (1986).  The lower courts have noticed this too.  In Freedom from Religion Foundation,Inc. v. McCallum, 324 F.3d 880 (7th Cir. 2003), the Seventh Circuit upheld the participation in abeneficiary choice program of the same faith-based service provider that the U.S District Courtbarred from participation in a direct financing scheme.  (The state did not appeal the exclusion ofthe provider from the direct financing scheme).  We analyze the significance of indirect financingin Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Zelman’s Future: Vouchers, Sectarian Providers, and theNext Round of Constitutional Battles, 78 Notre Dame L. Rev. 917 (2003), and Ira C. Lupu &Robert W. Tuttle, Sites of Redemption: A Wide-Angle Look at Government Vouchers andSectarian Service Providers, 18 J. L. & Politics 537 ( 2002).
38  Allegheny County v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989). 
39 The School Prayer cases of the early 1960's, which involved government-sponsoredreligious speech at the start of the school day, have been extended into moments of silence,Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985);  commencement prayer at public schools, Lee v.Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992); and school-sponsored student prayer at public high schoolathletic contests, Santa Fe Ind. Sch. Dist v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000).15
Clause constraints on the direct funding of activities by religious entities have withered.37This movement to Neutrality, though sweeping, has remained incomplete.  First, thenorms of Separationism have strengthened with respect to the government’s own sponsorship ofreligious speech,38 especially in the venue of the public schools.39  Second, even with respect todirect financial aid to religious institutions, a robust prohibition remains on activity that would
40 Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997).  We explore this proposition in more detail inIra C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Sites of Redemption: A Wide-Angle Look at GovernmentVouchers and Sectarian Service Providers, 18 J. L. & Politics 537 ( 2002), and Ira C. Lupu &Robert W. Tuttle, Government Partnerships with Faith-Based Service Providers: The State of theLaw 2002 (Roundtable on Religion and Social Welfare Policy, Rockefeller Institute ofGovernment).
41 Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 2xx (1997).
42 The Supreme Court’s opinion in Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) expresslypreserved this line of authority, even as it was rejecting religion-specific exemptions in othercontexts.  Id. at 877.  Kathleen Brady builds her contribution to this symposium on this dictum.
43 See discussion at infra notes **-** and accompanying text.16
render the government responsible for religious indoctrination by private parties.40Two additional doctrines,  both highly significant for the set of problems to which thispaper is addressed, also persist.  The Court’s doctrines about church-state entanglement, whichhave appeared in both Establishment Clause and Free Exercise settings, have been expresslyreaffirmed,41 though they have not been applied in the Supreme Court with much rigor over thepast fifteen years.  Finally, constitutional limitations persist with respect to adjudication ofmatters internal to the structure and belief of religious institutions.42  Courts, as noted above, mayapply religion-neutral principles to similarly neutral aspects of a religious entity’s activities, butcourts remain forbidden to resolve questions of religious structure or theological principle. Prominent in the context of internal disputes is the “ministerial exception” to employment law,which bars adjudication of most claims against religious entities with respect to decisionsinvolving who shall be a spokesperson for the faith.43  In all of these contexts – governmentspeech, direct financial assistance to religious entities, areas of potential entanglement, andresolution of internal church disputes – courts continue to apply norms that are the product of a
17
view that religion and religious entities are constitutionally distinctive for some purposes.What is the relevance of this distinct but incomplete movement from Separationism toNeutrality for questions of ecclesiastical immunity from tort liability?   If that movement isineluctably on its way to completion, and Separationism is a lingering but terminal patient, theanswer has the character of prediction – religion-distinctive tort immunities have beendisappearing, and they will continue to vanish to the point of zero.  At the bottom of the slide,religious entities and their officers will have neither fewer nor greater defenses than thoseavailable to comparable secular organizations and their agents. If, however, the trend away from a constitutional conception of religious distinctivenesshas a normative stopping place,  the answer to the question we pose about the future ofecclesiastical immunities may be very different.  In a world in which, for a variety of legal andcultural reasons, the constitutional distinctiveness of religion has eroded, the blanket immunitiesonce available to religious entities are gone for good.  It remains to be asked, however, whether anormative defense might yet be mounted for a narrower, still vibrant version of Separationism,and whether such a defense would lead in turn to a more focused account of immunity forreligious institutions and personnel with respect to certain categories of legal action.  It is to sucha normative theory, and its implications for issues of legal responsibility for clergy misbehavior,that we now turn.
II.  The Remnants of Ecclesiastical ImmunityAs we asserted in Part I, Separationism is built on a concept of the constitutionaldistinctiveness of religion and religious institutions.   The constitutional doctrines supporting
44 We analyze the underpinnings of Separationism as a philosophy of the ReligionClauses in Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The Distinctive Place of Religious Institutions in OurConstitutional Order, 47 Vill. L. Rev. 37, 51-65 (2001) (hereafter, “Distinctive Place”).
45 See, e.g., Frederick Mark  Gedicks, An Unfirm Foundation: The RegrettableIndefensibility of Religious Exemptions, 20 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 555 (1998);  Frederick Mark Gedicks, Towards a Defensible Free Exercise Doctrine, 68 George Washington L. Rev. 925(2000); Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience: TheConstitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1245 (1994).
46 Lupu & Tuttle, Distinctive Place, note xx supra, at 78-79. 
47 Lupu &  Tuttle, Distinctive Place, note xx supra, at 83-84. 18
Separationism, as a matter of  Free Exercise, non-Establishment, or both, receded from the highwater marks reached in the 1970's, because the characterization of religious beliefs, practices, ororganizations as categorically distinctive from their secular counterparts became increasinglyunpersuasive.44  As Fred Gedicks, Larry Sager, Chris Eisgruber and others have argued,contemporary Western culture and values make a claim of overarching distinctiveness, and thecorresponding demands for specialized legal treatment, impossible to sustain.45We have suggested elsewhere, however, that distinctiveness does not have to be an all ornothing proposition.  Religion may indeed be distinctive for some constitutional or legalpurposes, and not others, though we believe that the burden of persuasion should always beplaced on the proponent of distinctive treatment.46More fundamentally, the relevant constitutional vision to be applied to these questionsshould not begin with an examination of  religious belief, practice, or structure.  Instead, properconstitutional understanding commences with an examination of the political and constitutionaltheory of the state.  Here is our analysis of the question several years ago, offered in theGiannella Lecture at Villanova:47
48 For further discussion, see Forrest McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum: The IntellectualOrigins of the Constitution (1985).
49  For comparable assessment, see Jed Rubenfeld, The Right to Privacy, 102 HARV. L.REV. 737 (1989) (asserting anti-totalitarian theory of privacy).
50 Lupu &  Tuttle, Distinctive Place, note xx supra, at 92.19
Quite paradoxically, a constitutionally sufficient answer to the question ofreligious distinctiveness cannot begin with theology or the sociology of religion. It must begin, instead, with a political concept of religion—one implicit in thefounders’ “novus ordo seclorum.”48  Hopes for this new order rested, in importantpart, on its limited horizon.  The order would belong to "the ages," and its powerswould be restricted to the temporal welfare of its citizens.  Though each of themmight (indeed likely would) have religious commitments, the state itself wouldhave no religious confession to make.  By thus circumscribing the government'sjurisdiction, this new world order would avoid both conflict among religiousfactions for political authority and the inevitable despotism of the religious factionthat won out.  Seen in political terms, "religion" represents that which the neworder disclaims: jurisdiction over ultimate truths, a comprehensive claim toundivided loyalty, and a command to worship.  Separationism, then, depends onarticulation of this political concept of sacredness  and on some attempt to identifywhat particular aspects of the behavior of religious institutions are bound up withthe sacred.Understood this way, Separationism—a sense of boundary between stateand some aspects of institutional behavior—functions much like the constitutionalright of privacy, . . [that is,] as a check on totalitarianism.49  Totalitarian regimestypically try to control intimate aspects of their subjects' lives.  Control of theintellectual, political, sexual, and economic details of the lives of political subjectscreates enormous leverage for the state in the struggle for control of theirspirits—their souls, if you will.  If the right of privacy, at least in part, insulatesthe realm of the spirit from state control, the constitutional distinctiveness ofreligious institutions—those that nurture the spirit directly—rests on comparablefoundations.We concluded that Lecture with the following conceptualization of the state’s role:50The role of the contemporary state is broad indeed, but it remainscircumscribed by its penultimacy.  Life's ultimate questions are to be left inprivate hands, and when those hands are institutional, the state must respect theinternal life and self-governance of such institutions.  Most importantly, ourapproach is consistent with the duality of roles of religious institutions in
51 See, e.g., Article II of the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, reprinted in Michael S.Ariens & Robert A. Destro, Religious Liberty in a Pluralistic Society 49 (Carolina AcademicPress).  As Ariens and Destro recount, such a guarantee appeared in a variety of forms in almostevery early American constitution, id. at 45-63.  See also Thomas J. Curry, The First Freedoms:Church & State in America to the Passage of the First Amendment (1986). 
52  Judicial decisions at times locate these doctrines of church autonomy in both ReligionClauses, see, e.g., EEOC v. Catholic Univ. Of America, 83 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996), as do the20
contemporary America.  When those institutions perform functionsindistinguishable from other segments of the nonprofit world, the law should treatthem as their secular counterparts are treated.  When, however, religiousinstitutions act in uniquely religious ways, making connections with the worldbeyond the temporal and material concerns that are the proper jurisdiction of thestate, the legally distinctive qualities of such institutions begin to emerge.  It isonly by exploring the intrinsic limit on state power to affect these ultimateconcerns, rather than by mining the desires, activities or teachings of religiousorganizations, that the distinctive place of religious entities in our constitutionalorder can be located.Even if we are entirely correct that this vision of the state as a temporal entity accountsfor constitutional norms of religious distinctiveness, we still need to articulate the details thatfollow from this insight.  Issues of organizational commitment and leadership are obvious placesto begin.  If the state may mandate to a religious organization what its substantive commitmentsmay include – for example, by dictating or limiting the contents of liturgical material –  the statewill have seized control of the organization’s vision of the ultimate.  It is no surprise that theearliest American constitutions protected each citizen’s right to “worship God according to thedictates of his own conscience,”51 and such a guarantee remains at the core of any and everytheory of the Religion Clauses. The substantive freedom of religious communities to chart their own vision of divineorder has supported a pair of corollary freedoms that continue to find religion-distinctiveprotection in decisions linked to both the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause.52  
organizers of this Symposium.  For a variety of reasons explained below, it may matter greatly onwhich clause such doctrines rest.  Because the Establishment Clause is a structural limitation onthe role and power of the state, its prohibitions (unlike the rights protected by the Free ExerciseClause) may not be balanced against state interests and may not be “waived.”  Officiallysponsored prayer in public school, for example, is unconstitutional even if every parent of everychild in the school gives explicit written permission to the state to sponsor such prayer.  TheEstablishment Clause exists to keep the state out of the realm of ultimate concern, and privateparties do not have authority to vest any such power in state institutions.  For further explorationof the structural quality of the Establishment Clause, see Carl Esbeck, The Establishment Clauseas a Structural Restraint: Validations and Ramifications, 18 J. L. & Pol. 445 (2002). 
53 Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
54 See, e.g., Kedroff  v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church in NorthAmerica, 344 U.S. 94 (1952).
55 In hierarchical churches, judicial deference is to the hierarchical authority; incongregational churches, deference is to the congregational polity.  Cases in which religiousdenominations are organized in a mix of hierarchical and congregational forms, as is typical ofthe Presbyterian Church, present the greatest difficulty for courts.  See, e.g., Presbyterian Churchv. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969).  Fordiscussion of these polity forms and their significance, see Kent Greenawalt, Hands Off! CivilCourt Involvement in Conflicts Over Religious Property, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 1843  (1998). 21
The first is the right to settle, free from state interference, internal disputes whose resolutiondepends upon  judgments about theological principles or issues of religious polity.  If ownershipand possession of church property, for example, turns on fidelity to religious texts or principles,and competing factions within the church each assert that it is the only one faithful to churchteachings, courts cannot possibly adjudicate between the parties without judicial resolution of thetrue meaning of the faith.  It is this dilemma that has led American courts, first as a matter ofcommon law53 and now as a firm principle of constitutional law,54 to defer to the resolutionreached by the religious polity as organized by the faith community.55  No comparable doctrine of absolute deference exists with respect to disputes withinbusiness organizations or secular, nonprofit organizations, all of whom may be held by courts to
56 For a comparable assertion, see John H. Mansfield, Constitutional Limits on theLiability of Churches for Negligent Supervision and Breach of Fiduciary Duty, 44 B.C. L. Rev.1167, 1169 (2003) (hereafter cited as “Mansfield”).
57 General Partnerships - Construction of Partnership Agreements, 59A Am. Jur. 2dPartnership § 120 (2003).
58 Frankino v. Gleason, No. 17,399, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 219, at 12-14 (Del. Ch. 1999)(using contract interpretation principles to interpret a bylaw provision in a company's certificateof incorporation), McNamara v. Frankino, 744 A.2d 988 (Del. 1999); Morris v. Am. Pub. Utils.Co., 122 A. 696, 701 (Del. Ch. 1923) (noting that the terms of the contract between shareholdersare determined by “the appropriate provisions of the certificate of incorporation and the law ofthe state”).
59 See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 199(a) (1959).
60 As Professor Mansfield argues, this limitation on civil courts may deprive religiousentities of state assistance upon which others are free to call.  Mansfield, note ** supra, at 1169.22
comply with the substance of their founding legal documents.56  For example, courts may resolvedisputes among business partners according to the terms of a partnership agreement;57 settledisagreements between majority and minority shareholders of a corporation according to theterms of a corporate charter;58 and compel, in an appropriate action, a secular nonprofitorganization to conform to trust instruments under which it has been operating.59  Religiousentities thus possess a degree of autonomy over the resolution of internal disputes unlike anyother known to the law, and this autonomy may not be surrendered by contract or other act ofconsent to the exercise of state power.  Courts may not rely on theological principles to resolvedisputes, even if the parties so desire, and even if some immediate social good will be servedthereby.60 The second such corollary freedom is the right to designate leaders and spokespersons forthe faith.  Those in such positions are the authors of each faith community’s continuing vision.  
61 See Mark Chopko, Stating Claims Against Religious Institutions, 44 B.C. L. Rev. 1089,1112-1113 (2003). 
62 Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 1 (1929); Serbian E.Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976).23
They regulate its worship life, preside over changes in its liturgy and sense of values, andcommunicate its stories, beliefs, ethics, and sense of continuity from one generation to the next. State interference with the selection of leaders thus implicates the religious community’s methodof transmitting its vision, and cannot help but alter the content of the vision itself.  Here, too, the constitutional law of religious association protects the organizationalinterest in leadership selection, and does so more thoroughly and completely than it protects thecomparable interests of secular associations.  Although the matter has never come up directly, noone would doubt that the First Amendment precludes the state from instituting a system oflicensure for the clergy.  To do so would be to effectively impose a prior restraint on those whopreach the Word, and to give the state control, through criteria of education, character, orotherwise, over those who would speak in the name of a religious community.  The clergy maybe a learned profession, like medicine, law, architecture or others, but the state may not createbarriers to its entry.  If a faith community chooses to ordain an illiterate ex-felon as its pastor, thestate may not intervene or object.61Quite consistently with the norm against state licensure of clergy, the Supreme Court hason a number of occasions ruled against claims that ask the judiciary to overturn the judgment of areligious institution with respect to a selection for church office.62  These decisions require thelower courts to categorically reject claims of breach of contract, or implied contract, to place ormaintain a particular person in a religious office against the will of a religious organization.
63 McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972) (construing Title VII, 42U.S.C. sec. 2000e, of the 1964 Civil Rights Act to exclude religious bodies, hiring for positionsof religious significance, from the statutory prohibition on gender discrimination); accord, Rayburn v. Gen. Conf. of Seventh Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164 (4th Cir. 1985) (reaching sameresult as McClure on constitutional grounds.  The most prominent commentary on the ministerialexception remains Bruce Bagni, Discrimination in the name of the Lord: A Critical Evaluation ofDiscrimination by Religious Organizations, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 1514 (1979).  One of the authorsof this article has been highly critical of the ministerial exception, see Ira C. Lupu, Free ExerciseExemptions and Religious Institutions: The Case of Employment Discrimination, 67 B.U. L.Rev. 391 (1987).  See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note xx, at 90, n. 177.
64 EEOC v. Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1981),cert. denied,, 456 U.S. 905 (1982).
65  EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of America, 83 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (church-controlleduniversity constitutionally and statutorily immune from suit for sex discrimination in the refusalto tenure female professor of canon law).
66 EEOC v Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, 213 F.3d 795 (4th Cir. 2000).24
As an outgrowth of these decisions, the lower courts for many years have applied adoctrine of “ministerial exception” to a broad variety of norms that otherwise govern theemployment relation.  With respect to employees in a position of spokesperson for the faith –member of the clergy,63 professor of theology64 or canon law,65 director of religious music,66 andother positions, defined by function rather than title – religious organizations are immune fromclaims that would entail judicial evaluation of an employee’s performance or a prospectiveemployee’s qualifications.  The ministerial exemption is strikingly broad in its immunizing scope.  For example, inits application to the law prohibiting sex discrimination in employment, the exemption is notlimited to religious institutions that explicitly assert a preference for males over females forclergy positions.  The exemption extends to all claims of sex discrimination in the hiring orconditions of employment of clergy, including assertions that a religious organization that
67 Virtually every case of application of the ministerial exception takes this form.  For  arecent example, see Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, Inc., 203 F.3d 1299(11th Cir. 2000).  We analyze Gellington, and the generic problem it presents, in considerabledetail in Lupu & Tuttle, Distinctive Place, note xx supra. 
68 The Supreme Court’s decision in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000),protects the associational freedom of private, noncommercial groups to impose leadership (ormembership restrictions free from interference by the state’s laws against discrimination. Nothing in Dale, however, suggests that the Scouts (or any other comparable group) could takethe position that it treated heterosexuals and homosexuals equally, but that it should remain freefrom state inquiry into whether it behaved in fidelity to its commitment to nondiscriminatorytreatment.  There are, of course, special difficulties associated with applying civil rights norms tohigh level executive positions.  See generally Elizabeth Bartholet, Application of Title VII toJobs in High Places, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 945 (1982).   In his comment in this symposium, ProfessorSager argues that the ministerial exception  should be grounded in a right of intimate association. We doubt, however, that concerns of intimate or private association can successfully account forthe scope of the current doctrine. 25
purports to comply with norms of sex equality has covertly engaged in sex discrimination underthe pretext of some sex-neutral policy.67  To permit adjudication of such pretext claims, courtshave consistently ruled, would be to invite judicial second-guessing of institutional judgmentsabout the performance of agents in leadership roles. Here, too, as in the case of broad immunity from judicial determination of theologicalprinciple to resolve intrafaith disputes, no comparable doctrine of immunity exists with respect toleadership positions in other organizations, nonprofit or otherwise.   Perhaps, as a matter offreedom of association, the NAACP may reserve its presidency to African-Americans.  Can weimagine, however, that courts would be barred from adjudicating a claim of race discriminationagainst such an organization if it held itself out as hiring on a nondiscriminatory basis?  Nothingin American law would support such a claim.68For reasons that we develop below, the regime of legal immunity for intrafaith disputesand for personnel matters involving spokespersons for the faith has quite properly survived the
69 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
70 Id. at xxx. 
71 Id. at 877.
72 83 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 26
demise, decreed by Employment Division v. Smith,69 of a more general doctrine of religiousexemptions.  Smith held that religiously motivated claimants did not have a right under the FreeExercise Clause to remain exempt from religion-neutral, generally applicable laws.70  The laws ofproperty, contract, and economic association that permit state resolution of intra-organizationaldisputes are indeed religion-neutral and generally applicable.  The Smith opinion, however,explicitly recognizes the legal immunity of religious organizations from processes of civiladjudication that involve determinations of issues of religious principle or structure.71Nor have the courts backtracked from the ministerial exception in the wake of Smith.  InEqual Employment Opportunity Commission v. Catholic University of America,72 a  leading andwidely cited decision from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, the panelexpressly reaffirmed the ministerial exception in the face of an argument that it should notsurvive Smith.  The decision affirmed a district court ruling that constitutional immunities barredadjudication of Sister Elizabeth McDonough’s complaint that unlawful sex discrimination hadinfected the denial of her tenure application in the Department of Canon Law at CatholicUniversity. The Catholic University decision is worth noting in some detail.  It is a thorough, well-developed opinion by a prominent court on the scope of the ministerial exemption, and thecontinued vitality of the constitutionally distinctive immunity created by the exemption.  Sister
73 Id. at 459.  The Committee also stated that the candidate had made a contribution to“service and the practice of canon law,” but that this did not “counterbalance the marginalperformance in teaching and scholarly publications;” and that the divided vote in other votinggroups that had reviewed on her application did not give sufficient assurance that SisterMcDonough possessed the “optimal qualifications for the position.”  Id. 
74 EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of America, 856 F. Supp. 1, 11 (D.D.C 1994).27
McDonough’s tenure application had gone through a series of petitions and appeals to the facultyof Canon Law, the Committee on Appointments and Promotions of the University’s School ofReligious Studies, and a comparable committee of the University’s Academic Senate.  Theprocess went on for over a year, ending with the Senate Committee’s unanimous vote against atenure recommendation.  The Committee’s primary reason for its decision was that “[t]hescholarship of the candidate does not measure up to the standards expected in the field for thegranting of tenure.”73 Sister McDonough filed a complaint with the EEOC, alleging unlawful sexdiscrimination.  The Commission undertook a two-year investigation and made unsuccessfulefforts at conciliation.  The EEOC and Sister McDonough thereupon brought suit against theUniversity, and the case eventually went to trial.  The University did not raise the ministerialexception as a defense.  A week into the trial, after hearing competing expert testimony on thequality of Sister McDonough’s scholarship compared to that of men who had been granted tenurein the Canon Law Department at the University, District Judge Oberdorfer asked the parties tobrief the question of constitutional immunity. After they did so, he dismissed the case, holdingthat Sister McDonough’s role in instructing members of the Catholic clergy in Canon Law madeher functionally equivalent to a minister, and that the Free Exercise Clause therefore barredreview of the decision.74  He also ruled that the Establishment Clause barred adjudication of her
75 Id. at 12.
76 83 F.3d at 463-65.
77 Id. at 464. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 28
claim, because it  required impermissible judicial evaluation of the merits of scholarship inCanon Law, a theological subject, and because the EEOC investigation itself involvedimpermissible procedural entanglement between the government and a religious institution.75 On appeal, the D.C. Circuit Court synthesized Supreme Court decisions on intrafaithdisputes and lower court decisions applying the ministerial exemption, and focused on what itsaw as the central issue in the case – whether a Professor of Canon Law at Catholic Universitywould have “essentially religious” functions.76  Emphasizing her role as an instructor in theecclesiastical law that “governs the Church’s sacramental life, [and] defines the rights and dutiesof its faithful and the responsibilities of their pastors,”77 Judge Buckley’s opinion concluded thather primary duties would consist of teaching and spreading the faith.  The Court buttressed itsconclusion with an emphasis on the particular role played by Catholic University, whose CanonLaw Department “is the sole entity in the United States empowered by the Vatican to conferecclesiastical degrees in canon law.”78  Moreover, the great majority of graduate degrees awardedby the Department over the ten years preceding the litigation had been conferred upon priests ormembers of religious orders, a fact which led the Court to conclude that the Department played acentral role “in the graduate education of American priests.”79Having analyzed in close detail the functions of Sister McDonough’s position and the role
80 The Court also held that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act still applied to thefederal government, and that it too required dismissal of the action. Id. at 467-69.   A concurringopinion by Judge Henderson, id. at 470-76, expressed the view that the district court, by carefulmanagement, might have remained within the Constitution and still assessed whether theschool’s determination about Sister McDonough’s scholarship had been a pretext for sexdiscrimination.  Judge Henderson believed that the district court should have limited itself to theevidence of scholarly quality that had been considered by the University’s reviewingCommittees, and not taken outside, expert testimony from ecclesiastical sources on the quality ofthe work.   Judge Henderson concurred in the result, however, on the ground that the remedies  sought by Sister McDonough, including reinstatement with tenure, would interfere with the finalauthority of the Vatican to appoint tenured professors in the Canon Law Department at CatholicUniversity.  Id. at 476. 29
of Canon Law at both Catholic University and in the Church as a whole, the Court affirmed thedismissal of the case.  It concluded that the Free Exercise Clause (even after Smith) protected theUniversity against a court substituting its judgment for that of University agents on the merits ofSister McDonough’s scholarship, and that the Establishment Clause prohibited the kinds ofsubstantive and procedural entanglement that had been produced by EEOC investigation anddistrict court litigation, including discovery and trial.80   The opinion in the Catholic University case is noteworthy in several respects. First, itquite appropriately parsed the functions of the job to see if it was religiously distinctive; hadSister McDonough been a professor of mathematics, the school presumably would not have had acomparable immunity.  Second, it approvingly noted the district court’s sua sponte focus on theministerial exception and the questions of forbidden entanglement; these concerns relate to thesubject matter jurisdiction of the courts, and cannot be waived by the parties’ willingness tolitigate.  Whatever institutional reasons may have moved the University to contest SisterMcDonough’s claim of sex discrimination on its merits, this civil courts may not render
81 The least well explained element in Catholic University is the assertion of someprocedural concern about “excessive entanglement” independent of the substantive merits of theministerial exception.  Id. at 466-67.  The question of procedural entanglement is one that isomnipresent in the process of discovery and trial in tort cases involving claims of sexualmisconduct and defenses of  ecclesiastical immunity, and we shall return to it in the next part ofthis paper.
82 For elaboration of this view, see Carl Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a StructuralRestraint on Governmental Power, 84 Iowa L. Rev.1 (1998); Carl Esbeck, Myths, Miscues, andMisconceptions: No-Aid Separationism and the Establishment Clause, XIII Notre Dame J. ofLaw, Ethics, & Pub. Pol. 285 (1999). 30
judgments on theological questions.81We believe that the result reached by the D.C. Circuit in Catholic University is correct,but that the court – like virtually every other court that has confronted questions of ecclesiasticalimmunity – misanalyzed the problem in one critically important respect.  Ecclesiasticalimmunities, including the ministerial exception, are not the offspring of “rights” in theconventional sense.  They are not the legal entitlements of religious entities in the way that, forexample, authors and political advocates possess rights to communicate.  Instead, ecclesiasticalimmunities should be understood as the entailments of the jurisdictional limitations imposed bythe Establishment Clause on the state’s role.82  Because the state is forbidden from being theauthor or co-author of religious faith, it may not adjudicate or regulate the ways in whichcommunities of faith are organized.  Nor may the state select the voices by which suchcommunities are led, or its lessons communicated.  This jurisdictional limitation, which webelieve resides most comfortably in the Establishment Clause (even as it furthers Free Exercisevalues), may not be waived by religious entities – hence the district court judge’s correct decisionto stop the trial on the merits of Sister McDonough’s claim. Nor is the limitation subject to beingset aside by state assertion of countervailing state interests, compelling or otherwise.  The
83 Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley, 204 Cal. Rptr. 303 (1984).
84 Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley ("Nally III"), 763 P.2d 948 (Cal.1988).
85 See Bassett, Religious Institutions and the Law, § 8:19, n.9 (listing cases).  The oneexception seems to be Byrd v. Faber, 57 Ohio St. 3d 56, 565 N.E.2d 584 (1991), which leavesopen the possibility of a clergy malpractice claim (though the court does not allow such a claimin this case).  The quickly aborted development of the tort of clergy malpractice does not imply31
Catholic University decision remains correct, regardless of the weight to be assigned to thegovernmental interest in combating sex discrimination in employment. One additional development in American law sheds further light on ecclesiasticalimmunity, and reinforces our perception of the constitutional underpinnings of that immunity.About twenty years ago, in Nally v. Grace Community Church,83 a California court awardedjudgment against a pastor and his church to a family whose son had committed suicide afterundergoing a series of counseling sessions with the pastor.  The theory of the litigation wasclergy malpractice; i.e., that members of the clergy were legally obliged to follow objectivestandards of care in counseling parishioners, and that this pastor had failed to follow suchstandards. A California appellate court soon thereafter reversed the judgment, on the theory thatthe First Amendment precludes civil judges and juries from deciding what standards of care areasonably prudent and trained clergyman should follow.  The court reasoned that any suchinquiry would inevitably take judges and juries into the heart of theological arrangements, andwould inevitably be biased against non-mainstream faiths.84  Since Nally, almost every Americancourt that has been presented with a claim for clergy malpractice – i.e., a claim that requires civilauthorities to articulate and apply objective standards of care for the communicative content ofclergy counseling – has rejected the claim on grounds of ecclesiastical immunity.85
that clergy – and their supervisors -  are perpetually safe from liability for their performance ascounselors.  As we document and assess in Part III of this paper, a substantial number of clergy,and a smaller but significant number of their supervisors, have been held liable for sexualexploitation in counseling relationships with adult parishioners.  The courts that have affirmedimposition of such liability have based their rulings on a theory of fiduciary duty, which some –but by no means all – courts assert is an approach that avoids the constitutional pitfalls associatedwith the tort of clergy malpractice.  For now, we hold this question for the general discussion inPart III, below.
86 See, e.g., J.M. v. Minnesota Dist. Council of Assemblies of God, 658 (N.W.2d 589)(Minn. Ct. App. 2003).
87 Compare Bear Valley Church of Christ v. DeBose, 928 P.2d 1315 (Colo. 1996)(permitting negligent employment claim against church arising out of pastor’s molestation ofchild) with Bryan R. v Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y, 738 A.2d 839 (Me. 1999) (holding thatthe First Amendment bars such claims against religious institutions).  We discuss these trends,and cite cases supporting them, in Part III.__, infra.   Professor Idleman’s important work alsodocuments such trends in detail.  Scott C. Idleman, Tort Liability, Religious Entities, and theDecline of Constitutional Protection, 75 Ind. L.J. 219 (2000).32
In a number of recent lawsuits arising out of alleged sexual misconduct, the defendantreligious organizations have asserted as defenses some version of ecclesiastical immunity.86 Defendants have claimed that the disputes are ‘internal,” and therefore beyond the reach ofjudicial resolution.   Defendants have at times asserted that tort claims arising out of sexualmisconduct of clergy inevitably implicate the policies behind the “ministerial exception,”because the adjudication of such claims involve questions about the ordination, assignment,supervision, and retention of such clergy.  Some courts have been receptive to blanket claims ofimmunity, but many have not.87   And at least one academic commentator, writing from withinthe Catholic tradition, has begun to worry that broad assertions of immunity from tort claimsagainst supervisors and religious entities will not only fail, but will poison the well in ways that
88 See Angela Carmella, The Protection of Children and Young People: Catholic andConstitutional Visions of Responsible Freedom, 44 B.C. L. Rev. 1031, 1054-55 (2003).
89 We believe that we have looked at every case ever decided by an American courtinvolving sexual misconduct by a member of the clergy.  To our knowledge, all but one of theallegedly offending clergy in these cases have been men. The sole exception is found in Barquinv. Roman Catholic Diocese of Burlington, 839 F. Supp. 275 (D. Vt. 1993 (alleging sexual abuseof a child by an unnamed Sister Jane Doe). 33
render courts deeply resistant to more reasonable assertions of ecclesiastical immunity.88Cases involving sexual misconduct by clergy, especially those that include criminalsexual assaults on children, implicate the state’s legitimate and deep concerns to protect thebodily and psychic integrity of its citizens.  Additional inquiries into how such clergy came tohave repeated opportunities for such exploitation and misconduct inevitably trigger the sameconcerns.  When such inquiries, however, reach beyond the offending clergyman89 to thesubstance and process of clergy selection, assignment, and retention, they cannot help but touchthe institutional arrangements and theological understandings that inform the structure of faithcommunities and their leadership.  The tensions between protecting innocent victims of sexual misconduct and the policiesthat inform ecclesiastical immunities for distinctively religious activity are palpable.  How canthey be resolved?  The conventional but thoroughly unproductive way to approach this problemis by way of a regime of exemptions, based on the Free Exercise Clause, from generallyapplicable norms of tort and criminal law.  For a variety of reasons, this approach is a dead end. First, religious actors and institutions never claim that the sexual misconduct itself is religion-based.  As a result, courts quickly repudiate any notion that religious liberty requiresconsideration of an exemption for such behavior.  Second, the regimes of Employment Division v
34
Smith and Jones v. Wolf appear to intersect in a focus on “neutral principles,” meaning principlesthat do not single out religion for disfavored treatment.  Even though Smith appears to preserve arealm of church autonomy for resolution of internal disputes, it is all too easy to distinguish casesof property and contract, which involve voluntary private ordering, from cases of tort and crime,which involve coercive harm to third parties.  Smith repudiates any exemptions for religiousactors from general rules in this latter category.  Third, even if Smith were overruled, the state hascompelling interests in preventing predatory sexual behavior.  Moreover, the relevant law of tortand crime is sufficiently well-tailored to that end that courts are unlikely to narrow the ambit ofsuch rules in the name of free exercise.Does the failure of the model of free exercise exemptions mean the death of ecclesiasticalimmunities from law designed to control sexual misconduct?  Two important possibilities lead usto think otherwise.  First, the Free Exercise Clause protects religious actors and institutionsagainst discrimination in both the content of the law and its application.  Second, jurisdictionallimits on the state, as manifest in the ministerial exemption cases and the universal rejection ofthe tort of clergy malpractice, suggest boundaries on the application of criminal and tort law tothe structure of clergy supervision.  In Part III, below, we work out the implications of these twopossibilities.
III Sexual Misconduct and Ecclesiastical ImmunityCivil and criminal actions involving sexual abuse by religious leaders involve manydifferent kinds of claims and charges.  Some arise specifically from the sexual misconduct itself,while others arise out of the religious organization’s duties to avoid or respond to such
90 In many states, the age at which a minor may legally consent to sexual relations ishigher when the relationship is with a person in a position of trust and authority.  See, e.g.,Colorado Rev. Stats. §§ 18-3-405 & 18-3-405.3 (prohibiting sexual contact with a child underthe age of fifteen, except when person having contact is in a position of trust, in which case theage of consent is eighteen).  See also Bohrer v. DeHart, 943 P.2d 1220, 1227 (Co. App. 1996)(discussing Colorado provision on sexual assault on a child by a person in a position of trust).35
misconduct.  In this Part, we focus first on those claims and charges that relate most narrowly tothe act or acts of sexual abuse, including criminal charges of sexual assault and civil actions forbreach of fiduciary obligations.  We then turn to the broader assertions of liability made againstthe wrongdoer’s religious organization and officials, which include civil claims for breaches ofinstitutional fiduciary duty, negligent hiring or supervision, and perhaps criminal charges forfailure to protect children.A. The Wrongdoer’s Criminal and Civil Liability for Sexual MisconductEvery American jurisdiction criminalizes, and makes tortious, sexual contact withpersons below a specified age of consent.90  Ecclesiastical immunity has never barred criminalprosecution or civil actions for a religious leader’s violation of these laws.  The reasons areobvious.  Few would be willing to defend such conduct by claiming that their religiouscommitments included sexual interaction between adults and minors, or that a governmentinvestigation into such interaction would impermissibly entangle the state in religious matters. Were such defenses raised, courts would emphatically reject them on grounds that the publicinterest in protecting children vastly outweighs any claim of religious privilege, and thatinvestigation and adjudication of the sexual abuse of children can proceed without state intrusioninto questions of religious doctrine or governance.In some circumstances, sexual contact with adults presents equally simple cases.  If the
91 See, e.g., Minn. Stat.§ 609.344(1)(d) (2003) (prohibition on sexual contact withmentally impaired person).
92 See, e.g., Strock v. Pressnell, 38 Ohio St. 3d 207, 212-13, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1240(Ohio 1988) (discussing amatory actions and the reasons why such actions have largely beenabolished, and collecting cases and statutory provisions from other jurisdictions that haveabolished such actions). Many states have abolished amatory actions by statute. Ala. Code § 6-5-331 (1975); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-20-202 (1987); Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 3924 (1974); D.C.Code Ann. § 16-923 (1981); Mont. Code Ann. § 27-1601 (1995); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §2305.29 (Anderson 1995); Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-220 (Michie 1992); Wyo. Stat. § 1-23-101(1977).  See generally Gregory L. Thompson, Note, The Suit of Alienation of Affections: Can itsExistence Be Justified Today?, 56 N.D. L. Rev. 239, 243 (1980); Alienation of Affections andCriminal Conversation Revisited, 26 Pepp. L. Rev. 61 (1998) (explaining the history of theamatory torts). See also Richard A. Posner, Sex and Reason 81 (1992) (discussing civil remediesfor sexual offenses). 36
sexual contact involves physical coercion, or the adult lacks full mental capacity to consent, thenboth criminal and civil norms will condemn the conduct.91  As with sexual abuse of children,ecclesiastical immunity offers no shelter to a religious leader who has violated these norms.In the absence of physical coercion, however, sexual relationships between religiousleaders and mentally competent adults present significantly more complicated issues. Consensual sexual conduct between competent adults does not generally give rise to criminal orcivil liability.  The torts of seduction and criminal conversation, under which a paramour couldbe sued for luring a woman into a sexual relationship, are long dead in most jurisdictions.92  Ourlegal analysis in this section, then, turns on a fundamental question: what makes sexualinteraction between a clergyman and congregant different than an ordinary, non-actionable,consensual sexual relationship between two adults?The standard answer to that question identifies the clergy-congregant relationship as“special,” one that imposes heightened obligations on the clergyman not to exploit parishioners
93 See generally Janice D. Villiers, Clergy Malpractice Revisited: Liability for SexualMisconduct in the Counseling Relationship, 74 Denver U.L. Rev. 1, 37-48 (1996) (arguing thatrelationship between clergy and congregant is fiduciary in character, and sexual contact withinthe relationship is a breach of the fiduciary’s duty).
94 See, e.g., Sanders v. Baucum, 134 F.3d 331, 336-37 (5th Cir. 1998) (Court upheld claimagainst clergy for professional negligence in his practice of essentially secular marriagecounseling).
95 See, e.g., Minn. Stat. §§ 609.345(h)-(j) (2003) (criminal prohibition on sex betweenmental health practitioners and their patients).  See also id. at § l (extending criminal prohibitionto sexual contact between clergy and congregant, when sex arises from counseling relationship).
96 Dausch v. Rykse, 52 F.3d 1425, 1433 (7th Cir. 1994) (...today, religious groups offertheir adherents, and sometimes the entire community, services that were not offered byecclesiastical sources in the past.  Few would doubt, however, that a lawyer practicing in a legalclinic operated by a church or a physician practicing in a clinic under church auspices would haveto comply with the same standards of professional care and responsibility as any other law firmor medical facility”). 37
under his care.93  The special quality of this relationship may arise from the clergyman’s practiceof professional techniques that are essentially secular, rather than from his religious role.94  Inmost jurisdictions, psychotherapists, social workers, and others who hold themselves out assecular counselors face tort liability, criminal responsibility, and professional discipline forsexual exploitation of their patients.95  When clergy publicly advertise their availability toprovide such counseling, perform the counseling in clinical settings similar to those of a secularcounselor, and receive payment for rendering the service, they invite the broader community toapply to them the standards imposed on others similarly trained.   If a pastor provided medicalservices – as a trained and licensed physician – in addition to her duties as a pastor, and wasalleged to have negligently set a broken arm, no court would take seriously a claim forecclesiastical immunity from medical malpractice.96  There is no more justification forrecognizing such immunity for a pastor who practices secular therapy.
97 Id. at 1435; Mullen v. Horton, 46 Conn. App. 759, 764-66, 700 A.2d 1377, 1380-81(Conn. App. 1997).  See also Villiers, supra note **, at 43-45.
98 Sanders v. Baucum, 134 F.3d 331, 337-38 (5th Cir. 1998).
99 See, e.g., Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 283-86 (Colo. 1988) (In suit over sexualmisconduct of pastoral counselor, court permitted breach of fiduciary duty claim, but rejectedplaintiff’s claim of malpractice in counseling).
100 47 Cal. 3d 278, 763 P.2d 948, 253 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1988), cert. denied 490 U.S. 1007(1989).
101 47 Cal. 3d at 299. 38
Claims of sexual misconduct by secular counselors typically sound in professionalnegligence – malpractice – on the theory that a therapist has mishandled the strong emotionalbonds that often arise between therapist and patient.97  To the extent that a clergyman hasundergone training in secular modes of therapy, held himself out as qualified to perform suchtherapeutic techniques, and induced a patient to rely on that expertise, the clergy-counselorshould be held to answer for therapeutic malpractice in that vocation as well.98With few exceptions, however, courts have been unwilling to impose malpractice liabilityon clergy-counselors.99  This unwillingness can be traced back to the landmark case of Nally v.Grace Community Church of the Valley.100  In Nally, as we discussed above, plaintiffs allegedthat their son had received negligent pastoral counseling at the church, and that the pastors’negligence was responsible for their son’s suicide.  After an intermediate appellate allowedplaintiffs to sue on a theory of clergy malpractice, the California Supreme Court reversed,holding, among other things, that imposition of malpractice liability for negligent pastoralcounseling would involve the court in judgments about the “religious philosophy of the particulardenomination or ecclesiastical teachings of the religious entity.”101
102 Id.  See also Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp.321, 326-28 (SDNY 1991), Roppolo v.Moore, 644 So.2d 206, 208-10 (La. App. 1994), Strock v. Pressnell, 38 Ohio St. 3d 207, 527N.E.2d 1235, 1239 (Ohio 1988).
103 Nally, 47 Cal. 3d at 284-87.
104 763 P.2d 275 (Colo. 1988). 39
Courts have good reason to reject claims of clergy malpractice when such claims invitethe court to determine the standard of pastoral care for a “reasonable Catholic priest” or a“reasonable Orthodox rabbi.”  These are judgments that can only be made from within thereligious tradition, and are precisely the kind of judgments barred by the doctrine of ecclesiasticalimmunity.102  In Nally, the church and its pastors did not advertise their competence to performsecular therapy, but instead offered thickly religious counseling.103  The court held that it couldnot adjudicate plaintiff’s claim without determining a standard of care for “reasonable spiritualcounseling,” and that the Constitution prohibits such a determination.In order to avoid the need for a court to find a standard of care for the “reasonableclergyman,” plaintiffs and courts have looked to the law of fiduciaries as an alternative legalbasis for recognizing the special relationship between clergy and congregant.  In Destefano v.Grabrian,104 the leading case involving a priest’s sexual relationship with a woman he wascounseling, the Supreme Court of Colorado rejected plaintiff’s claim of clergy malpractice, butfound that she could proceed on a theory that the priest had breached his fiduciary duty to her:Edna's first claim for relief alleges that Grabrian, in his position as a priest and asone who holds himself out to the community as a professional or trained marriagecounselor, breached his fiduciary duty to her.  A fiduciary is a person having aduty, created by his undertaking, to act primarily for the benefit of another inmatters connected with the undertaking. A fiduciary has a duty to deal “withutmost good faith and solely for the benefit” of the beneficiary. . . . A fiduciary'sobligations to the beneficiary include, among other things, a duty of loyalty, . . a
105 Id. at 284 (citations omitted). 
106 Id. at 284.
107 Id. at 284. 40
duty to exercise reasonable care and skill, . . . and a duty to deal impartially withbeneficiaries . . . .A person standing in a fiduciary relationship with another is subject toliability to the other for harm resulting from a breach of the duty imposed by therelationship. . . .  We have no difficulty in finding that Grabrian, as a marriagecounselor to Robert and Edna, owed a fiduciary duty to Edna.  His duty to Ednawas “created by his undertaking” to counsel her.  Grabrian had a duty, given thenature of the counseling relationship, to engage in conduct designed to improvethe Destefanos’ marital relationship.  As a fiduciary, he was obligated not toengage in conduct which might harm the Destefanos’ relationship.  If theallegations are true, it is clear to us that Grabrian breached his duty and obligationwhen he had sexual intercourse with Edna.105The Destefano court also held that Grabrian had no plausible constitutional defense to the breachof  fiduciary claim, because the alleged misconduct is “not an expression of sincerely heldreligious belief.”106Three aspects of the Destefano court’s fiduciary analysis suggest constitutionalweaknesses in this approach.  First, the Destefano court limits its constitutional analysis to theFree Exercise Clause, and summarily dismisses any defenses based on that clause because “thealleged wrongdoing of [the] cleric clearly falls outside the beliefs and doctrine of his religion.”107 As we discussed above, courts and litigants too frequently mischaracterize the constitutionalroots of ecclesiastical immunity, which rest not in an individual’s claim of religious liberty, butrather in the court’s recognition of the state’s limited jurisdiction.  Few clerics claim that theyhave a religious justification for engaging in sex with their congregants, but that is not the properconstitutional inquiry.  The doctrine of ecclesiastical immunity requires the court to determine
108 Id. at 285.
109 For precisely this reason, a number of courts have rejected the distinction betweenclergy malpractice and breach of a cleric’s fiduciary duties.  See, e.g., Dausch v. Rykse, 52 F.3d1425, 1438-39 (7th Cir. 1994), Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321, 326-27 (SDNY 1991), Teadtv. Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, 237 Mich. App. 567, 577-81, 603 N.W.2d 816, 821-23(Mich. Ct. App. 1999), Langford v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 271 A.D.2d 494, 495705 N.Y.S.2d661, 662 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000).
110 See, e.g.,Winkler v. Rocky Mountain Conf. of the United Methodist Church, 923 P.2d152, 157-58 (Colo. App. 1995), Doe v. Evans, 814 So. 2d 370, 373-75 (Fla. 2002), F.G. v.MacDonell, 150 N.J. 550, 563-67, 696 A.2d 697, 703-05 (1997).41
whether, and on what terms, it is competent to impose the standards of civil law on the clergy-congregant relationship.Second, the court’s expansive definition of the fiduciary’s obligations make this cause ofaction virtually indistinguishable from malpractice, a claim that the court rejects because it“raises serious first amendment issues.”108  In addition to the duties of loyalty to and impartialityamong beneficiaries, the court recognizes “a duty to exercise reasonable care and skill” incarrying out the fiduciary’s responsibilities.  A breach of the duty of loyalty, and perhaps also abreach of the duty of impartiality, might be proved without reference to a standard of care; but“reasonable care and skill” obviously depend on a standard of the “reasonably carefulfiduciary.”109  The Destefano court does not explain how application of the reasonable fiduciarystandard differs in any way from the constitutionally impermissible adjudication of thereasonable priest standard – and nor does any of the multitude of courts that has followed theDestefano court’s analysis.110Third, and most importantly, the court held that the relationship between priest andcounselee imposed fiduciary obligations on the priest as a matter of law, and that sexual contact
111 763 P.2d at 284.  In his concurring opinion, Justice Quinn makes this point moreclearly:   “No one can reasonably dispute the fact that the relation between a Catholic priest and aperson of the same faith who is receiving marriage counseling from the priest is in a fiduciaryrelation founded on utmost trust and confidence.”  Id. at 289 (Quinn, J., concurring).
112 177 Misc.2d 897, 900, 677 N.Y.S.2d 436, aff'd, 705 N.Y.S.2d 661, 271 A.D.2d 494(2000) (citing Scallen, Promises Broken vs .Promises Betrayed: Metaphor, Analogy, and theNew Fiduciary Principle, 1993 U.Ill.L.Rev. 897, 922).  See also Richelle L. v. Roman CatholicArchbishop of San Francisco, 106 Cal. App. 4th 257, 272; 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 601, 611 (Cal. App.Dist. 1 2003).
113 Enderle v Trautman, 2001 WL 1820145 (D.N.D), at *5 (quoting D.E.M. v. Allickson,555 N.W.2d 596, 604 (N.D. 1996)).  See also Doe v. Evans,  814 So. 2d 370, 373-77 (Fla. 2002).This argument is advanced in Villiers, supra note **, at 46-48.  See also Zanita Fenton, Faith inJustice: Fiduciaries, Malpractice & Sexual Abuse by Clergy, 8 Mich. J. Gender & L. 45, 58-67(2001). 42
between such a fiduciary and his beneficiary constituted a breach of the fiduciary’s duties111 These two determinations – the identification of a fiduciary relationship, and the designation ofsexual contact between fiduciary and beneficiary as a breach – represent the fulcrum upon whichturn Destefano and its substantial progeny.  They also represent the point at which carefulconstitutional analysis is most needed, yet least often found in the decisions.To establish the existence of a fiduciary relationship, the plaintiff is typically required toprove the following elements, as articulated in Langford v. Roman Catholic Diocese ofBrooklyn:1121) The vulnerability of one party to the other, which 2) results in theempowerment of the stronger party by the weaker which 3) empowerment hasbeen solicited or accepted by the stronger party and 4) prevents the weaker partyfrom effectively protecting itself.For our purposes, the most constitutionally significant elements are the first two – the source ofthe plaintiff’s vulnerability to the defendant cleric.  Some courts have held that such vulnerabilityis the result of a “power imbalance between a clergy person and a parishioner.”113  Put more
114 Id. at *6.
115 Richelle L., 106 Cal. App. 4th at 282. 43
starkly, the cleric’s “fiduciary position is derived from his position as a pastor in his church.”114 Leaders of non-religious voluntary associations are not generally deemed to stand in fiduciaryrelationships with adult members of the association.  Why, then, should the law treat religiousleaders differently?Any answer that focuses on the peculiar nature of religious belief rests on dubiousconstitutional ground.  In a careful consideration of this question, a California appellate courtrejected a plaintiff’s breach of fiduciary duty claim when the alleged duty was based on thereligious relationship between priest and parishioner.  “[T]he crucial questions [of] whetherappellant was vulnerable to Reverend Namocatcat and unable to protect herself effectively wouldfocus sharply on the nature and depth of her religious faith and its basis, if any, in RomanCatholic doctrine.  These are, of course, profoundly religious questions, as to which courts maynot constitutionally inquire.”115This constitutional limitation stems from the basic legal definition of a fiduciaryrelationship as an entrustment by one who is vulnerable to one who is not only stronger but whohas also induced or accepted the vulnerable one’s entrustment.  In short, the fiduciaryrelationship requires intentional action by both the weaker and the stronger.  To determinewhether a religious relationship should give rise to fiduciary obligations, a court would need toexamine the religious understandings of parishioner and priest.  It is possible, of course, that the
116 See F.G. v. MacDonell, 150 N.J. 550, 560-61, 696 A.2d 697, 702-03 (1997) (priestadmitted in deposition that sex with parishioner violated his fiduciary obligation to her).
117 Martinelli v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 196 F.3d 409 (1999)(“Where a person's beliefs are alleged to give rise to a special legal relationship between him andhis church, we may be required to consider with other relevant evidence the nature of thatperson's beliefs in order properly to determine whether the asserted relationship in fact exists”).
118 See Richelle L. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of San Francisco, 106 Cal. App. 4th257, 274, 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 601, 612 (Cal. App. 2003) (listing cases arising out of sexualrelationship in religious counseling context). 44
parties will hold consonant religious understandings of the relationship.116  It is equally possible,however, that the parties will assert divergent understandings.How would a court resolve this difference?  Several courts seem to rely solely on thesubjective religious views of the plaintiff,117 but that approach effectively – andunconstitutionally – discriminates against religious defendants by imposing fiduciary obligationson them through the unilateral action of the alleged beneficiary.  The alternative is no moreconstitutionally acceptable.  If the plaintiff and defendant disagree about the religious meaning ofthe relationship, the court will need to decide between the rival understandings.  Whether thedecision is made by judge or jury, the constitutional offense is the same; a court may no moredetermine the ‘true’ theological meaning of a clergy-congregant relationship than it maydetermine the standard of a reasonable cleric, or who should be imam of a mosque, or whichfaction is more faithful in an intra-church dispute.A fiduciary relationship between clergy and congregant must be grounded in somethingother than its religious character.  The vast majority of cases of clergy sexual misconduct withadult victims, including Destefano, arise from counseling relationships.118  As we argued above,the Constitution does not bar adjudication of claims where the clergyman has held himself out as
119 Of course, if the fiduciary conditioned performance of his duties on the beneficiary’sparticipation in a sexual relationship, the fiduciary likely would have breached his duty – but thesexual quality of the condition does not make it a breach; any condition not specified in the trustwould constitute a breach. 45
willing and capable to provide secular counseling.  The fiduciary character of the counselingrelationship is established by secular considerations – the vulnerability of one who seeks therapy,induced and accepted by one who offers such services.  The cleric-therapist’s initiation of asexual relationship with his counselee will likewise be judged by secular standards – the extent towhich such conduct violates the obligations of one who offers such therapy.  It matters littlewhether the plaintiff’s claims are styled as therapist malpractice or a breach of fiduciary duties,because the standard of care will be measured by that of a reasonable practitioner of the seculartherapy at issue.More constitutionally problematic, however, are cases in which the cleric did not holdhimself out as offering secular therapeutic counseling, but did provide religious counseling to aparishioner with whom he engaged in sexual misconduct.  To assess such cases, it is importantfirst to understand that the act of counseling does not create a legal relationship such that anysexual contact between the counselor and counselee constitutes actionable misconduct.  Informalcounseling between friends may lead to sexual intimacy, but the entrustment of confidences andits attendant vulnerabilities do not transform this intimacy into a breach of fiduciary duties.  Nor does the fact that two legally competent adults stand in a fiduciary relationship withone another mean that sexual contact between the two is necessarily a breach of the fiduciary’sduties.  Sex between a stockbroker and client or a trustee and beneficiary creates no greater legalliability than that between any two adult strangers.119  Even the relationship between a physician
120 See, e.g., Atienza v. Taub, 194 Cal. App. 3d 388; 239 Cal. Rptr. 454 (1987); Darnabyv. Davis, 2002 OK Civ. App. 103; 57 P.3d 100; Odegard v. Finne, 500 N.W.2d 140 (Minn. App.1993).  See generally, Scott M. Puglise Note: "Calling Dr. Love": The Physician-Patient SexualRelationship as Grounds for Medical Malpractice – Society Pays While the Doctor and PatientPlay, 14 J.L. & Health 321 (1999/2000).
121  Puglise, supra note **, at 336.
122Id. at 335-36. 46
and patient, with its – legally privileged – confidential conversations about treatment, is not onein which sexual contact represents a per se actionable breach of fiduciary duty.120  In cases that have recognized fiduciary duty claims arising from sexual relationshipsbetween a doctor and patient, courts have typically focused on one of several special factors thatwould overcome the patient’s capacity to give effective consent to intimate contact.  Courts finda breach of fiduciary duties when a physician induces a patient to have sex by representing thatthe sex is part of the course of treatment,121 though such inducement may be better characterizedas a form of fraud.  As we discussed above, courts regularly hold that a physician has breachedhis fiduciary obligation if he offers therapeutic counseling, and the sexual relationship arises outof the transference-countertransference dynamic.122  Absent such factors, however, courts havebeen reluctant to hold physicians liable for engaging in sexual relationships with their patients,even if such conduct represents a serious breach of standards of professional ethics.What, then, of a sexual relationship between a cleric and his congregant, when the affairdoes not arise out of a secular therapeutic counseling?  If courts deciding such cases follow thedecisions of cases involving sex between physicians and patients, they should be reticent aboutfinding civil liability, even though no one defends the moral propriety of the sexual relationship. In particular, courts should avoid the temptation to impose heightened liability on religious
123 150 N.J. 550; 696 A.2d 697 (1997).
124 Id. at 565.  This passage was quoted, with approval, by the Florida Supreme Court inDoe v. Evans, another case involving sexual misconduct in a religious counseling relationship. 814 So.2d 370, 375 (2002).
125 Id. at 564.
126 See Mansfield, supra note ___, at 1170 (the civil duty to act or not act in a certain waymay not be based on “a church’s law, structure, or traditions”).47
leaders because of the leaders’ “sacred” position – a temptation into which a number of courtshave fallen.  Perhaps the starkest example of this can be found in F.G. v. MacDonnell,123 inwhich the Supreme Court of New Jersey wrote:Ordinarily, consenting adults must bear the consequences of their conduct,including sexual conduct.  In the sanctuary of the church, however, troubledparishioners should be able to seek pastoral counseling free from the fear that thecounselors will sexually abuse them.  Our decision does no more than extend tothe defenseless the same protection that the dissent would extend to infants andincompetents.124 In the F.G. court’s reasoning, the religious quality of pastoral counseling is a crucial element ofthe parishioner’s vulnerability.  Trust in the pastoral relationship arises because parishioners“turn to their pastor in the belief that their religion is the most likely source to sustain them intheir time of trouble.”125The F.G. court’s language raises serious constitutional concerns that the court hasdeployed civil law to enforce religious obligations – securing “the sanctuary of the church” for“troubled parishioners,” who should be able find sustenance in their pastor’s care.126  Althoughthe court refers at times to the duties of secular psychotherapists, the court does not rest theduties of a pastoral counselor on the cleric’s practice of secular therapeutic techniques.  Instead,the court explicitly grounds the duties of a pastoral counselor in the religious qualities of the
127 717 A.2d 346 (D.C. 1998). 48
relationship between clergy and congregant.  Indeed, the court’s rationale does not depend in anyway on counseling as a course of treatment, and would easily encompass the act of sacramentalconfession.  The F.G. decision thus reflects precisely the same constitutional defect as those thatregard clergy to be fiduciaries of their congregants as a matter of law – both approaches imposespecial legal status on the religious character of a relationship.In rejecting the approach taken in F.G., we do not conclude that sex between a cleric andhis congregant is only actionable if the cleric is engaged in the practice of secular therapeuticcounseling.  We do believe, however, that judicial assessment of sexual relationships betweenclergy and parishioners requires heightened sensitivity to the constitutional problems inherent insuch adjudications.  At a minimum, courts should ensure that religious defendants are not held toa heightened standard of care because of their religious character.  This protection would likelyrequire courts to inspect closely the plaintiff’s case to determine if it contains sufficient evidence,not dependant upon religion-specific characteristics, of both a fiduciary relationship and breachof the attendant duty.  Absent such evidence, the court should not permit the case to go to thejury. To illustrate how such a case might proceed, we return to the analogous situation ofsexual relationships between patients and physicians.  In recent years, several courts have heldthat a physician may be held liable for engaging in sex with his patient, even if the physician didnot offer therapeutic counseling or represent that sex was part of the medical treatment.  Forexample, in McCracken v. Wells-Kaufman,127 the District of Columbia Court of Appealspermitted a woman to proceed with a breach of fiduciary claim against her chiropractor, arising
128 Id. at 351.
129 Id. at 353.
130 Id. at 349.  The court cites a Nevada case, Hoopes v. Hammargren, 102 Nev. 425, 725P.2d 238 (Nev. 1986), on the question of the patient’s particular vulnerability to exploitation.  Id.at 351.
131 Where cleric held himself out as offering – or offered – secular therapeutic counseling,claims of sexual misconduct against him should be treated the same as claims against any secularcounselor. 49
from the chiropractor’s sexual contact with her during her course of treatment.  The courtrecognized that the chiropractor’s conduct did not fit within the normal categories for holding “aperson engaged in the healing arts” liable for having sex with his patients: he was not engaged inthe practice of psychotherapy; he did not hold himself out as a therapeutic counselor, and he didnot “represent[] to the patient that sex is a part of the treatment.”128  Nevertheless, the courtreversed the trial court’s dismissal of the patient’s claim, and held that such liability could alsoextend to contexts in which a health practitioner “become[s] engaged in giving counsel or adviceto patients similar to that usually given by psychologists or psychologists.”129  The plaintiffalleged that the chiropractor invited discussion of personal matters during her treatments,provided advice and counseling to her on such matters, and knew that she was speciallyvulnerable because of an addiction to Valium.130  Given those facts, the court held that theplaintiff’s complaint survived the chiropractor’s motion to dismiss.A similarly structured inquiry could be applied in cases alleging sexual misconduct byclergy, where the cleric has not held himself out as practicing secular therapeutic counseling.131 As a minimum condition for imposing liability, the inquiry should establish that the cleric has
132 The category of potential plaintiffs need not be restricted to members of the cleric’scongregation – or even faith tradition – so long as plaintiff can show she or he developed acounseling relationship with the cleric.  As noted above, this category of claims only involvesmentally competent adults who engaged in non-coercive sexual relationships with the cleric.
133 For purposes of simplicity, we typically refer in this section only to the liability of theorganization, although plaintiffs frequently make claims against individual agents of theorganizations as well. 50
undertaken a regular course of counseling sessions with an adult congregant,132 in which thecleric offers the congregant particularized advice on personal – as opposed to entirely spiritual –matters.  In addition, the congregant-plaintiff should demonstrate that the cleric knew of somespecial circumstance that made the congregant specially vulnerable to exploitation, such as ahistory of mental illness or substance abuse.  Taken together, these requirements provide asafeguard against the temptation to hold clergy to a heightened standard of care because of theirreligious status, while simultaneously permitting courts to compensate plaintiffs who have beenexploited in circumstances functionally identical to secular counseling.B. Civil Claims Against Religious Organizations and SupervisorsIn the preceding section, we discussed claims and charges against religious leadersaccused of sexual misconduct.  In this section, we examine plaintiffs’ claims against religiousorganizations arising out of the sexual misconduct of their clergy.133  For plaintiffs, claims ofinstitutional liability are important because institutional actors are often the only available sourceof compensation for the wrongdoing.  This is especially true when the wrongdoing happenedlong in the past, or when the wrongdoing involved criminal conduct for which the cleric is nowincarcerated.  Moreover, the victim frequently has a long and deep relationship with the religiouscommunity that was served by the wrongdoer, and is likely to experience the sexual abuse as a
134 863 P.2d 310 (Colo. 1993).
135 Suffolk Co. Superior Ct, online at www.socialaw.com/superior/supFeb03xx.htm.
136 The court distinguished plaintiffs’ negligent retention, selection, and transfer claimsfrom negligent failure to laicize – i.e., to strip priests’ ordination. Id.51
betrayal of trust that the victim placed in the community and its faith.In this section, we divide plaintiffs’ civil law claims against religious institutions intothree categories.  The first consists of claims that arise out of the religious organization’s directinteractions with the plaintiff, including allegations that the organization breached obligationstoward the plaintiff that it undertook in responding to the plaintiff’s injury.  The widely citeddecision of the Supreme Court of Colorado in Moses v. Diocese of Denver134 is a good exampleof an alleged breach of the fiduciary’s duty of loyalty, raised by a victim of sexual misconductagainst a church official who had supervisory authority over the wrongdoer.The second encompasses claims arising out of the organization’s actions taken withrespect to the wrongdoer – including training, hiring, and supervising – that are alleged to havecaused harm to the plaintiff.  The recent decision of a Massachusetts trial court in Hogan v.Archbishop of Boston,135 which led to the $85 million settlement of claims brought by severalhundred plaintiffs, provides a typical list of alleged breaches of duties of care.  The plaintiffsclaimed that the Archbishop and his agents acted negligently with respect to the ordination,assignment, selection, supervision, transfer, and retention of its priests.136The third category consists of claims that the religious organization should be heldvicariously liable for the sexual misconduct of its employee.  These claims do not involveallegations of wrongful conduct on the part of the institution, but rather impute to the
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wrongdoer’s employer the responsibility for bearing the costs of its employee’s misdeeds.1. Institutional Fiduciary Duties to Victims of Sexual MisconductIn Part III.A., above, dealing with claims against sexual wrongdoers, we noted thepersistent trend among courts to reject claims of clergy malpractice while remaining receptive to claims that clergy had breached fiduciary duties to their parishioner-counselees.  It was only withmore caution than courts have exercised that we approved of this move, which rests on theconstitutional presupposition that the state may not define duties of pastoral care but may specifyduties of pastoral-counselor loyaltyWhen the locus of liability shifts from clergy wrongdoers to institutional actors who standbehind them, the constitutional norms may play out in more subtle ways but the underlyingdynamics remain the same.  Here, too, legally imposed duties must be crafted in constitutionallysensitive ways.  Tort law rules and processes should not permit the imposition of duties that aretriggered by religious character alone, or would effectively require religious entities to restructurethemselves to satisfy a state-imposed vision of the “good” or well-ordered religion.In a number of recent suits, plaintiffs have diversified their claims against organizationsin much the same ways that they and their lawyers have learned to do against individualwrongdoers.  It has become routine for such lawsuits to include claims that the defendantinstitutions and/or supervisors have breached fiduciary duties, as well as duties of care, toplaintiffs who assert that they have been victims of sexual abuse.  In the context of institutionalclaims, however, fiduciary responsibilities have a very different character than in the context ofclaims against clergy alleged to be sexual wrongdoers.  In the latter context, the assertion alwaysinvolves a close personal relationship between the clergyman and the parishioner; the fiduciary
137 See, e.g., Martinelli v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 196 F.3d 409, 426-30 (2d Cir. 1999).
138 Bryan R. v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y, 738 A.2d 839 (Me. 1999).
139 Doe v. Evans, 814 So.2d 370, 372 (Fla. 2002).
140 See supra notes **-** and accompanying text (defining elements of fiduciary relation).
141 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 874 comment a.
142 Bryan R. v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y, 738 A.2d 839, 844-47 (Me. 1999);Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239, 245 (Mo. 1997); Podolinski v. Episcopal Diocese ofPittsburgh, 23 Pa. D & C 4th 385, 395-98 (Pa. Com. Pl. 1995).53
breach story is one of a counselor taking sexual advantage of his counselee.  In contrast, theinstitutional fiduciary claims rarely involve any close, personal connection betweenorganizational leaders and victims of sexual abuse.  Instead, the claim of fiduciary breach in suchcases typically arises out of the organization’s failure to investigate allegations of wrong,137 or itsfailure to warn potential victims,138 or its failure to take earlier remedial action against knownwrongdoers.139The law of fiduciary duties requires a demonstration that a relation of trust andconfidence exists between the parties – that the claimed beneficiary of the duty has reposedspecial confidence in the claimed holder of the duty, and that the asserted holder of the duty hasaccepted that trust.140  In such a relationship, the trusted party is under a legal duty to act for, andgive advice for the benefit of, the trusting party on matters within the scope of theirrelationship.141  A number of courts have dismissed on the pleadings such claims againstreligious institutions, on the theory that the defendant religious organization and itsrepresentatives have not undertaken any special duties with respect to all adherents of the faith.142 
143 863 P.2d 310 (Colo. 1993).
144 Id. at 317. 54
These courts have recognized that religious institutions have their own set of interests, somereligious and some material, which may conflict with the interests of adherents of the faith.  Accordingly, adherents do not have any legitimate expectations that organizations will respond toassertions of sexual misconduct by clergy with actions taken for the sole benefit of the accuser. Moreover, religious organizations – especially those that are large and bureaucratic – do not andcannot be reasonably expected to have relationships of personal trust and confidence with eachand every adherent to the faith.Nevertheless, perhaps out of understandable impulses that wrongs should be remediedand that religious organizations, claiming to do God’s work, should be held to standards higherthan that of the marketplace, some prominent courts have begun to expand the fiduciaryobligations of religious organizations and their spokespersons in cases involving sexual abuse.The first important decision in this line of development is Moses v. Diocese of Colorado,143decided by the Colorado Supreme Court in 1993.  Ms. Moses (now known as Mary MosesTenantry, and so referenced in the opinion), who had been sexually abused by her father and hada long history of mental illness, became sexually involved with a Episcopal priest, FatherRobinson, at her church.  Ms. Tenantry had sought the priest out for counseling on familymatters, although the opinion hints that her infatuation with him began prior to the counseling.When her husband learned of the affair, he consulted with the Diocesan Bishop, who asserted hisdesire to supervise “whatever needed to happen.”144  In the presence of Ms. Tenantry’s husband,the Bishop confronted Father Robinson, the offending clergyman, who by this time had become
145 Id. at 318.
146 Id. 
147 Id. at 318, n. 9. 55
pastor of a different church, and urged him to get counseling and to advise the Bishopimmediately if there were any similar episodes in his new parish.   The Bishop then met with Ms. Tenantry, and advised her to stay away from FatherRobinson.  He further advised her to stop talking about her affair to anyone except for herhusband and a “priest or counselor.”  In the words of the opinion, the Bishop “took no furtheraction to assist Tenantry after this meeting.”145 Three years later, Tenantry had a chance encounter with Father Robinson.  She reportedthis to her husband, and this somehow spiraled into dissolution of her marriage, collapse of otherfamily relations, failure of her business, and profound collapse of her mental health.  At trial,mental health experts testified that the Bishop’s willingness to support Father Robinson in hisassignment at his new parish “led to the unraveling of Tenantry’s personality structure.”146  Moreparticularly, these experts testified that her personality structure depended upon her relationshipwith the church, in which she had lost confidence as a result of her experience with FatherRobinson and the Bishop.  The Bishop’s actions, according to this testimony, aggravated herbreakdown in trust because the Bishop “1) allowed her to believe that she was primarily at fault;2) did not ask to hear her side of the affair; 3) did not ask her how she felt about the relationshipor how she planned to deal with it; and 4) requested that she maintain secrecy about therelationship.”147The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed a judgment for Tenantry against the Bishop and
148 The Colorado had pioneered the distinction in DeStefano, discussed and criticized inPart III.A. above. 
149 Id. at 322. 56
the Diocese.  Asserting the quite familiar distinction between clergy malpractice and fiduciaryduties,148 the Court ruled that the jury had been properly instructed on the elements of fiduciaryduty, and that there had been sufficient evidence to support the verdict.  As the Courtcharacterized the claim, “this case involves a party who used his superior position as a counselor,a bishop, and a final arbiter of problems with the clergy to the detriment of a vulnerable,dependent party.”149The Moses opinion is full of danger signs for religious organizations, and it has spawnedother decisions against them on considerably weaker facts.  It is not hard to see the ways in whichMs. Tenantry’s troubled past would lead the courts, and the jury, to be sympathetic with herplight. But it is equally easy to see, if one is willing to look, that the Bishop did not hold himselfout as her counselor, nor did he represent that he was acting in her interest rather than theinstitutional interests of the church in clergy management and crisis control.  The expert’stestimony that the Bishop did not listen to Ms. Tenantry’s side of the story, or help her exploreher feelings or her planned course of action, is quite inconsistent with a claim that he was actingas her spiritual counselor rather than the caretaker of the church’s interests.   When juries arepermitted, under vague and general instructions, to permit the institutional position of Bishop orpastoral leader to become dispositive factors in the imposition of fiduciary duties, they areeffectively imposing upon religious organizations a state-backed vision of how pastoral relationsand religious organizations should be conducted.   As understandable as those normative
150 If Father Robinson exploited another counselee at his new parish, and the Bishop hadfailed to warn officers at that parish of Father Robinson’s prior problems, potential liability to thenext victims would rest on theories of negligence we explore in Part III.___ below, rather than atheory of fiduciary duty.
151 923 P.2d 152 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995).
152 Id. at 158. 57
expectations may be, application of them to religious organizations in cases like Moses is inserious tension with the First Amendment considerations associated with the doctrines ofecclesiastical immunity.150 The constitutional defects lurking in the Moses decision became manifest two years laterin Winkler v. Rocky Mountain Conference,151 decided by a Colorado appellate court.  Winkler, achurch volunteer, alleged that she and other women had been groped by their pastor; she sued thepastor, the congregation, and the United Methodist Conference to which the congregationbelonged, alleging, among other things, breach of fiduciary duty.  The local congregation settledwith the plaintiff, but the plaintiff received a substantial jury award in her fiduciary duty claimagainst the conference.  In contrast to Moses, Winkler’s claims do not arise out of the directcounseling relationship between conference officials and herself.  Instead, the alleged fiducaryrelationship is based entirely on actions taken by the conference in investigating her charges:Winkler asserts that a fiduciary relationship was created by the Conferenceassuming control of the investigation of her complaints and those of others. Winkler argues that such a fiduciary relationship was created by: (1) theConference’s actions at the April 24, 1992, meeting at which the Conferenceseemed very concerned about the women and wanted them to stay together and besupportive of each other; (2) the Conference providing a therapist to help thewomen; and (3) the Conference preparing and sending a letter to the GraceChurch congregation stating that:  “We are equally concerned for the healing ofany persons who have been hurt.  They will continue to receive appropriate helpfor their healing and restoration.”152
153 The conference did not directly provide the women with counseling; instead, itfinanced counseling of the women provided by professionals.  Id.
154 Id.
155 196 F.3d 409 (2nd Cir. 1999).
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Winkler then alleged that the conference breached its fiduciary duties by not providing thevictims with adequate support, which included the conference’s failure to inform thecongregation “that it had found the women’s claim credible.”  Although the conference’s act ofproviding counseling may look like a traditional fiduciary’s undertaking,153 Winkler did notallege any breach arising out of the quality of that counseling.  The breach seems to involve onlythe quality of the conference’s administrative response to the cleric’s wrongdoing.154 Nonetheless, the court sustained the jury’s finding that the conference owed, and had breached,fiduciary duties to Ms. Winkler. Four years later, judicial willingness to permit claims of fiduciary duty againstorganizations expanded yet further in a highly influential decision of the U.S. Court of Appealsfor the Second Circuit in  Martinelli v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp.155  Martinelliinvolved allegations that the Diocese had failed, in the middle 1960's, to investigate complaintsabout Father Lawrence Brett, who had been a parish priest in Stamford, Connecticut and thenspiritual director at a Catholic college within the Diocese.  Father Brett had initiated a sexualrelationship with Mr. Martinelli at a time when Brett “acted as a mentor and spiritual advisor to asmall group of boys, including Martinelli, who were interested in liturgical reforms in theCatholic Church.”156  Martinelli alleged that he recovered his memory of this experience in the
157 Id. at 426.
158 Id at 430. 59
early 1990's, and complained in his lawsuit that the Diocese had not pursued the complaintsabout Father Brett that it received from others in the middle 1960's.  Had the Diocese done so,Martinelli claimed, it would have discovered that he had been abused by Father Brett, and itwould have helped Martinelli to seek the sort of assistance  that might have prevented theemotional harm that befell him as his life proceeded.157The fiduciary claim in Martinelli played a central role in the disposition of the case,because of the statute of limitations.  Had Martinelli’s claim sounded only in negligence, hisclaim would have been time-barred.  If, however, the claim of fiduciary obligation and breachwas legally sufficient, tolling doctrines of fraudulent concealment (applicable to those withfiduciary obligations) would come into play and open up the possibility of recovery on the merits.Under the pressure of this problem of the period of limitation, the Second Circuit ruledthat the Diocese could be found to have fiduciary obligations to Martinelli.  The Diocese arguedthat it could not be held to have a special relationship of trust and confidence with each and everyone of the 300,000 Roman Catholics in the Bridgeport Diocese.  The Court rejected, however,this way of viewing the case.  The complaints that had come to the Diocese in 1966 included onefrom a young man who had been a member of the small group of boys with whom Father Bretthad cultivated special and close relationships.  Accordingly, the Court reasoned, the Diocese hada duty to the other students in that small group to investigate further, to locate other victims ifthere were any, and to help such victims cope with the emotional injury inflicted by theirexperience with Father Brett.158
159 Mark Chopko characterizes this sort of liability as “situational.”  See Chopko, supranote __, at 1106-07.
160 814 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 2002). 60
Like Moses, the opinion in Martinelli proceeds from understandable impulses.  Martinellihad suffered emotionally from Father Brett’s encounters with him, and the Diocese had donenothing to search out other, unknown victims of Father Brett’s sexual misconduct.  But here, asin Moses, the imposition of fiduciary duties upon the Diocese to a young man whose identity wasunknown involves assertions of a relationship of personal trust and confidence that the Diocesehad not undertaken.  That parishioners hope and expect that religious officials will respond toallegations of wrongdoing in a proactive, victim-oriented way cannot in and of itself create arelationship in which the religious organization is legally obliged to do so. To hold otherwise isto make the combination of organizational expectations held by parishioners, judges, and juriesthe measure of organizational liability.  And that measure, imposed by the expectations of thirdparties rather than by explicit undertakings of the faith community, will inevitably result inpressure to internalize state-imposed changes in organizational structure.  Whatever it is labeled,this kind of liability represents a normative judgment about organizational (mal)practice – that is,a judgment about how the religious polity responds in crisis to its own representatives, the clergy,and to its adherents.159For church lawyers looking for ways to confine Martinelli, the fact that Mr. Martinelliwas a member of a small group of followers of Father Brett, and that the Diocese had learned thatFather Brett had abused another boy in that group, represents the case’s dominant and potentiallylimiting feature.  The recent decision of the Supreme Court of Florida in Doe v. Evans160 thus
161 Id. at 371-73.  The complaint does not allege a sexual relationship, although the partiesbriefed the case, and the Court decides it, on the assumption that the relationship was sexual. One of the dissenting judges rested his objections to the opinion on the ground that the Court hadimpermissibly gone outside the pleadings in making this assumption.  Id. at 379-381 (Wells, C.J.,dissenting).
162 816 So.2d 347 (Fla. 2002). 61
must  have sent a chill up the spines of such lawyers, because Doe significantly expands the trendtoward recognizing organizational fiduciary duties in cases in which there is no personal, face-to-face relationship between the organization and the claimed beneficiary.  Ms. Doe, an adult at all relevant times, alleged that she belonged to the Church of theHoly Redeemer, an Episcopal Church in the Diocese of South Florida; that Pastor Evans hadoffered her pastoral marital counseling when he learned that she was having marital difficulties;that he had commenced a personal and romantic relationship with her,161 which had caused herharm; and that the Diocese and its officers knew that Evans had engaged in sexual misconductduring counseling at this and other churches within the Diocese.  Doe also alleged that theDiocese had the right to “exercise control” over a sexually exploitive pastoral counselor, and hadfailed to do so. She asserted that the Diocese’s actions constituted negligent hiring, negligentsupervision, and a breach of fiduciary duty.   The lower court dismissed these claims on FirstAmendment grounds, ruling that all of them involved assertions of “clergy malpractice” thatwere improper for courts to consider.The Florida Supreme Court reversed and reinstated all of Ms. Doe’s claims.  The Courthad analyzed comparable negligence problems in a very recent companion case, Malicki v.Doe,162 and said virtually nothing new in Evans about issues of negligent supervision, other thanan assertion that such claims involved “neutral principles” of law and therefore were not subject
163 The Court also cited the Colorado Supreme Court’s opinion in DeStefano.  Id. at 374.
164 Id. at 375. 62
to the First Amendment bar.  With respect to the fiduciary duty claim, the Court was brief andblunt. Citing the Second Circuit’s opinion in Martinelli,163  the opinion announced:[W]hen a church, through its clergy, holds itself out as qualified to engagein marital counseling and a counseling relationship arises, that relationshipbetween the church and the counselee is one that may be characterized asfiduciary in nature. . . . [A]s to the relationship between Doe and . . . the ChurchDefendants, it is a question for the jury to determine whether a fiduciaryrelationship arose; the nature of that relationship; and whether as a result of theChurch defendants’ conduct, there was a breach of the Church Defendants’ dutyas fiduciaries to Doe.164 The opinion at this point drew no distinction between the Church of the Holy Redeemer, whichemployed Pastor Evans, and the Episcopal Diocese of South Florida, which stood somewhere inthe background of that employment relation, but was not a party to it.Doe v. Evans thus completes the cycle of expansion of institutional fiduciary duties. Unlike claims against the sexual wrongdoer, in which fiduciary duties arise out of the personalundertaking as counselor, such duties arise in Doe v. Evans out of wholly impersonal relationsbetween the church and its adherents.   The duty springs from the general church’s holding out itspastors as willing to counsel its adherents, coupled with general knowledge of a pastor’stendencies to exploit such relationships in the past.  Under legally apt circumstances of control,discussed below, we can understand and might well approve the imposition of duties ofsupervision on Pastor Evans, although they fall more easily on his employer, the Church of theHoly Redeemer, than on the far more remote Episcopal Diocese of South Florida.   Failure tosupervise, by one with knowledge of danger and in a position to supervise, might well give rise
165 See Patrick Schiltz, The Impact of Clergy Sexual Misconduct Litigation on ReligiousLiberty, 44 B.C. L. Rev. 949 (2003) 63
to liability in negligence.The holding in Doe v. Evans, however, goes considerably further.  It is unmindful ofdegrees of care and supervision that the church and the Diocese might have imposed on PastorEvans, and it is particularly heedless of questions of diocesan control, or lack thereof, over thehiring and work of pastors.  The decision effectively instructs such a religious organization that itacts at its peril if it fails to remove from any pastoral role all clergy that it has reason to knowhave tendencies like those allegedly possessed by Evans.  Religious polities and personnel policies of the sort dictated by Doe v. Evans may well beprudent and humane.   To those untutored in the complex structure of religious organizations,and the pastoral quality of their personnel arrangements, the Florida Supreme Court’sexpectations of how such organizations should behave will seem entirely reasonable.  And juries,which will be asked to apply this new, sweeping conception of fiduciary duty, are likely to sharethose expectations, especially in a world flooded with stories about pedophile priests and lustfulclerics of every religious persuasion. Nevertheless, we believe that the trend represented by the decisions from Moses to Evanscreates three, distinct problems.  First, the triggering of fiduciary duties by meetings betweenreligious leaders and victims may create disincentives to ameliorative contacts within thereligious community.165  Whatever mixture of institutional interests and victim-supportiveconcerns may produce such interactions, they have the potential to accomplish some good.  Ifinstitutions, in doing more than they must create a risk of liability for doing less than they might,
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such efforts inevitably will decrease in frequency.Second, this line of decisions finds no counterpart among secular institutions, andtherefore raises a question of discrimination against religious organizations in application of thelaw.  Perhaps courts would apply comparable fiduciary standards to secular entities in anappropriate case, but this saving possibility has not yet arisen and there is reason to doubt thatcourts would do so, especially in circumstances where the relationship is as remote as thatbetween the Diocese and the plaintiff in Doe v. Evans.  Courts could, of course, take steps towardsolving this problem by making clear that such theories of fiduciary duty apply equally to bothreligious and secular organizations.  Even if the doctrine were so clarified, jury instructionsshould be carefully framed so as to warn against relying on an institution’s religious character asitself a source of legal duty.Third, as we emphasize throughout this paper, the state is forbidden from using the civillaw to impose a normative vision of the structure of religious organizations.  Such organizationsface complex tasks, material and spiritual.  They have responsibilities to their adherents, but theyalso maintain relationships with their financial supporters, with other organizations in theircommunity, and, most importantly, with the religious tradition of which they represent the livingembodiment.  Like many secular non-profit organizations, they operate through a variety ofagents, both employees and volunteers.  Without question, they should be aware of the risks ofharm to third parties which their activities may create, and they should take reasonableprecautions – within the boundaries of their own self-determined structures – to avoid the harmssuch risks entail.   Encumbering them, however, with special duties of loyalty to their adherents,who may number in the many millions and be spread across the globe, inevitably involves either
166 Doe v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 268 F. Supp. 2d 139, 143 (D. Conn.2003); Roman Catholic Bishop of San Diego v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. App. 4th 1556, 1562-64(1996); Beach v. Jean, 746 A.2d 228, 234-35 (Conn. Super. 1999); Kenneth R. v. RomanCatholic Diocese of Brooklyn, 229 A.D.2d 159, 162-63, 654 N.Y.S.2d 791, 794 (1997); Pritzlaffv. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 194 Wis.2d 302, 309-10, 533 N.W.2d 780, 783 (1995)65
a rearrangement in their structure, policy, or practice of relations with clergy, or – if they areunwilling to so rearrange under the pressures of tort law – a system of fines upon them forcontinuing to rely on structures of authority inadequate to control clergy who misbehave. Because such duties of loyalty effectively dictate the mechanisms of control over clergy, andorganizational response to victims of clergy misbehavior, imposing them tends tounconstitutionally establish a legally preferred structure of denominational life. 2. Institutional Duties of Care in Employment of ClergyMost of the cases brought against religious organizations allege that such institutions areobliged to act with reasonable care in their employment practices, especially when theiremployees will have significant interaction with children or other vulnerable people.  Plaintiffs’claims of institutional negligence can be divided into two general categories.  The first consistsof charges that the defendant negligently conferred religious status on the wrongdoer; the secondincludes claims that the defendant negligently employed the wrongdoer. We discuss each in turn.a. Negligent OrdinationClaims in this category are the most constitutionally problematic, and are – perhaps forthat reason – the least commonly raised by plaintiffs.  Four different kinds of alleged negligencefall within this heading: the religious entity should have done a better job of screening candidatesfor the ministry to eliminate those with a propensity for sexual misconduct;166 the entity should
167 Doe v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 268 F. Supp. 2d 139, 144 (D. Conn.2003); Wilson v. Diocese of New York of the Episcopal Church, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2051,*13-*14 (SDNY).
168 Rashedi v. General Board of Church of the Nazarene, 203 Ariz. 320, 322-23, 54 P.3d349, 351-52 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002); Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239, 246-47 (Mo. 1997);Kenneth R. v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, 229 A.D.2d 159, 162-63, 654 N.Y.S.2d791, 794 (1997).
169 Hogan v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Boston (negligent failure to laicize) (onlineat http://www.socialaw.com/superior/supFeb03xx.htm).
170 The closest case may be Harkins v. Gauthe, 707 So.2d 1308 (La.App. 1998) (priestemployed by the diocese sexually molested a boy at a motocross event; court held that “thispriestly status, which is conferred by the church” can be the basis of the diocese’s duty to aCatholic child – even though the child did not plead that he was a member of a congregationwithin that diocese.  Id. at 1313-1314).
171 “Whether an individual is qualified to be a clergy member of a particular faith is amatter to be determined by the procedures and dictates of that particular faith.”  Rashedi v.General Board, 54 P.3d 349, 352 (Ariz. App. 2002) (citations omitted).  See Chopko, supra note__, at ___. 66
have trained candidates for the ministry in how to avoid or prevent sexual misconduct;167 theentity should not have ordained (or licensed or certified) a particular candidate for ministry;168 orthe entity should have revoked the wrongdoer’s religious status.169As far as we can tell, no court has permitted a plaintiff to proceed on a claim that aninstitution negligently prepared or ordained a candidate for ministry.170  The constitutionaldefects with such an inquiry are all too obvious.  Qualification for ordained ministry, whether asa general question or as applied to a particular candidate, is a quintessentially religious questionbecause – if for no other reason – ordination is an exclusively religious category.171  On twooccasions, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that courts cannot exercise jurisdiction over the
172 Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976); Gonzalez v.Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 1 (1929).
173 See supra notes **-** and accompanying text.
174 Accreditation standards of the Association of Theological Schools in the United Statesand Canada (online at: ats.edu/accredit/stantoc.htm).
175 See John T. Noonan, The Lustre of Our Country: The American Experience ofReligious Freedom 67 (1998) (on James Madison’s opposition to the Crown’s licensing ofministers in Virginia); Edward M. Gaffney, Jr., Pierce and Parental Liberty as a Core Value inEducational Policy, 78 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 491, 503-05 (2001) (same).67
eligibility of candidates for ecclesiastical office.172  The ministerial exception to employmentlaws has a similar function; it strictly limits the ability of courts to intervene in disputes about thequalification or employment status of clergy.173 Claims about the screening or training of candidates for ministry may seem, at firstglance, to be less objectionable than those focused on the decision to ordain or license acandidate.  After all, seminaries and theological schools often have to comply with standards foraccreditation, which tend to have far more robust requirements than those proposed byplaintiffs.174  Accreditation, however, is voluntary.  Organizations may choose to require theirleaders to obtain certain credentials, but the government does not – and cannot – mandate anyqualifications for ordained ministry.  Indeed, hostility to government licensing of ministers is animportant part of the historical legacy of the Constitution’s Religion Clauses.175Finally, a duty of “reasonably careful ordination” would place a greater burden onreligious organizations than is imposed on non-religious bodies, and therefore violate theconstitutional norm against disfavoring religious entities.  Neither law schools nor state barassociations can be held liable for negligent preparation for or admission to the bar.  Because
176 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 307; Restatement (Second) of Agency § 213 (“Aperson conducting an activity through servants or other agents is subject to liability for harmresulting from his conduct if he is negligent or reckless: . . . (b) in the employment of improperpersons or instrumentalities in work involving risk of harm to others”).  In the context of clergysex abuse, plaintiffs’ claims of negligent hiring involve defects in the decision to place acandidate in a specific position, or defects in the process of selection – that is, the employershould have done more thorough investigation or screening of candidates.  See, e.g., Nutt v.Norwich Roman Catholic Diocese, 56 F. Supp. 2d 195, 200-01 (D. Conn. 1999); RomanCatholic Bishop of San Diego v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. App. 4th 1556, 1562-67 (1996); Evan F.v. Hughson United Methodist Church, 8 Cal. App. 4th 828, 842-43 (1992); Moses v. Diocese ofColorado, 863 P.2d 310, 323-29 (Co. 1993) ; Petho v. Fuleki, 10 Conn. L. Rptr. 254, 1993 WL446795 (Conn. Super. 1993); Malicki v. Doe, 814 So.2d 347, 361-63 (Fla. 2002); J.M. v.Minnesota District Council of the Assemblies of God, 658 N.W.2d 589, 593-94 (Min. App.2003); Jones v. Trane, 153 Misc. 2d 822, 829-30, 591 N.Y.S.2d 927, 931-32 (1992); Podolinskiv. Episcopal Diocese of Pittsburgh, 23 Pa. D.&C. 4th 385, 401-04 (1995).68
other theories of relief can address the harms about which the state has a legitimate concern –protection of the vulnerable from foreseeable harm – courts should continue to reject claims ofnegligent preparation for ministry.b. Negligent EmploymentPlaintiffs’ most common claims of institutional negligence focus on the defendant’semployment relationship with the wrongdoer.  The claims allege that the defendant failed toexercise due care in one or more facet of that relationship, whether in hiring, supervising, orfailing to discharge the wrongdoer.  In contrast to claims of negligent ordination, those allegingnegligent employment practices have clear and well established secular parallels.  Section 307 ofthe Restatement (Second) of Torts provides: “It is negligence to use an instrumentality, whether ahuman being or a thing, which the actor knows or should know to be so incompetent,inappropriate, or defective, that its use involves an unreasonable risk of harm to others.”176  Section 317 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts extends that liability to acts that fall outside thescope of the agent’s employment:
177 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 317.  Section 317 is important because so few courtshave found sexual misconduct – especially involving children – to be within the scope of thecleric’s employment.  See also Konkle v. Henson, 672 N.E.2d 450, 454-55 (Ind. App. 1996);Nardella v. Dattilo, 36 Pa. D.&C. 4th 364, 379-80 (1997).
178 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 317 Comment c.
179 Other scholarly attempts to discuss these questions include Mansfield, supra note __,at ___; Carmella, supra note __, at ____; Chopko, supra note __, at ___; Christopher Farrell,Note, Ecclesiastical Abstention and the Crisis in the Catholic Church, 19 J. L. & Pol. 109 (2003).69
A master is under a duty to exercise reasonable care so to control his servant whileacting outside the scope of his employment as to prevent him from intentionallyharming others or from so conducting himself as to create an unreasonable risk ofbodily harm to them, if(a) the servant(i) is upon the premises in possession of the master or upon which theservant is privileged to enter only as his servant, or(ii) is using a chattel of the master, and(b) the master(i) knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to control hisservant, and(ii) knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercisingsuch control.177The Comment to Section 317 addresses liability for negligent retention:There may be circumstances in which the only effective control which the mastercan exercise over his servant is to discharge the servant.  Therefore the mastermay subject himself to liability under the rule stated in this Section by retaining inhis employment servants who, to his knowledge, are in the habit of misconductingthemselves in a manner dangerous to others.178Despite widespread recognition of the tort of negligent employment in cases againstsecular employers, courts have disagreed sharply on the constitutionality of applying the tort toreligious institutions’ employment of clerics and other leaders.179  In some jurisdictions, courtshave held that the First Amendment confers on religious institutions complete immunity from
180 See, e.g., Bryan R. v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y, 738 A.2d 839 (Me. 1999);Swanson v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland, 692 A.2d 441 (Me. 1997); L.L.N. v. Clauder,563 N.W.2d 434 (Wisc. 1997); Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 533 N.W.2d 780 (Wisc.1995).
181 Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 716 A.2d 967 (Conn. Super Ct.1998); Moses v.Diocese of Colorado, 863 P.2d 310 (Colo. 1993); Doe v. Evans, 814 So.2d 370(Fla. 2002).
182 Smith v. O’Connell, 986 F. Supp. 73, 80 (D.R.I. 1997) (citing Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at2172 (Stevens, J., concurring)). 70
claims of negligent employment,180 while courts in other jurisdictions have held that the FirstAmendment provides no such immunity181 – indeed, that the Establishment Clause may actuallyprohibit a grant of immunity in this context.182  As we argue below, these two categoricalapproaches are inadequate models of legal analysis, both in terms of the constitutional values andof the public policies at stake in adjudications of negligent employment claims against religiousorganizations.  After examining and rejecting the two categorical models, we offer a morenuanced way to accommodate the relevant constitutional and policy concerns.i. Categorical ApproachesWhen faced with claims that a religious institution has failed to exercise due care in theemployment of a religious leader, courts tend to proceed on an all-or-nothing basis.  These courtshold that either the First Amendment imposes no limitation on applying traditional tort standards,or the First Amendment stands as a complete bar to the application of those standards.a. No ImmunityThe first approach holds that religious employers deserve no different treatment thansecular employers for their tortious employment practices.  On this view, the First Amendmentoffers religious institutions no shield against claims of negligent hiring, supervision, and
183 General Council on Fin. & Admin. v. Superior Court of California, 439 U.S. 1355,1372-3 (1978).  Quoted in Doe v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 268 F. Supp.2d 139,144 (D. Conn. 2003); Malicki v. Doe, 814 So.2d 347, 356-57 (Fla. 2002); Konkle v. Henson, 672N.E.2d 450, 455 (Ind. App. 1996); G.B. v. the Archdiocese of Portland in Oregon, 2002 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 7033 (D. Or.); JC2 v. Maurice Grammond, 232 F. Supp. 2d 1166 (D. Or. 2001).
184 Smith v. O’Connell, 986 F. Supp. 73 (D. R.I. 1997).  This distinction between internaland external matters is also found in Malicki v. Doe, 814 So.2d 347, 355-65 (Fla. 2002); Konklev. Henson, 672 N.E.2d 450, 455-56 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996); Podolinski v. Episcopal Diocese ofPittsburgh, 23 Pa. D & C 4th 385, 410-11 (Pa. Com. Pl. 1995).71
retention, especially when those claims are raised in the context of clergy sexual misconduct. Many courts that have adopted this “no immunity” approach point to language in an opinion byJustice William Rehnquist, in which he denied a stay in a case involving a religious nursinghome: There are constitutional limitations on the extent to which a civil court mayinquire into and determine matters of ecclesiastical cognizance and polity inadjudicating intrachurch disputes. But the Court never has suggested that thoseconstraints similarly apply outside the context of such intraorganization disputes. .. . [Some] cases are premised on a perceived danger that in resolving intrachurchdisputes the State will become entangled in essentially religious controversies orintervene on behalf of groups espousing particular doctrinal beliefs. Suchconsiderations are not applicable to purely secular disputes between third partiesand a particular defendant, albeit a religious affiliated organization, in whichfraud, breach of contract, and statutory violations are alleged.183Courts that adopt this approach draw a sharp distinction between internal and external disputes,and restrict the doctrine of ecclesiastical immunity to disputes that are internal.  Tort claims fallsquarely outside that limit.  A dispute involving “those who allege that they were seriouslyinjured by the negligence of the church officials . . . hardly can be characterized as a disputeinvolving an internal church matter.”184Moreover, courts that reject ecclesiastical immunity typically find that the tort ofnegligent employment is a “neutral principle of law,” applicable to religious institutions even if
185 Rashedi v. General Board of the Church of the Nazarene, 203 Ariz. 320, 325-26, 54P.2d 349, 354-55; Moses v.Diocese of Colorado, 863 P.2d 310, 319-21 (Colo. 1993); Jones v.Trane, 153 Misc. 2d 822, 828-29, 591 N.Y.S.2d 927, 931 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992); Bivin v. Wright,275 Ill. App. 3d 899, 902-04, 656 N.E.2d 1121, 1124-25 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995); Konkle v. Henson,672 N.E.2d 450, 454-56 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996); Smith v. Privette, 128 N.C. App. 490, 492-95, 495S.E.2d 395, 396-98 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998); Enderle v Trautman, 2001 WL 1820145, *8-*10(D.N.D); Podolinski v. Episcopal Diocese of Pittsburgh, 23 Pa. D & C 4th 385, 401-03 (Pa. Com.Pl. 1995).
186 Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 603-04 (1979) .  See also infra notes **-** andaccompanying text for further discussion of “neutral principles” in clergy sex abuse cases.
187 Konkle v. Henson, 672 N.E.2d 450, 456 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (citing Moses v.Dioceseof Colorado, 863 P.2d 310, 321 (Colo. 1993)).  See also Bear Valley Church of Christ v. DeBose,928 P.2d 1315, 1323-24 (Colo. 1996) (citing same passage); Rosado v. Bridgeport RomanCatholic Diocesan Corp., 716 A.2d 967, 970 (Conn. Super Ct. 1998) (same); Smith v. Privette,128 N.C. App. 490, 494, 495 S.E.2d 395, 397-98 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998) (same).
188 See supra notes **-** and accompanying text.
189 Moses v.Diocese of Colorado, 863 P.2d 310, 320-21 (Colo. 1993); Konkle v. Henson,672 N.E.2d 450, 456 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996); Enderle v. Trautman. 2001 WL 1820145, *10.72
the dispute involves questions of religious documents or practices.185  These courts’ use of the“neutral principles” approach – approved by the Supreme Court in cases involving disputes overreligious property186 – is reducible to a basic proposition: “The court is simply applying secularstandards to secular conduct, which is permissible under the First Amendment.”187  “Secularstandards” refers to the principles of tort law which define an employer’s liability for negligentlyhiring, supervising, or retaining an employee.188  “Secular conduct” reflects these courts’tendency to analyze defendants’ constitutional arguments under the free exercise clause.  Becausedefendants rarely claim that the wrongdoer’s misconduct was religiously motivated, courts findthat the religious institution’s response to that misconduct is not religious either, and so theirinquiry does not implicate defendants’ rights under the First Amendment.189
190 2001 WL 1820145 (D.N.D.)
191 Id. at *9.
192 Id. at *10. 73
Enderle v. Trautman190 provides a good example of the “no immunity” approach.  InEnderle, an adult parishioner alleged that she was injured through her adulterous sexualrelationship with her pastor.  In addition to claims that the pastor had breached his fiduciary dutyto her, the plaintiff alleged that the congregation and synod had negligently supervised andretained the pastor.  The court denied the summary judgment motions of the congregation and thesynod, holding that “determination of whether the defendants negligently supervised or retainedTrautman can be made solely in accordance with well-established tort law principles.”191  Thecourt continued: “a determination of whether Olivet and the Synod knew of Trautman’s allegedsexual improprieties and failed to respond adequately to allegations of sexual improprietieswould not implicate any interpretation of ecclesiastical principles or doctrine.”192  The twofindings represent the core of the “no immunity” approach – resolution of negligent employmentclaims in the context of sexual misconduct claims involves only the application of “secularstandards” to “secular conduct.”The problem with the Enderle court’s analysis becomes evident in the very next sentenceafter it declared that proof of defendants’ negligence “would not implicate” matters of religiousdoctrine.  In its summary judgment motion, the synod denied that it had “the authority tosupervise or fire Trautman.”  The court responded:The Synod contends that any negligent supervision/retention claim is predicatedupon an employer-employee relationship and since it did not employ Trautman itcannot be responsible for his acts.  The Court agrees that an employer-employee
193 Id.
194 See Chopko, supra note **, at __; Mansfield, supra note **, at ___.
195 See supra notes **-** and accompanying text.74
relationship is necessary for a finding of supervisory and retention liability. . . .However, whether Trautman was an employee of the Synod is a question of factproperly resolved by a jury.193This “simple” question of fact goes to a profoundly contested question of ecclesiastical polity –the proper relationship between bishops and pastors.194  And yet the “no immunity” approachtreats proof of this relationship as no more important than any other disputed fact in thelitigation.Is such treatment constitutionally appropriate?  Or might there be some constitutionallimitation on adjudication of negligent employment claims against religious organizations, alimitation that derives from the same principle that has led courts to reject claims for clergymalpractice?  Above we noted that courts have uniformly denied plaintiffs’ attempts to state acause of action for clergy malpractice.195  Any such action requires the court to recognize asnormative a standard of the reasonable cleric.  Whether the standard is denomination-neutral,identifying the “reasonable religious professional” or denomination-specific, identifying the“reasonable Greek Orthodox priest,” the problem remains the same: plaintiff will have to put onevidence of the rules governing conduct of the religious office.  If this evidence attempts toestablish a generic duty of care for all ministers, the court’s adjudication will amount to thewholesale creation of not only the duty but even the categories of generic minister or generic
196 The Internal Revenue Service, of course, must distinguish religious from non-religiousactors and entities.  While an assessment of IRS practice in this area is beyond the scope of thisarticle, we think it significant that the IRS’s designation of an entity as religious does not imposenormative obligations on the entity; the designation simply means that the entity enjoys a favoredtax status (one that is generally, though not universally, shared with non-religious charitableinstitutions).  In contrast, a court’s determination of a religious professional’s standard of carewould necessarily involve determination of normative obligations.
197 A highly influential decision from the federal district court for the Southern District ofNew York makes the same point: “The traditional denominations each have their own intricateprinciples of governance, as to which the state has no rights of visitation.  Church governance isfounded in scripture, modified by reformers over almost two millenia.”  Schmidt v. Bishop, 779F. Supp. 321, 332 (SDNY 1991). 75
religion, neither of which has independent reality.196  If, however, the plaintiff’s evidence seeks toestablish the standard of care of a “reasonable Greek Orthodox priest,” the court will be facedwith the specter of dueling theologians, with each presenting a rival account of the priest’s office– and requiring the court to decide which of the rivals represents the authoritative interpretationof Greek Orthodox doctrine.A similar problem faces courts’ adjudication of negligent employment claims againstreligious organizations.  The hiring, supervision, and retention of religious leaders are invariablygoverned by the normative documents or standards of the religious tradition.  Deep and long-standing theological differences between and within faith traditions are often made manifest indisputes over the power to select leaders and to exercise authority over the conduct of theministerial office.197  And yet adjudication of a negligent employment claim may result in a courtimposing a specific resolution to such theological disputes.  If supervisory authority is arguablylocated in the dioceses of a particular tradition, then a diocese may be deemed to have actedunreasonably if it failed to exercise that authority.  The operation of tort law, then, effectivelyrequires the religious body to adopt stronger episcopal oversight, even if the extent of such
198 Schiltz, supra note **, at ___.  This concern is especially present when the issue ofinstitutional control is a factual dispute submitted to a jury; as we note below, a jury is likely toassume that the structure of the defendant organization conforms to its expectations (everybishop is a Roman Catholic bishop)
199 863 P.2d 310 (Colo. 1993).
200 Moses, 863 P.2d at 323-329. 76
oversight is strongly contested within the faith tradition.198  To determine whether a diocese should be held liable for negligently hiring or supervisinga priest, the court will need to decide that the bishop or some other agent of the diocesepossessed the authority to hire, supervise, or remove that priest, and that the diocese’s agent actedcarelessly in exercising that authority.  Both of these determinations seem to invite much thesame inquiry as that deemed unconstitutional when applied to claims of clergy malpractice.  Toestablish the bishop’s authority over the priest, the plaintiff must introduce evidence of suchauthority from canon law or from the practices of the defendant or other dioceses.  To establishthe allegedly unreasonable exercise of the diocese’s authority, the plaintiff must present evidenceof what a reasonable person who possessed that authority would have done – in short, answeringthe question “what would a reasonable bishop have done?”These concerns are not speculative, but real.  Moses v. Diocese of Colorado199 provides aconcrete illustration of litigation that focused on expert testimony about the authority of anEpiscopal bishop.  The expert testified about the formal and informal authority Episcopal bishopsexert within their dioceses.  His evidence ranged from details about the bishop’s exercise ofpastoral care for priests in the diocese, to the bishop’s relationship with seminarians preparing forministry, to the bishop’s influence over matters not directly under control of the diocese.200  As in
201 Id. at 327. 77
Enderle, the Moses court shows no signs of treating this evidence as constitutionally sensitive,and offers the following conclusion to its recitation of the expert’s testimony: “The trial courtproperly submitted this issue to the jury for determination and the jury found that there was anagency relationship between Father Robinson and the Diocese.”201The Enderle and Moses decisions represent both substantive and procedural flaws in the“no immunity” approach.  The substantive error resides in the courts’ treatment of ecclesiasticalstructure as an ordinary question of fact.  This error is compounded by the courts’ method ofresolving disputes about that structure – both courts sent the question to the jury.  We think thatthe attitudes reflected in Enderle and Moses about the role of juries, in disposing of issues ofreligious authority and control, are constitutionally troublesome.  As is always the case in tortlaw, juries are seeing these cases from hindsight; they are aware that someone has been injured,and they are in the position of assigning culpability.   When religious organizations aredefendants, especially in sexual misconduct cases, they may well face a form of jury bias thatwill lead to the discriminatory imposition of special ecclesiastical liability.  Jurors may haveexpectations, conscious or not, that religious leaders will demonstrate greater virtue than theaverage person.  Moreover, jurors unaware of the particulars of ecclesiastical structure mayassume that bishops and other religious officials have, by virtue of their office, considerablymore control than they actually do.  A judicial posture that religious organizations have noconstitutional immunity whatsoever from liability for negligent employment of clergy may thuslead with some predictable frequency to the imposition of undeserved liability for failure to act asa “reasonable religious organization” should.  And this, in turn, will inevitably create incentives
202 A number of courts hold that categorical immunity applies only to claims of negligenthiring and/or negligent retention - a distinction that they purport to draw from the “ministerialexception” cases.  See, e.g., Isely v. Capuchin Province, 880 F. Supp. 1138 (E.D. Mich. 1995)(First Amendment bars claim of negligent hiring, but not negligent supervision); J.M. v.Minnesota Dist. Council of Assemblies of God, 658 N.W.2d 589 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003) (FirstAmendment bars scrutiny of church’s hiring decision, but not supervision or retention.  It is notclear to us why that distinction should matter: negligent hiring, supervision, and retention all askessentially the same questions: did the defendant have notice of the wrongdoer’s propensity tocommit sexual misconduct, authority to prevent the harm, and some duty of care to those whowere harmed?  Seen in that light, hiring and retention are simply “moments” along a spectrum oftypes of a principal’s control over her agents.
203 1997 ME 63, 692 A.2d 441. 78
for religious organizations to reconfigure their structure of authority in ways designed to avoidliability.  It is the role of state law in the imposition of that incentive structure that FirstAmendment norms should address. b. Categorical ImmunityThe second approach is the complete opposite of the first, and holds that any inquiry intoa religious entity’s exercise of authority over its leaders unconstitutionally entangles the courtwith a religious community’s right of self-governance.202  As expressed by the Supreme JudicialCourt of Maine in Swanson v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland,203When a civil court undertakes to compare the relationship between a religiousinstitution and its clergy with the agency relationship of the business world,secular duties are necessarily introduced into the ecclesiastical relationship andthe risk of constitutional violation is evident.  The exploration of the ecclesiasticalrelationship is itself problematic.  To determine the existence of an agencyrelationship based on actual authority, the trial court will most likely have toexamine church doctrine governing the church’s authority over [the priest].. . . . . . . . . .Even assuming that the trial court could discern the existence of actualauthority without determining questions of church doctrine or polity . . . ,constitutional obstacles remain.  The imposition of secular duties and liability onthe church as a “principal” will infringe upon its right to determine the standardsgoverning the relationship between the church, its bishop, and the parish priest. . .
204 Id. at 444-45
205 See Bryan R. v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y, 738 A.2d 839 (Me. 1999);Napieralski v. Unity Church of Greater Portland, 2002 ME 108, 802 A.2d 391; L.L.N. v.Clauder, 563 N.W.2d 434 (Wisc. 1997); Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 533 N.W.2d 780(Wisc. 1995).  Several decisions in New York, involving both federal and state courts, havereached a similar conclusion.  See Ehrens v. Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, 269 F. Supp. 2d328 (SDNY 2003); Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321 (SDNY 1991); Langford v. RomanCatholic Diocese, 271 A.2d 494 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000).  But see Jones v. Trane, 153 Misc. 2d822, 591 N.Y.S.2d 927 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992) (permitting negligent hiring and supervision claimsagainst church).
206 Swanson, 692 A.2d at 444-45.
207 426 U.S. 696 (1976) (cited in Swanson, 692 A.2d at 444).
208 Swanson, 692 A.2d at 445. 79
. Pastoral supervision is an ecclesiastical prerogative.204Courts in Wisconsin have generally followed the same path as the Swanson court, recognizing acategorical prohibition on negligent employment claims against religious organizations, andgrounding that recognition in a robust doctrine of non-entanglement.205 The Swanson court determined that any judicial inquiry into the distribution of authoritywithin or among religious institutions would require courts to construe religious texts anddoctrines.206  Drawing from the US Supreme Court’s decision in Serbian Eastern OrthodoxDiocese v. Milivojevich,207 the Swanson court then held that it is constitutionally barred fromundertaking any inquiry that depends on the interpretation of religious texts, such as canon law ora congregational charter, because to do so would inevitably impose on the religious organizationan external, government-endorsed model of ecclesiastical governance.  Under this view, any setof employment standards adopted by the court usurps the religious institution’s autonomy tostructure its polity in accordance with its own beliefs and practices.208
209 See infra notes **-** and accompanying text (discussing use of “neutral principles” toguide construction of religious texts). 80
 The Swanson court’s approach, however, fails to acknowledge that, as with claims ofprofessional negligence by clergy, claims of negligent employment may be justiciable undersome circumstances.  Not every inquiry into the authority of a diocesan Bishop will require thecourt to resolve disputed questions of ecclesiastical polity, or invite the court to impose anormative form of parish governance.209  If any such inquiry can be conducted without resultingin unconstitutional entanglement, there are sound jurisprudential and policy grounds for allowingcourts to determine whether a particular case can proceed.At the most basic level, plaintiffs often bring compelling tales of profound, lastinginjuries from sexual molestation, and the religious institution often represents the only viablesource of remedy for the harm they have experienced.  Moreover, and notwithstanding ourconcerns about the imposition of alien structures of authority on religious organizations, theviability of civil actions against religious institutions should make such institutions and theirinsurers more responsive to concerns about their leaders’ abusive behaviors.  By foreclosing allclaims of negligent employment by religious organizations, the Swanson court’s doctrine ofcategorical immunity determined that the risk of unconstitutional entanglement outweighs thebenefits of recovery to injured plaintiffs and potential reform of socially harmful practices ofreligious organizations.  We believe that such a determination is neither compelled by theConstitution nor a wise exercise of jurisprudence.  ii. An Alternative ApproachThe two categorical approaches share one virtue – they are both easy for courts to apply
210 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 81
in cases alleging negligent employment by religious organizations.  One rejects constitutionalchallenges to the use of traditional tort principles, the other finds that the First Amendment grantscomplete immunity to religious organizations accused of negligence in their employmentpractices. Neither approach, however, manages to give a coherent account of why certain claimsagainst religious organizations – most notably clergy malpractice – should be barred, and whyothers – such as an organ builder’s action against a congregation for breach of a contract to buyan instrument – should be allowed to proceed.  From the no-immunity perspective, if “neutralprinciples” can be applied to determine the character of the authority that a bishop has over apriest, such principles could similarly be developed to adjudicate claims of clergy malpractice. From the no-liability perspective, if courts are constitutionally forbidden to inquire into the polityof a religious organization, how can a court determine whether the organ builder has a contractenforceable against the religious entity, when the contract was signed by individuals whopurported to bind the entity? Courts need – and the Religion Clauses require – an approach that falls somewherebetween the categorical analyses outlined above.  In the sections that follow, we sketch outseveral interrelated analyses that attempt to delimit courts’ inquiry into the character andstructure of ecclesial authority, while still permitting plaintiffs to hold institutions accountablefor the harms that such institutions negligently inflict on those under their care.  The problemrequires reconciling state-created tort law with the demands of the First Amendment.  As allgood first amendment lawyers know, such reconciliations have been part of the enterprise ofconstitutional law since the Supreme Court’s decision in New York Times v. Sullivan210 almost
211  Id.; see also Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts, Associated Press v. Walker, decided together at388 U.S. 130 (1967) (extending rule of New York Times to plaintiffs who are “public figures”).
212 Time, Inc. V. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
213 Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
214 443 U.S. 595 (1979). 82
forty years ago.  Whether the tort is defamation,211 invasion of privacy,212 or intentional inflictionof emotional distress,213 the First Amendment sometimes requires that tort law concerns giveway, at least in part, to constitutional considerations.  In what follows, we draw in detail on theconcerns of substance and process that characterize this methodology of reconciliation.Moreover, we expand on this methodology by revisiting Jones v. Wolf,214 and focusing on itscharacter as a decision about rules of evidence.  So viewed, Jones may buttress rather thanundermine the case for constitutional limits in cases alleging negligent employment.a. Reconciling Tort Law and the First Amendment:Lessons from the Freedom of the PressAs we argued above in critiquing the cases that reject all ecclesiastical immunities in thiscontext, the constitutional problems here may concern the interaction of process and substance –that is, it is the role of juries, in applying general and sweeping standards of care to anemployer’s duties to third parties, that represents the threat to First Amendment values.  Thiscontext is not the only one in which tort law and First Amendment considerations, and therespective roles of judge and juries, must be reconciled.  The Supreme Court’s decisions in New
215 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
216 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
217 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
218 At least one court has extended the rule of New York Times to defamatory falsehoods uttered during a sermon on divorce delivered as part of a worship service in a church.  SeeMcNair v. Worldwide Church of God, 197 Cal. App. 3d 363 (1988)83
York Times v. Sullivan215 and its progeny, Time, Inc. v. Hill,216 and Hustler v. Falwell,217 in whichpotential liability of the press under state law is harmonized with considerations of pressfreedom, offer provocative analogies from which to draw.  The doctrines elaborated in thesedecisions (which we hereafter describe as the “regime of New York Times”) are designed topermit the press to perform its duties robustly, without inhibition borne of the fear of after-the-fact imposition of liability by hostile juries.   Similarly, ecclesiastical immunity is designed togive religious organizations “breathing space” within which to organize their own polities, selecttheir own leaders, and preach their own creeds.218  The New York Times regime contains elementsof both substance and process, and we draw on both in teasing out our own recommendations.1. Substantive standards of liability a. KnowledgeOne highly relevant and particularized way in which the regime of New York Times mightinform the legal questions we discuss in this part involves the question of whether liabilityshould be limited to those who have actual knowledge of a clergyman’s propensity to commitsexual misconduct, or should be extended to those with constructive knowledge.  Under the mostrobust versions of the constructive knowledge rule, religious entities may find themselvespressured to investigate the backgrounds of those who seek training or employment in their ranks
219 For discussion of this and other effects of sexual misconduct litigation on religiousorganizations, see Patrick Schiltz, The Impact of Clergy Sexual Misconduct Litigation onReligious Liberty, 44 B.C. L. Rev. 949 (2003).
220 The regime of New York Times also extends to press comment on public figures.  SeeCurtis Pub. Co. v. Butts, Associated Press v. Walker, decided together at 388 U.S. 130 (1967).84
of clergy.  Failure to do so may give rise to liability for sexual misconduct that juries determinewas reasonably foreseeable at a much earlier stage.If the First Amendment interdicts any system of clergy licensing, as suggested in Part IIabove, it is arguable that it similarly prohibits a regime of liability that imposes on religiousentities a duty to inquire into the psychological makeup of clergy aspirants, and the consequentfinancial incentive to exclude those whose life details and behavioral profiles suggest apropensity to sexual misconduct.219  Such a broad duty may well lead religious entities into aform of self-limitation, or self-censorship, that is inconsistent with the freedom protected byecclesiastical immunity from official inquiry into the selection of religious leaders.With respect to the question of culpable states of knowledge, the qualified privilegerepresented by the regime of New York Times v. Sullivan might be of particular value.  That rulelimits the liability of the press for defamation of public officials with respect to their officialconduct to situations in which the defendant acted with “actual malice” - defined in New YorkTimes as “knowing falsehood” or “reckless disregard of the truth.”  The rationale of New YorkTimes is that strict liability in defamation, as the common law imposed, or even a system ofnegligence-based  liability, will lead to self-censorship, with a consequent loss to the public of apress willing to provide information about public officials and their official behavior.220
221 952 SW2d 239 (Mo. 1997).
222 Id. at 247.  The court reaches the same conclusion with respect to negligentsupervision: “Adjudicating the reasonableness of a church’s supervision of a cleric – what thechurch “should know” – requires inquiry into religious doctrine. . . . [T]his would create anexcessive entanglement, inhibit religion, and result in the endorsement of one model ofsupervision.”  Id.  Quite provocatively, the Gibson court also said that the clauses in Missouri’sstate constitution “‘declaring that there shall be a separation of church and state are not only moreexplicit but more restrictive’ than the First Amendment.”  Id. at 246 (quoting Paster v. Tussey,512 SW2d 97, 101-02 (Mo. 1974)).  The Gibson court does not address the state constitution,because it said that neither party had raised Missouri’s religion clauses.  If part of theconstitutional defect in plaintiffs’ claim falls under the state disestablishment provision, and thusrepresents a defect of the court’s subject matter jurisdiction, the court certainly would have theauthority to raise the provision sua sponte, but the court did not do so.
223 Id. at 248. 85
In Gibson v. Brewer,221 the Supreme Court of Missouri adopted a closely analogous rulefor adjudicating claims against religious organizations, where the claims arise out of theorganization’s employment of one who commits sexual misconduct.  The Gibson court rejectedplaintiffs’ claims of negligent employment, holding that adoption of any standard of reasonablecare for that conduct “would result in an endorsement of religion, by approving one model forchurch hiring, ordination, and retention.”222  The court then distinguished claims for “intentionalfailure to supervise clergy” from those of negligent employment:A cause of action for intentional failure to supervise clergy is stated if (1) asupervisor (or supervisors) exists, (2) the supervisor (or supervisors) knew thatharm was certain or substantially certain to result, (3) the supervisor (orsupervisors) disregarded this known risk, (4) the supervisor’s inaction causeddamage, and (5) the other requirements of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,section 317 are met.  This cause of action requires a supervisor.  The FirstAmendment does not, however, allow a court to decide issues of churchgovernment – whether or not a cleric should have a supervisor.223The Gibson court’s twofold focus on actual, rather than constructive knowledge and actual,rather than constructive authority, parallels closely the concerns expressed in the regime of New
224 The Missouri Supreme Court’s approach in Gibson has been followed in at least oneother jurisdiction.  See Heroux v. Carpentier, 1998 R.I. Super. LEXIS 52.  See also Chopko,supra note **, at 1119.
225 We recognize that in other respects, the New York Times analogy may be off the mark. First, the New York Times rule is limited to cases in which the plaintiffs are public officials, orpublic figures, who can fairly be said to have assumed some of the risk of defamatory publicity.86
York Times.224In the defamation context, the privilege created by New York Times protects the press asan instrument of control over the actions of government, at the potential expense of thereputation of officials.  The press is free to publish unless it knows the story to be false anddefamatory, or is in possession of information creating a high probability that the story is falseand defamatory.  In the context of clergy sexual misconduct, a requirement that plaintiffs showthe defendants had actual knowledge of their employees’ propensity to commit misconduct isstrongly analogous to the requirement of knowing falsehood in defamation; both involve a highlyculpable form of scienter as a basis for liability.  Similarly, if  agents of a religious organizationhad facts readily available to them that indicated a significant risk of sexual misconduct, and yettook no relevant action, their action might be seen as a “reckless disregard” of the likelihood ofharm.  When a clergyman spends “too much” time alone with adolescent boys, or flirtsprovocatively and excessively with attractive women in his congregation, supervisors will not beable to ignore the clergyman’s conduct.  Any broader version of constructive knowledge ofpropensity for sexual misconduct, however, would function like liability for negligence orperhaps even like strict liability.  Such liability standards, if internalized by religious entities,would require expensive and sweeping precautions about whom to train and ordain, and wouldtend to function  as an externally imposed, though self-enforced, scheme of clergy licensing.225
In contrast, plaintiffs in sexual misconduct cases – especially those in which the clergymisbehavior is criminal – cannot be said to have consented to such risks.  The case forassumption of risk is at least somewhat more plausible in cases of adult counseling, but eventhere we cannot say that plaintiffs assume risks analogous to those of bad publicity assumed bypublic officials and public figures.  We note, however, that the New York Times regime extendsto “private figure” lawsuits for invasion of privacy, and that courts may award punitive damagesin defamation cases brought by “private figures” only upon a showing of actual malice.  Gertz v.Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
226 376 U.S. at xxx. 87
One significant objection to extending the “actual malice” rule to claims of negligentsupervision by religious entities is the disincentive such a rule may create to investigate, andrespond to, hints of sexual misconduct by clergy.  Under the regime of New York Times, the pressmay have such a disincentive to more fully investigate stories that are potentially defamatory. This disincentive would arise from a fear of learning information that might make a story appearto be “knowingly false,” or to have been published in “reckless disregard of the truth.”226We do not dismiss this concern lightly, but we believe that structural qualities of religiousinstitutions are likely to lead them to respond differently than press organizations to signs ofdanger.  The press writes about strangers, operates on short time lines, and is in the business ofselling copy.  Whatever its institutional concerns about accuracy, fairness, and reputation, thepress frequently lacks sufficient incentive to self-correction.  By contrast, clergy misconductinvolves mistreatment of adherents to a faith community, and sex scandals leave an enduringstain on the affected institutions and individuals.  When rumors float upward, we expect thatincentives to ameliorate the problem will frequently overcome the liability-avoiding disincentivesto investigate.b. The relationship between culpable knowledge and authority over the offending employee.   
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Adjacent to the issue of the quantum of knowledge necessary for liability lies the questionof who possesses it – that is, whether the person alleged to have the requisite knowledge of riskalso has the responsibility and  authority to act on that knowledge.  Imagine, for example, that amanager at the Buick Division of General Motors lives next door to an employee of  a Chevroletdealer, a firm which is in a contractual relationship with GM.  The Buick employee knows thathis neighbor has a tendency to drink at lunch and then drive autos around the Chevy dealer’sparking lot.  If the Chevy employee’s drinking and driving leads to an accident on the Chevydealer’s premises,  the law would not impute knowledge of, and legal responsibility for,  theaccident to  General Motors.  The common affiliation of Buick and Chevrolet with GeneralMotors would not make GM legally culpable on these facts, because the business relationshipamong the various parties would not support the imputation of knowledge from the Buickmanager to the Buick Division, and then from Buick to GM, nor would it support the legalresponsibility of GM for the accident on the lot of an independent contractor.In some circumstances, such questions of the coincidence (or lack thereof) of knowledgeand authority may raise constitutional questions.  In the context of defamation, for example,  theFirst Amendment may require limits on whose knowledge may be attributed to the defendantorganization.  The press acts through agents and employees, and ordinarily a suit for libel wouldfocus on what the reporters, editors, fact-checkers and others involved in the subject matter of astory knew at the time of publication.  Suppose, however, that someone far removed from thepreparation of a story, but within the press organization – say, someone working in the printingplant across town from the editorial offices -- had knowledge of a story’s falsehood.   Would it violate the First Amendment to impute such a person’s knowledge to her
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defendant-employer?  We know of no judicial decision on facts of this character, but theconstitutional argument is not hard to develop.  If the defendant’s “state of mind” includes thestates of mind of all of the defendant’s agents, including those who have nothing whatsoever todo with the story, the organization would have a liability-driven incentive to take expensive andtime-consuming steps to clear every story it published with everyone who works for it.  Moreover, the problem of imputed knowledge, liability risk, and self-censorship would bethat much greater if it extended to the defendant’s organizational affiliates.  Assume that USAToday, a Gannett publication, was under a civil obligation to clear potentially defamatory stories with every employee of every newspaper in the Gannett chain in order to be sure that no one inthe organization had actual knowledge of the story’s falsehood, or information that wouldsuggest that publication is in “reckless disregard of the truth.”  Once the imputation ofknowledge is allowed to spread that far, no editor could ever be sure that his news organizationwas safe from a successful libel suit in a matter where the facts are contested and uncertain.  Theprobable  chilling effect of such a rule on major news organizations would be obvious.  Undersuch a regime of tort liability, they would be inclined to refrain from publishing anything thatwas potentially defamatory, or reorganize their processes in complex and expensive ways inorder to avoid the possibility of such liability.However farfetched such concerns may be when applied to questions of libel, where therisk of the knowledgeable but otherwise uninvolved employee may appear remote, they areanything but fanciful in the context of religious organizations being called upon to answer fornegligent supervision of clergy.  Any claim of negligent supervision must include an assertionthat the employer knew, or should have known, of the risk that the offending employee would
227 Mark Chopko has done the most comprehensive work on the relationship between the complexity of religious organization and issues of liability.  In addition to his article in theBoston College Law Review, note xx supra, see Mark Chopko, Ascending Liability of ReligiousEntities for the Actions of Others, 17 Am. J. Trial. Advoc. 289 (1993). 
228 Our knowledge of the organization of the LDS Church derives primarily fromFrederick Mark Gedicks, Church Discipline and the Regulation of Membership in the MormonChurch, xx Eccles. L. J. 31, 31-33 (200x). 90
cause harm.  Even within a religious organization that is organized along simple lines, thequestion of imputation of knowledge from someone within the organization to the entity itselfmay be quite difficult.  If, acting collectively, a Baptist congregation hires a particular pastor, andone person within the congregation knows of – but does not disclose – past sexual misbehaviorwith minors by the new pastor, has the congregation engaged in actionable negligent hiring? Only if the knowledge of one is imputed to all would a conclusion in favor of liability be sound.  To make matters considerably more difficult, religious organizations frequently haveidiosyncratic and complex organizational forms.227  Consider the LDS Church, in which all adultmales in good standing are members of a lay, unpaid priesthood.  May the knowledge that anyone of them may have of the sexual proclivities of another be imputed to their local congregation,to their Bishop, to the stake president to whom the Bishop reports, or to the Corporation ofPresiding Bishops in Salt Lake City?228  If liability may result from imputation of such far-flungknowledge, religious organizations will come under tremendous pressure of one or both of twokinds.  They may impose elaborate, expensive, and rigid systems of surveillance and reporting onall of their clergy, in order to ensure that those in a position to remove potential or actualoffenders really do know everything that will be imputed to them.  Alternatively, orcumulatively, they may adopt a tremendously thick initial screen on those who seek the status of
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clergy or priest.  Either way, they will have  responded to the risk of liability by changing thestructure of their organization or their criteria for the priesthood.  For reasons we have elaboratedabove, law-driven reforms in either of these directions are constitutionally troublesome. In order to avoid constitutional problems of this character, courts adjudicating claims ofnegligent hiring, supervision, or retention must follow a few simple but significant rules.  First,the legal judgment about who is the employer of a particular member of the clergy must be madeusing criteria identical to those utilized in analogous secular settings.   Just as GM should not beresponsible for the actions of an employee of a Chevy dealer, even if the dangers were known toan agent of the Buick Division, a religious organization that is affiliated by name with manycongregations, but does not control their hiring, supervision, and retention of clergy, should notbe held liable for the behavior of a congregational employee.   Second, this result should not change even if an employee of the larger organization hasactual knowledge of the relevant risk.   Liability in these cases should turn on a conjunction ofknowledge and supervisory authority.   Just as we argued in the preceding section that authority without knowledge should not be sufficient to create liability, so we suggest here that knowledgeof risk, without legal authority to act on it, is similarly insufficient.The concern that knowledge, unaccompanied by legal authority to act, should not permitthe imposition of tort liability involves more than a constitutionally-inspired insistence on even-handed treatment of religious and secular entities.  Beyond that constitutional worry lies a matterof policy and practice that moves many religious entities, as well as some secular organizations –that crisis intervention by institutional leaders not be the predicate of liability for theirorganizations.  As long reflected in tort law policies concerning good samaritans, and as reflected
229 For comparable argument with respect to freedom of speech and press, see Henry P.Monaghan, First Amendment Due Process, 83 Harv. L. Rev. ___ (1969).92
above in our discussion of institutional fiduciary duty, the imposition of liability on those whointervene voluntarily to minimize harm will tend to discourage ameliorative steps.  A similarconcern attends the imposition of negligence liability on those who seek knowledge aboutwrongdoing within their ambit of institutional concern.  If acting in this way leads to actualknowledge that a clergyman presents a risk of sexual misconduct, but the acquirer of thatknowledge invites personal or institutional liability once the knowledge is in his possession, hemay be disinclined to seek the truth and to act correctively through the use of influence orpersuasion rather than legal authority.  Legal standards should not discourage this sort of effort.  Thus, for reasons of both constitutionality and policy, we strongly recommend that theadjudication of claims of negligent hiring, supervision, and retention of clergy employees beaccompanied by constitutionally sensitive methods of deciding who within a religiousorganization had authority to act in the requisite ways.  On this point, we have no substantiverecommendation analogous to the “actual malice” rule on the question of requisite knowledge. Instead, we urge in the next two sections of this paper that constitutional awareness bemanifested in concerns of process.229  In particular, courts may demonstrate the requisitesensitivity to the issue of authority to supervise in their decisions allocating power betweenjudges and juries, in doctrines concerning evidentiary sources, and in jury instructions that aretailored to the relevant constitutional concerns.2. Processes of Adjudication and the First AmendmentThe regime of New York Times v. Sullivan is not one of substance alone.  From New York
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Times onward, the Supreme Court has been concerned about the problem of jury bias inapplication of First Amendment norms in defamation cases.  The rule of “actual malice” will dolittle good in protecting press freedom if juries, acting to protect their neighbor’s reputation, cansystematically disregard the rule and bring in verdicts against the press.   Accordingly, the Court has created in defamation cases a series of process rules designedto allocate power to judges, entrusted with constitutional values, and away from juries.  In NewYork Times itself, the Court ruled that “the proof presented to show actual malice lacks theconvincing clarity that the constitutional standard demands,”230 and thus “would notconstitutionally sustain the judgment”231 against the Times; the case was thus remanded fordismissal rather than a new trial.  In subsequent decisions, the Court has reinforced thisrequirement that proof of “actual malice” must rest on clear and convincing evidence;232 that trialjudges should lean towards granting  summary judgment to press defendants in cases where theevidence of actual malice that would go to the jury cannot reasonably be said to be clear andconvincing;233 and that appellate courts should scrutinize the record in defamation cases to besure that they properly went to the jury under these standards.234  Coincidentally with and insupport of this structure of decisionmaking, the Court in  Hebert v. Lando235 approved of broad
236 See Byrd v. Faber, 57 Ohio St. 3d 56, 61-62, 565 N.E.2d 584, 589-90 (Ohio 1991)(imposing standards for specificity of pleading in negligent employment cases because of dangerof excessive entanglement with religious organization).94
freedom for defamation plaintiffs to engage in discovery designed to ferret out evidence of actualmalice; if that is to be the controlling constitutional standard, the Court reasoned, plaintiffs mustbe free to inquire into editorial processes in order to demonstrate that the press defendants indeedknew that the information was false or that there was a high probability that it was false.These process rules, designed to permit plaintiffs to prove their cases but to protect thepress against juries that may be insensitive to the concerns reflected in constitutional rules ofprivilege, might play a comparable role in lawsuits alleging the negligent employment of clergywho commit acts of sexual misconduct.  If a rule of  “actual employer knowledge” were to beadopted for such cases, the procedural apparatus of defamation cases – full opportunity todiscover relevant knowledge, requirements of evidentiary clarity, and corresponding practices forsummary judgment and appellate review – might well be appropriate for this category oflitigation.Even beyond substantive issues of degree of awareness of clergy proclivities byorganizational defendants, however, these sorts of judicial controls might be more widelydeployed in such cases.  As we note above, a crucial question in many of the negligence casesbrought against religious entities is that of the authority of the entity to take action with respect toa member of the clergy, even if the entity’s agents have actual knowledge of the danger.  Thecombination of the inability of juries to appreciate the nuances of ecclesiastical structure withjury expectations of the virtuous character of such organizations has made processes of jury trial treacherous indeed for organizational defendants.236  In particular, juries should not be left to
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draw their own unguided conclusions about the authority reposed in an officer with the title of“Bishop,” or other comparable title suggesting hierarchical authority.In light of the danger that negligent employment claims pose to the freedom to structureecclesiastical arrangements free from state prescription or interference, judges might assumeextraordinary control of such cases.  In particular, judges might take it upon themselves toinspect the evidence of supervisory authority, in order to be sure that the evidence to support afinding of requisite authority is sufficiently clear and convincing that the question shouldappropriately go to the jury.  We recognize that this recommendation is one of process alone, and that substantiveconstitutional questions remain concerning the sources of such evidence, and the permissibilityof considering them in determining issues of knowledge and control.   Whatever the form of theevidence, the role of the judge in such cases should be to ensure that juries will impose liabilityonly on the basis of actions that create unreasonable risks in light of the actual structure of thedefendant religious organization, understood as much as humanly possible in secular terms.   Juries should not be free to decide what constitutes a reasonable structure for a religiousorganization, and judges should scrupulously withhold from  juries those questions whicheffectively ask whether a religious community has organized itself in reasonable ways.  The First Amendment doctrine of ecclesiastical immunity is designed to remove fromstate cognizance precisely those questions.  If judges do not understand the contours of such aforbidden inquiry, they will be unable do their job in ensuring that the state and its decision-making processes stay clear of it.  The subtleties attached to these questions are considerable, and we hope that our attention to them will invite more nuanced consideration than they have
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240 In Jones v. Wolf, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the Georgia courts to clarifywhether their decision to award the property to the local congregation was based on a standardlegal presumption of majority rule.  443 U.S. 595, 606-08.96
received to date. b. Neutral Principles and Evidentiary Sources Faced with claims that a religious institution has failed to exercise due care in theselection or management of its clergy, courts frequently ask whether “neutral principles of law”can be applied to resolve the dispute.  The concept of “neutral principles” refers to an analyticmodel accepted by the Supreme Court, in Jones v. Wolf,237 as a way of resolving disputes over theownership and control of religious institutions’ property.  As we saw above, courts that invokethe concept of “neutral principles” typically, and with little or no explanation, restate the conceptas “the application of secular standards to secular conduct.”238  Finding that the tort law analysisof negligent employment is a “secular standard,” courts then proceed use that analysis to measurethe performance of religious organizations.239  A close examination of the Supreme Court’sdecision in Jones v. Wolf, however, reveals an inquiry that is markedly different from the oneundertaken by most courts in the context of clergy sex abuse.Jones v. Wolf was the penultimate chapter in a long story of conflict within Presbyterianchurches in Georgia.240  In the mid-1960s, several congregations that belonged to the PresbyterianChurch USA (PCUSA) withdrew from that body and joined the Presbyterian Church in America(PCA).  The PCUSA decided, through its adjudicative process, that ownership of the local
241 Presbyterian Church v. Eastern Heights Church, 224 Ga. 61, 159 SE2d 690 (1968),reversed by Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, 393 US 440 (1969).
242 159 S.E.2d at 695-96.
243 Id. at 701.  The actual holding was slightly more complicated, but no moreconstitutionally appealing: the Georgia court held that the question of the national church’sdeparture from doctrine was one that properly went to the jury for determination.  Id.
244 Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, 393 US 440 (1969).
245 Id. at 449-50. 97
congregations’ property should remain with the national body.  When the PCUSA attempted toassert control over the local church properties, the congregations brought suit to establish theirrights to ownership. In Presbyterian Church v. Eastern Heights Presbyterian, the Supreme Court of Georgiadecided that the property should remain with the local congregations.241  The Georgia court foundthat the local congregational property was held in an implied trust for the national church;  ordinarily, such a finding would require deference to the national body’s decisions about theproperty.242  In this case, however, the court determined that the national body had breached theimplied trust through its “substantial abandonment of, or departure from, the original tenets offaith and practice. . . .”243  The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Constitutionprohibits courts from determining whether a religious community has “substantially abandoned”its faith.244  Adjudication of disputes within religious organizations, the Court held, must not turnon resolution of ecclesiastical questions.245  Instead, “there are neutral principles of law,developed for use in all property disputes, which can be applied without ‘establishing’ churches
246 Id. at 449.
247 Presbyterian Church v. Eastern Heights Presbyterian, 225 Ga. 259; 167 S.E.2d 658(1969).
248 Id. at 659-660. 98
to which property is awarded.”246On remand, the Supreme Court of Georgia abandoned its doctrine of implied trust , andheld that it now would  adjudicate such disputes by examining the traditional documents used toresolve any dispute over title to property.247  The Georgia court then found that the deeds to thechurch properties in question made no mention of any express trust or other interest benefittingthe national church, and so reaffirmed ownership in the local congregations.248Jones v. Wolf involved a very similar controversy within a Presbyterian congregation,although in this case the local congregation was divided, and the majority faction decided toremove the congregation from the PCUSA and join the PCA.  The minority faction of thecongregation appealed to the PCUSA, which held that ownership of the church property shouldremain with the minority faction.  The parties brought the dispute before the civil courts, and,following the “neutral principles” approach adopted on remand in Presbyterian Church v.Eastern Heights Presbyterian, the courts examined the relevant deeds, corporate charters, andother church documents, and found no grant of an express trust to the national body.  TheGeorgia courts confirmed ownership of the property in the majority faction of the congregation.The US Supreme Court affirmed the approach taken by the Georgia courts, but remandedfor clarification of the reason that the trial court had awarded the property to the majority
249 Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. at 607-08.
250 Id. at 603-04.  Professor Greenawalt raises serious questions about the extent to whichthe neutral principles approach actually respects the intention of the members of religiouscommunities.  Greenawalt, supra note **, at 1901-04.
251 Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. at 604.
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253 See General Council on Finance and Administration v. Calif. Super. Ct., 439 U.S.1369, 1372-73 (1978) (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice, denying application for stay).  See also CITE.99
faction.249  In approving the “neutral principles” analysis adopted by the Georgia courts, theCourt wrote:The primary advantages of the neutral-principles approach are that it is completelysecular in operation, and yet flexible enough to accommodate all forms ofreligious organization and polity.  The method relies exclusively on objective,well-established concepts of trust and property law familiar to lawyers and judges. It thereby promises to free civil courts completely from entanglement in questionsof religious doctrine, polity, and practice.  Furthermore, the neutral-principlesanalysis shares the peculiar genius of private-law systems in general– flexibility inordering private rights and obligations to reflect the intentions of the parties. Through appropriate reversionary clauses and trust provisions, religious societiescan specify what is to happen to church property in the event of a particularcontingency, or what religious body will determine the ownership in the event ofschism or doctrinal controversy.  In this manner, a religious organization canensure that a dispute over the ownership of church property will be resolved inaccord with the desires of the members.250Using neutral principles of property and trusts law, courts can examine documents relating tocontrol of the property – including “religious documents, such as a church constitution”251 – todetermine ownership.  Any judicial inquiry into such documents requires “special care” to ensurethat the court’s interpretation can be done “in purely secular terms.”252Many, including Justice Rehnquist, have questioned whether the “neutral principles”approach should be applied outside the context of church property disputes.253  We earlier quoted
254 General Council on Finance and Administration v. Calif. Super. Ct., 439 U.S. at 1372-73. 
255 Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, xxx (1976). (Rehnquist, J. dissenting). 100
Justice Rehnquist’s opinion in denial of a stay in a case involving a religious nursing home, inwhich he stated that “the Court never has suggested that those constraints [imposed on resolutionof church property disputes] similarly apply outside the context of such intraorganizationdisputes.”254There are at least two reasons for questioning Justice Rehnquist’s conclusion.  First,Justice Rehnquist opposed special protections for religious institutions even in the context ofinternal disputes,255 so he would not be likely to extend such protections to external disputes. Second, the boundary between internal and external disputes is less clear than one might think. Disputes over the appointment or retention of a priest seem internal, but a cleric who alleges thatshe was wrongfully terminated does not look much different from others who bring tort claimsagainst the church.  Indeed, disputes over the ownership of church property cannot be consideredpurely internal.  In Jones v. Wolf, the minority faction was literally external – barred from use ofa church to which many of them had contributed.Even if one recognizes that the First Amendment has some application to “external”disputes involving religious organizations, one still might believe that the “neutral principles”approach should be restricted to disputes within religious communities over ownership of realproperty.  As developed by the Georgia courts and approved by the U.S. Supreme Court, theneutral principles approach focuses heavily on interpretation of written evidence – and especiallylegal documents, such as deeds and corporate charters – to determine the parties’ relative legal
256 See, e.g., Official Code of Georgia, § 13-5-30 (2003) (contracts required to be inwriting). 101
interests in the disputed property.  This almost exclusive focus on documents is entirelyappropriate in the context of real property; the Statute of Frauds requires that any creation orconveyance of an interest in property must be done in a signed writing.256  No such evidentiarylimitation applies in most tort cases, in which resolution of the claim requires the court toconsider all relevant evidence, including parties’ patterns of conduct that may directly contradicttheir written authority. We may, however, glean from the neutral principles approach some guidelines for dealingwith a wider range of disputes, including tort claims, involving religious organizations.  Theneutral principles approach has two central limitations on the scope of admissible evidence. First. to avoid the constitutional error of imputing to religious organizations patterns of authoritythat they have not chosen, courts might strictly limit the introduction of testimony intended toshow patterns of conduct that contradict the organization’s written allocations of authority.  Evenif such testimony might be useful in determining what really happened in a given dispute, courtsshould be concerned that the jury will disregard the formal structure of a religious entity, and –either out of prejudice against the organization, or a desire to provide a remedy for the victim –impose its own views of the responsibilities that a religious organization should bear formisconduct by those who speak in its name.  Second, in looking to the religious organization’s documents to determine the respectiverights and obligations of and within a religious organization, the court should examine only thosematerials that can be interpreted in secular terms.  If the burden of persuasion rests on the
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plaintiff, courts should look for clear statements of specific kinds of authority to supervise clergy.In the context of claims that religious organizations failed to exercise due care in theiremployment practices, the reconsidered doctrine of neutral principles would thus permit the mostconstitutionally sensitive determinations to be made by the judge on a motion for summaryjudgment, rather than sending those determinations to the jury.  By examining the documents thatcreate or reflect a religious entity’s structures of authority, the court could determine whether aparticular official or body had the power to hire, supervise, or retain a particular individual.  Aswith the neutral principles approach in the context of property disputes, this examination has thedecided virtue of letting the religious organization determine its own patterns of authority.  Thecourt would avoid the constitutional problem of imposing on the entity an alien polity.We can identify at least three reasons that this reconsidered application of neutralprinciples is less than perfect.  First, despite Jones v. Wolf, this application cuts directly againstthe basic intuition of many courts, which have intentionally excluded consideration of thereligious community’s documents, in the belief that any interpretation of the responsibilitiesreflected within such documents would unconstitutionally entangle the court in the religiouscommunity’s affairs.  Second, the approach might work with institutions that have developedformal patterns of interaction, but many religious communities have unwritten and even fluidstructures, which then cannot be assessed under this reconsidered doctrine.  Exclusive reliance ondocuments rather than practices to prove authority thus can be more than a presumption,designed to govern only when documentary evidence is available.  Third, even in religiouscommunities that have a codified structure, a review of documents may not eliminate all of theambiguities present in our current methods of determining the powers and duties of a particular
257 The most sophisticated commentary on issues of the vicarious liability of religiousorganizations is that of Mark Chopko.  See Chopko, Stating Claims Against ReligiousInstitutions, 44 B.C. L. Rev 1089 (2003); Chopko, Ascending Liability of Religious Entities forthe Actions of Others, 17 Amer. J. Trial Advocacy 289 (1993).  See also see also Carl H. Esbeck,Tort Claims Against Churches & Ecclesiastical Officers: The First Amendment Considerations,89 W. Va. L. Rev. 1 (1986).
258 Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219.  In at least two different ways, claims ofvicarious liability can become intertwined with allegations of negligence.  First, plaintiffs canclaim that defendant-organization should be deemed to have ratified the wrongdoer’s conductbecause it failed to take action to disavow or report the wrong, or to mitigate plaintiff’s harm.  Restatement (Second) of Agency § 82; Gagne v. O’Donoghue, 1996 Mass. Super. LEXIS 481.Second, a number of statutes relating to sexual exploitation by psychotherapists have provisionsthat hold the therapist’s employer liable for such exploitation if the employer has failed toinvestigate the wrongdoer’s employment history.  Minn. Stat. § 148A.03(a) (quoted in JM v.Minnesota District Council of the Seventh-Day Adventists, 658 N.W.2d at 595). 103
office or body.  In property cases, such ambiguity can be resolved by recourse to the default norm– absent express evidence to the contrary, property belongs to the holder of record – but that isnot the case when the dispute involves the authority of a position.  Nonetheless, we believe thatthis evidenced-centered conception of the doctrine of neutral principles may be a useful approachfor courts to apply in those cases where formal documentation of rights and duties is available.
3. Vicarious Liability of a Religious Organization for its Agent’s Sexual MisconductPlaintiffs in cases of sexual misconduct routinely claim that the wrongdoer’s religiousorganization should be held vicariously liable for the wrongdoer’s acts.257  The claim of vicariousliability – typically referred to as respondeat superior – does not allege fault on the part of thereligious organization, but only that the wrongdoer was an agent of the organization, and that thewrong involved acts that fall within the scope of that agency.258  The doctrine of respondeatsuperior rests on a variety of grounds.  Because the organization – the principal – reaps the
259 Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219 Comment a.
260 See, e.g., Moses v. Diocese of Colorado, 863 P.2d 310, 329-30 (Colo. 1993).
261 N.H. v. Presbyterian Church (USA), 998 P.2d 592, 599 & n.30 (Ok. 1999) (holdingthat, as a matter of law, sexual misconduct is not within the scope of pastor’s duties, and listingother jurisdictions in which courts have reached the same conclusion).104
benefit of its agent’s work, the principal should also bear the costs of that agent’s work, includingharms imposed on third parties through the agent’s performance of his work.  As a matter ofpolicy, it also seems reasonable to impose that burden on the principal, because the principaltypically has the financial means to pay claims resulting from the agent’s misconduct and theability to obtain insurance that will cover such claims.259Plaintiffs rarely succeed in their claims that a religious organization should be heldvicariously liable for its agent’s sexual misconduct.  In most of the cases in which plaintiffsassert claims of vicarious liability, the court skips over the question of whether the wrongdoerwas an agent of the defendant, because the court finds that the plaintiff cannot prove that thetortious behavior was within the scope of a cleric’s agency – regardless of who employed thecleric.260  Courts in a significant majority of jurisdictions have held, as a matter of law, thatsexual misconduct is not within the scope of a religious leader’s employment by a religiousorganization.  Such misconduct is, these courts hold, motivated by the wrongdoer’s desire for“personal gratification.”261  Although courts tend to reach this legal conclusion with littleexplanation, it is logically connected with plaintiffs’ claim that the sexual abuse represents abreach of the cleric’s fiduciary obligations.  In alleging that the clergyman breached his duty ofloyalty by taking personal advantage of the relationship, the plaintiff at least implicitly claimsthat the clergyman has put his own desires above his professional responsibilities – in short, that
262 See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 228(2) (“Conduct of a servant is not within thescope of employment if it is different in kind from that authorized, far beyond the authorizedtime or space limits, or too little actuated by a purpose to serve the master”).  In otherjurisdictions, courts have denied vicarious liability on facts that are intertwined with the limitedsituations in which parishioners may bring suit against the cleric for sexual misconduct.  Forexample, in Hawkins v. Trinity Baptist Church (30 S.W.2d 446 (Tex. Ct. App. 12th Dist. 2000)),a Texas appellate court permitted plaintiff to bring a tort claim for sexual misconduct against apastor from whom she received marital counseling, but allowed the claim only because thecontent of the counseling was secular.  Id. at 452 (finding that plaintiff stated a cause of actionunder Texas Sexual Exploitation by Mental Health Services Provider Act, Tex. Civ. Prac. &Rem. Code Ann. §§ 81.001 - 81.009).  The court then found that such secular counseling wasoutside the scope of the pastor’s employment; the church authorized only religious teaching andcounseling, and had no notice that the pastor was offering secular counseling.  Id. at 452.  Seealso Hodges v. Kleinwood Church of Christ, 2000 WL 994337 (Tex. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 2000)(same); Sanders v. Casa View Baptist Church, 134 F.3d 331 (5th Cir. 1998) (same).
263 791 P.2d 344 (Alaska 1990).  Cited in Enderle v. Trautman, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS20181 (D.N.D.); Patel v. Himalayan Int'l Inst. of Yoga Sci. & Philosophy of the United States,1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22532 (M.D. Pa.).  The Supreme Court of Alaska subsequently overruledportions of its decision in Samaritan Counseling.  Veco v. Rosebrock, 970 P.2d 906 (Alaska1999) (“In [Samaritan Counseling] we stated the ‘motivation to serve’ test would be satisfied‘where tortious conduct arises out of and is reasonably incidental to the employee's legitimatework activities.’ To the extent that this language suggests that the employee's act need not bemotivated in fact at least to some degree to serve the master's business we disapprove of it”).105
the cleric has ceased to serve his principal.  This, of course, is the legal description of acts thatfall outside the scope of an actor’s agency.262Several courts, however, have allowed plaintiffs to proceed on claims of vicariousliability against religious organizations for the sexual misconduct of their agents.  Most of thesedecisions follow Doe v. Samaritan Counseling Center,263 in which the Supreme Court of Alaskasaid that a plaintiff could assert a claim of vicarious liability against a counseling center thatemployed the pastoral counselor, whom she accused of sexual misconduct in a counselingrelationship.  The court held that the wrongdoer’s “motivation to serve” the employer is not aprerequisite to a finding of vicarious liability.  “[W]here tortious conduct arises out of and is
264 Id. at 348.  Overruled by Veco v. Rosebrock, 970 P.2d 906 (Alaska 1999).
265 Id. at 348-49.  See also Mullen v. Horton, 46 Conn. App. 759, 700 A.2d 1377 (1997)(plaintiff alleges sexual exploitation by priest-psychotherapist; court permits vicarious liabilityclaim to go forward because “a trier of fact could reasonably find that the sexual relationsbetween [the priest] and plaintiff grew out of, and were the immediate and proximate results of,the church sanctioned counseling sessions.”  700 A.2d at 1381).
266 See generally, Timothy E. Allen, Notes & Comments: The Foreseeability ofTransference: Extending Employer Liability under Washington Law for Therapist SexualExploitation of Patients, 78 Wash. L. Rev. 525 (2003); Linda Mabus Jorgenson, Pamela K.Sutherland, and Steven B. Bisbing, Transference of Liability: Employer Liability for SexualMisconduct by Therapists, 60 Brooklyn L. Rev. 1421 (1995).
267 See Odenthal v. Minnesota Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 657 N.W.2d 569,576-77 (Min. App. 2003) (neutral principles guide judicial definition of the scope of vicariousliability). 106
reasonably incidental to the employee’s legitimate work activities, the ‘motivation to serve’ testwill have been satisfied.”264  In the counseling context, the court held, sexual misconduct can beseen as the counselor’s mishandling of the “transference phenomenon,” which is a normal part ofthe counseling relationship.  Seen in that light, the misconduct is a normal – if unfortunate –aspect of the employer’s business, and the costs of the harm can justly be imposed on theemployer.265As long as the test for vicarious liability is applied neutrally to religious and non-religiousentities, the Samaritan Counseling court’s expansive interpretation of that test does not raisespecial constitutional problems when applied to religious organizations.266  If the underlying tortclaim against the employee survives constitutional scrutiny, then the identity of the one uponwhom the remedy is imposed – whether agent or principal – is a matter without constitutionalsignificance.267The few courts that have addressed the wrongdoer’s status as an agent find that proof of
268 JM v. Minnesota District Council of the Assemblies of God, 658 NW2d 589, 595-96(Minn. App. 2003).
269 Id. See also Restatement (Second) of Agency, § 220 (listing factors for determiningwhen actor is a servant).
270 See supra notes **-** (discussing claims of negligent employment made againstreligious entities). 107
an agency relationship may proceed because the inquiry involves only neutral principles oflaw.268  In J.M. v. Minnesota District Council of the Assemblies of God, the Court of Appeals ofMinnesota held that plaintiff could establish a minister’s employment status through factors thatcourts apply to determine employment in any context:(1) the right to control the means and manner of performance; (2) the mode ofpayment; (3) furnishing of materials and tools; (4) control of premises where workis performed; and (5) right of the employer to hire and discharge.269The second, third, and fourth factors are clearly susceptible of proof by “neutral principles oflaw”; a court should be able to determine whether the defendant organization paid for thewrongdoer’s services, provided the means through which the wrongdoer performed his work, andcontrolled the place(s) where that work was performed.  As we argue above, however, proof ofthe first and fifth factors – the power to hire, supervise, and retain – may well draw the court intocomplex and perhaps contested questions of ecclesiastical polity, questions that are not so readilysolved through application of “neutral principles.”270  Many religious traditions have multiplelayers of authority, with very different types of relationships between the layers.Even if judicial determination of which entity has the powers to hire, supervise and retainis constitutionally problematic when the plaintiff claims that a religious institution has been
271 See infra notes **-** and accompanying text.
272 IRS Publication 15-A (p.5ff) 108
negligent in its performance of those functions,271 the constitutional problem might be avoidablewhen the court is analyzing a claim of vicarious liability.  Assume, for example, that a cleric hassexually molested a minor in his congregation, and sued the cleric’s congregation, diocese, andreligious order under a claim of vicarious liability.  Assume also that the court has said that suchmisconduct could be considered within the scope of the cleric’s employment.  Adjudication ofthe vicarious liability claim does not require the court to find that any particular entity failed touse due care in exercising its authority over the cleric, so the court does not have to determine theprecise extent of authority possessed by any single entity.  Instead, the court can avoid that constitutionally sensitive determination by asking asimpler question, and one that is regularly applied by the Internal Revenue Service: was thewrongdoer an employee or an independent contractor?272  If the cleric is deemed to be anindependent contractor, then the claim of vicarious liability fails by definition.  If, on the otherhand, the court finds that the cleric should be treated as an employee, then the court will need toidentify the employer.  In some, and perhaps most, circumstances, identification of the employerwill be uncontroversial; a single entity will pay for and control the work of the wrongdoer.In other circumstances, control over the employee might be dispersed among a number ofbodies, with uncertainty or dispute about the precise limits of each body’s authority.  In suchcases, all that we have said above, in the context of negligent employment cases, aboutconstitutional sensitivity in processes of adjudication and sources of evidence, applies with equal
273 If a court finds sufficient justification to hold that several different entities bore indiciaof employer status, the court might hold each of the bodies jointly and severally liable.  Theparties would then be free to allocate among themselves their shares of the vicariousresponsibility.  Such an approach might even encourage the various entities to make ex anteagreements about how such liability should be apportioned for a given position.
274 Office of the Attorney General, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, The Sexual Abuseof Children in the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Boston, released July 23, 2003 (hereafter“Massachusetts Report”).
275 Office of the New Hampshire Attorney General, Report on the Investigation of theDiocese of Manchester, March 3, 2003 (hereafter “NH Report”).
276Suffolk County Supreme Court, Special Grand Jury, May 6, 2002, Term ID, Grand JuryReport CPL sec. 190.85(1)(C), January 17, 2003 (hereafter “Suffolk County Report”).  Of the109
force.273C.  Criminal Culpability of Supervisors and Religious InstitutionsAs demonstrated in Part IIIB, religious institutions may be held accountable in civil courtfor their failure to supervise their clergy, when such failure leads to foreseeable harms to thosewho are vulnerable.  Does anything change when prosecutors pursue supervisors and religiousorganizations for alleged criminal wrongdoing arising out of the same conduct?  The firstinsights into this question may be gleaned from the results of the criminal investigations ofvarious Roman Catholic Dioceses over the past several years.  The most prominent and well-publicized among these occurred in Boston, where the Office of the Attorney General ofMassachusetts conducted a lengthy investigation, empaneled a grand jury, and prepared a high-profile public report;274 in New Hampshire, where the state Attorney General similarlyinvestigated and reported on the Diocese of Manchester;275 in Suffolk County, New York, wherethe County District Attorney empaneled a special grand jury, whose report on sexual abuse ofchildren in the Diocese of Rockville Centre, NY, was eventually made public,276 with names of
three reports, this one is the most detailed and graphic with respect to the sexual misconduct ofthe offending clergy.
277 NH Report at 1. 110
alleged perpetrators and victims omitted; and in Phoenix, Arizona, where the Maricopa CountyDistrict Attorney in June, 2003 reached an agreement with the Bishop of the Diocese in lieu ofprosecuting him for obstruction of justice.  All four of these investigations were focused onallegations of supervisory wrongdoing by leaders in the church hierarchy, and contemplated thepossible indictment of leaders as well as the religious institution of the Diocese or Archdioceseitself. In addition to their focus on organizations belonging to the Roman Catholic Church, theseproceedings displayed certain common themes.  First, they all involved sexual crimes againstminors rather than adults.  As noted in Part III.A., above, sexual abuse of minors by clergy isalways a crime of some sort, while comparable mistreatment of adults by clergy has rarelyinvolved criminal wrongdoing.  Second, all of the investigations involved religious entitiesagainst which there had been allegations of systematic wrongdoing going back over a period ofmany years.  The New Hampshire Report for example, summed up its relevant conclusions byasserting that “ . . .in multiple cases the Diocese knew that a particular priest was sexuallyassaulting minors, the Diocese took inadequate or no action to protect these children within theparish, and  the priest subsequently committed additional acts of sexual abuse against childrenthat the priest had contact with through the church.”277  In Massachusetts, the Attorney General’sreport found “that widespread sexual abuse of children was due to an institutional acceptance of
278 MA Report Finding No. 3, Executive Summary at 3.
279Id.  The relevant statute, New Hampshire Revised Statutes Annotated sec. 639.3,provides that “A person is guilty of endangering the welfare of a child . . . if he knowinglyendangers the welfare of a child under 18 years of age . . . by purposely violating a duty of care,protection, or support he owes to such a child.”  Under state law, a corporation (including the“corporation sole” represented in the office of the Roman Catholic Bishop of Manchester, isincluded within the definition of “person” in the state’s criminal code.  New Hampshire RevisedStatutes Annotated, sec. 625:11, II. 111
abuse, and a massive and pervasive failure of leadership.”278  In light of this combination ofcriminal abuse of children and persistent institutional failure to take appropriate action withrespect to accused priests, it should be no surprise that prosecutors pursued the possibility ofsupervisory or organizational culpability.Third, none of these jurisdictions produced an indictment of a supervisor or anorganization.  As described below, all of the investigations produced evidence of wrongdoingthat public authorities thought sufficient to warrant the imposition of criminal penalties.  InBoston, MA and  Suffolk County, NY, however, the authorities concluded that the available lawwas insufficient, either because (in the cases of many of the sexual abusers) the statutes oflimitations had expired or (in the cases of supervisors and organizations) the relevant statuteswere insufficiently tailored to the wrongs.  In Manchester and Phoenix, church officers admittedcriminal wrongdoing, and the investigations ended with agreements rather than trials.  1.  New Hampshire The State of New Hampshire came closest to an indictment of the Diocese itself.  TheAttorney General’s Report, which appeared in March, 2003, asserts that the State “was preparedto present indictments [to the local grand jury] . . . charging the Diocese of Manchester withmultiple counts of endangering the welfare of a minor . . . . “279   Rather than face those
280 Id. at 1.
281 The key provisions of the agreement are summarized in the NH Report, supra note xx,at 2.  NH is the only one of the four to explore First Amendment considerations, but these arelimited to Smith and exemptions, and do not represent anything like a full and fair exploration ofpossible ecclesiastical immunities of the sort we are considering in this paper. Id. at 19-20.
282 Massachusetts AG Report at 15 (Finding No.1).
283 Id. At 25 (Finding No. 3).  The elaborate subfindings in this part of the Report includethose pertaining to knowledge by Archdiocese officials of the extent of the clergy sexual abuseproblem; placing children at risk by official inaction; failure to notify law enforcementauthorities of allegations of abuse; failure to conduct adequate internal investigations;transferring abusive priests to other parishes; accepting transfers of abusive priests from otherDioceses; and failure to supervise priests with a history of sexual abuse of children.  See MAReport, note xx supra, at Executive Summary, 3-5. 112
indictments, the Diocese “acknowledged that the State had evidence likely to sustain a convictionagainst the Diocese for child endangerment.”280  The Diocese entered into an agreement with theState in which the Diocese promised to comply with strict requirements of reporting futureallegations of similar wrongdoing, and to provide the state’s authorities with unlimited access tochurch documents, past and future, concerning the internal handling of such claims.2812.  MassachusettsThe Massachusetts AG’s Report, released to the public in July, 2003, conceded that itsinvestigation had found no evidence of recent or ongoing sexual abuse of children in theArchdiocese of Boston.282  The bulk of the Report, however, consists of a scathing set ofaccusations aimed at the behavior of the leaders of the Archdiocese.283 Nevertheless, the Report includes as a major finding that “the  investigation did notproduce evidence sufficient to charge the Archdiocese or its Senior Managers with crimes under
284 Id. at 21 (Finding No. 2).
285 Mass General Laws, Chap. 119, section 51A.  This law, which had originally beenenacted in 1973 and had covered health care professionals, teachers and others but not clergy,was amended to include any “priest, rabbi, clergy member, ordained or licensed minister, leaderof any church or religious body, accredited Christian Science practitioner, person performingofficial duties on behalf of a church or religious body that are recognized as the duties of a priest,rabbi, clergy, ordained or licensed minister, leader of any church or religious body, or accreditedChristian Science practitioner, or person employed by a church or religious body to supervise,educate, coach, train or counsel a child on a regular basis . . . “  The statute also provides,however, “ [n]otwithstanding section 20A of chapter 233, a priest, rabbi, clergy member,ordained or licensed minister, leader of a church or religious body or accredited ChristianScience practitioner shall report all cases of abuse under this section, but need not reportinformation solely gained in a confession or similarly confidential communication in otherreligious faiths. Nothing in the general laws shall modify or limit the duty of a priest, rabbi,clergy member, ordained or licensed minister, leader of a church or religious body or accreditedChristian Science practitioner to report a reasonable cause that a child is being injured as set forthin this section when the priest, rabbi, clergy member, ordained or licensed minister, leader of achurch or religious body or accredited Christian Science practitioner is acting in some othercapacity that would otherwise make him a reporter.”  Id.113
applicable state law.”284  The Report cursorily analyzes and dismisses the possibility that theArchdiocese or its leaders might have 1) committed acts of obstruction of justice; 2) beenaccessories before or after the fact of the felony of child sexual abuse; or 3) been parties to acriminal conspiracy.  All of these crimes include requirements of intent to facilitate or benefitfrom the primary crime, and the Report asserts that these elements could not be proven with theevidence produced by the investigation.The Report applauds, however, the recent enactment by the Massachusetts legislature ofseveral laws designed to correct similar wrongdoing in the future.  First, in the Spring of 2002,the legislature acted to extend to clergy, and other church employees who work regularly withchildren on the church’s behalf, the state’s law on mandatory reporting of child abuse.285  Second,a few months later, the legislature created the new crime of “recklessly endangering children.” 
286 Mass. General Laws, chap.265, S13L.
287 Suffolk County Report, note xx supra, at 3-95.
288 Id. at 106-171.
289 Id. at 174. 114
This enactment covers “whoever wantonly or recklessly engages in conduct that creates asubstantial risk of serious bodily injury or sexual abuse to a child or wantonly or recklessly failsto take reasonable steps to alleviate such risk where there is a duty to act.”286 The Report lamentsthat neither of these enactments can be applied to the Archdiocese’s institutional failures, all ofwhich predated the new laws.3.  Suffolk County (Long Island), NYAs mentioned above, the report of the special grand jury empaneled to investigate theDiocese of Rockville Centre is the most graphic of all those produced by the official inquiriesinto possible criminal wrongdoing by a Catholic Diocese or Archdiocese.   The Report includesnearly 100 pages of close detail concerning alleged instances of abuse of minors by Diocesanpriests and the failures of other Diocesan agents, aware of the abuses, to take protective action.287 And the Report devotes another 65 pages to the institutional inadequacies of Diocesan policy andpractice in responding to sexual abuse by clergy.288  Nevertheless, as in the Boston investigation, the grand jury did not issue indictments.  Itconcluded that the acts of many priests had violated laws protecting children against sexualabuse, but that the relevant statutes of limitations had expired, making successful prosecutionsimpossible.  And it concluded “that the conduct of certain Diocesan officials would havewarranted criminal prosecution but for the fact that the existing statutes are inadequate.”289
290 Id. at 175-76.
291 Id. at 177.  See supra notes **-** and accompanying text (discussing tort liability forclergy who hold themselves out as providers of mental health and other services).
292 Id. 
293 Id.
294 Id. at 178.
295 Id. at 177.  Such an enactment would apparently be akin to the recently enactedMassachusetts law on reckless endangerment of a child.115
The Suffolk County Report concluded with a lengthy list of legislative recommendations. These included elimination or extension of statutes of limitations for various sexual crimesagainst minors;290 the extension of laws prohibiting sexual relations between professional care-givers and clients to include “anyone representing themselves as a member of the clergy whoprovides health care or mental health care services;”291 the expansion of accessory liability toinclude post-crime conduct “that conceals or hinders discovery of the crime or evidence of thecrime;”292 the expansion of the statutory duty to report abuse of a child to include any childabused by any person,293 and the specific imposition of this duty upon members of the clergy orothers serving a religious institution;294 and the enactment of a new criminal law on“Endangering the Welfare of a Child.”295 4.  Phoenix, AZ.The Maricopa County District Attorney’s Office conducted a lengthy grand juryinvestigation of sexual misconduct in the Phoenix diocese.  The grand jury indicted six priests forabuse of children, and the grand jury heard evidence that Bishop Thomas O’Brien knew of themisconduct, failed to report it to public authorities, and transferred the accused priests to new
296 Charlie LeDuff, Phoenix Bishop Admits Moving Accused Priests, New York Times,June 3, 2003.
297 The agreement was printed in full on the website of the Arizona Republic, and isavailable in the database on clergy sexual abuse at www.poynter.org.
298 Id. 116
parishes without informing anyone at those parishes of the accusations.296  The District Attorneyseriously considered indicting Bishop O’Brien for obstructing justice as a result of the Bishop’sconduct during the investigation.Ultimately, Bishop O’Brien, facing the likelihood of prosecution, entered into anagreement covering the relationship between the Diocese and public authorities with respect tothe handling of complaints of sexual misconduct against clergy under the Diocese’s jurisdiction.  Like the agreement in New Hampshire, the Phoenix agreement requires reporting to publicauthorities of all complaints of sexual misconduct by clergy within the Diocese.  The Phoenixagreement goes further, however, by committing the Bishop to appoint a Moderator of the Curia,who is to serve as the Bishop’s chief of staff, and a Youth Protection Advocate within the officesof the Diocese.297  The agreement specifies that the newly appointed Moderator, rather than theBishop, will have ultimate responsibility “for dealing with issues that arise relating to revision,enforcement and application of the [newly agreed to] sexual misconduct policy.”298  The YouthProtection Advocate is responsible for implementation of the policy within the diocese.  Inaddition, the agreement specifies that the Advocate’s decision to report allegations of childsexual abuse to public authorities are “to be made by the Youth Protection Advocateindependently and not subject to the consent of Thomas J. O’Brien, or any other Diocesan
299 Id.  Bishop O’Brien’s woes have mounted since the plea bargain.  See Terry GreeneSterling and T.R. Reid, Bishop Convicted in Fatal Hit-and-Run, Washington Post, Feb. 18, 2004,p. A1 (reporting on conviction of Bishop O’Brien for “leaving the scene of an accident in whichthe car he was driving struck and killed a man”).  
300 For a thorough appraisal of these issues, see Norman Abrams, Addressing the TensionBetween the Clergy-Communicant Privilege and the Duty to Report Child Abuse in StateStatutes, 44 B.C. L. Rev. 1127 (2003). 117
personnel.”299The policies reflected in the enactments and agreements produced in these fourjurisdictions are of course highly significant for the protection of children from future wrongs,and for the control of future misbehavior of this character by any and all institutions, religious orotherwise.  Our particular focus in the remainder of this section, as in what has preceded it, liesin the question of religious distinctiveness.   With respect to the child protection laws invoked orrecommended by these Reports, are there any which raise such issues of distinctiveness, such thatecclesiastical immunities from them deserve consideration?At the very outset of this Part III, we rejected any notion that ecclesiastical immunitiesmight protect clergy who themselves engage in actionable sexual misconduct.  Nothing in theconstitutional principles we have been exploring suggests any limitation on the state’s authorityto allege and prove unlawful sexual contact with a minor by a member of the clergy.   Withrespect to supervisors and institutions, however, we think that the Establishment Clause maysuggest limitations on some of the actions and recommendations that have emerged from thesecriminal investigations.First, the imposition upon clergy and religious institutions of a duty to report suspectedinstances of child abuse may raise questions related to the priest-penitent privilege.300  If, as is
301 Id.   
302 Non-Catholics may indeed wonder why this obligation of clergy is more strenuousthan the obligation to refrain from sexual misconduct itself, especially with respect to a child. But it is the business only of the religious community, not the state, to assign gravity and priorityamong the religious duties of members of the clergy.118
frequently the case, the information about abuse does not come to the official of the religiousentity from a communication covered by the privilege, this concern of course does not arise.   Insome cases, however, a clergyman may learn of sexual misconduct by another clergyman only asa result of an otherwise privileged communication.  In such circumstances, may the state imposea mandatory duty to report?301  Such an imposition would implicate, for some faiths at least,profound issues of religious freedom.  In the Roman Catholic Church, for example, a priest isabsolutely forbidden from breaking the seal of the confessional.302  And it may well be both crueland futile to impose a duty to report on clergy who will go to prison rather than violate thesacraments of their faith.Whatever the policy merits of imposing duties to report on otherwise privilegedcommunications with clergy, we think it is useful to frame and answer the constitutional questionthat such an imposition would raise. If the priest-penitent privilege is a creature of common lawor statute only, it would follow that a state may create an exception to the privilege for cases ofsexual abuse of a child.  And, indeed, the case for such an exception would be quite powerful ifevery other helping profession were similarly regulated; if all secular professionals are obliged toreport suspected abuse of a child, why should clergy be let off the hook?  The demise ofconstitutionally required exemptions from religion-neutral general laws, dictated by Employment
303 Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
304 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
305 See generally Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability ofConscience: The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1245(1994) (arguing for a constitutional paradigm shift from understanding religious liberty as a rightof privilege to an understanding of religious liberty as – and only as – equal liberty of conscienceand association). 119
Division v. Smith,303 suggests that clergy would have no basis for complaint under the FreeExercise Clause if they were among a wider group of professionals whose communicationprivileges were trimmed as a response to the problem of child abuse.  Only if clergy were singledout among professionals for the loss of such a privilege would Free Exercise objections to thatdeprivation seem meritorious.304There remains, however, a different constitutional perspective from which to analyze thequestion of a legislatively mandated exception to the priest-penitent privilege in cases of sexualabuse of a child.  For reasons that derive from considerations of equal protection rather than freeexercise of religion, we think that the scope of the priest-penitent privilege must be comparedwith the scope of attorney-client privilege.305  The law currently assures perpetrators of these (andother) crimes that they may safely confide in their lawyers concerning their misdeeds, and theSixth Amendment’s right to counsel may require such assurances.  To permit the continuation ofthe attorney-client privilege for sex offenders while denying a comparable priest-penitentprivilege for those same offenders is to create a secular advantage, favoring those who seekadvice about legal consequences and options over those who seek spiritual advice concerning thesame underlying behavior.  Thus, so long as the state maintains the attorney-client privilege forsexual abusers of children, it may be under a constitutional obligation to do likewise with respect
306 This equality-based argument to preserve the priest-penitent privilege has the sameforce with respect to victims or witnesses only so long as the state recognizes attorney-clientprivilege for those in the same position.  For victims and witnesses, however, the 6th Amendmentright to counsel provides no floor under the attorney-client privilege, so states remain free tomandate reporting by lawyers and clergy when they learn of child abuse from those other than theperpetrator.  No states ever do mandate such reporting by lawyers, so the equality-basedargument for exempting from mandatory reporting the communications protected by the priest-penitent privilege seem quite strong.
307 See, e.g., John S. Baker, Jr., Prosecuting Dioceses and Bishops, 44 B.C. L. Rev. 1061(2003) 120
to the priest-penitent privilege.  By the same reasoning, victims of or witnesses to crimes ofsexual abuse should also have the same right to seek spiritual or legal counsel, without fear ofprofessional betrayal.306The second concern raised by the application of criminal laws to religious institutions incases of sexual misconduct relates to the basis for imposition of affirmative duties to protectchildren and others.307  The crime of reckless endangerment of a child – the charge which led theDiocese of Manchester, NH, to acknowledge culpability and enter into an agreement with thestate Attorney General –  includes as an element of the crime that the perpetrator be under a legalduty to protect the child.   Those who are legal strangers to the child (even though they might befriends or neighbors) are under no such duty, and thus need not act to protect a child, even one inobvious and immediate danger. The crime of reckless endangerment thus sounds in fiduciary duty, and raises the precisequestion that we considered in Part III.B.1, concerning the constitutional danger that religiousorganizations will be held to unique and distinctive legal responsibilities.  In discussing the dutyof care that the Diocese of Manchester owed to its child parishioners, the New Hampshire AG’sreport cited with approval the decision in Martinelli v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan
308 196 F.3d 409, 429-30 (2nd Cir. 1999), cited in New Hampshire Report at 5-6.
309 See also Chopko, B.C. L. Rev. at 1123-24.121
Corp.308  We criticize Martinelli in Part III.B.1, above, for its unreflective acceptance of the riskthat a civil jury might rely on the religious character of an organization in the imposition offiduciary duties.309In the criminal context as in the civil, we think it is a constitutional mistake to derive sucha duty and all of its legal consequences from the religious character of the association.  Religionsmay differ widely in their internal sense of obligation of the community to its members, and it isinappropriate for courts to impose a single, compulsory model of duty upon them all withoutmore careful, individuated inquiry.  The proper question to ask in this situation must be areligiously neutral one – has the organization held itself out as being responsible for the care andprotection of children who are involved in its activities?When the organization does so, duties of care to children follow.  If, for example, areligious entity operates a youth ministry, children’s camp, or after-school sports program, theentity can fairly be said to assume a duty of care and protection towards the children enrolled; inthese circumstances, parents and guardians are trusting their wards to the entity and itsdesignated agents.  If the entity, in such a program, assigns a person known to be a child abuserto a position of trust and responsibility toward children enrolled, it is fair to conclude that theentity has recklessly endangered a child toward whom it has a legal duty of protection.  Thisresult would be no different if the entity were a secular private school, camp, scouting program,or soccer league.  In contrast, a religious community should not be held to the same legal duty to protect all
122
children within the community from all persons who have some authority to speak for the group. If a clergyman offers, disconnected from his official role within the faith community, to babysitfor a parishioner’s child and then abuses that child, it is not reasonable, constitutionally orotherwise, to assign criminal liability for that abuse to the religious organization, even if itsleaders knew of the clergyman’s proclivities.  To hold otherwise is effectively to put the faithcommunity under a mandatory duty to defrock the clergyman for his prior abuse, a duty whichthe state may not impose.  Moreover, it would always seem unreasonable to impose such a duty in a comparablesecular setting.  If, for example, a university professor had been forcibly moved to emeritus statusas a result of his sexually aggressive behavior with female students, we would not think that theuniversity was under a legal duty to protect all women with whom the emeritus professor cameinto contact, even if the university had expressly permitted him the continued use of the emeritustitle and he used the title to attract the attention of female students.  If this is correct, the resultshould be no different if the organization from which the title is derived is religious rather thansecular.  As in the civil context, the Constitution precludes any concept of religiously distinctiveliability or legal responsibility.Our final concern relates to the remedial surrender of ecclesiastical authority under thethreat of criminal prosecution.  The Phoenix plea agreement raises serious constitutional questionbecause it represents just such a surrender.  The agreement requires the Bishop of the Diocese tocede final control to the Moderator of the Curia and the Youth Protection Advocate with respectto the internal handling of complaints of sexual abuse against clergy members.  Issues ofallocation of disciplinary authority over clergy are matters of church structure, and the state
310 We are not troubled by the provisions requiring reporting to public authorities of allinternal complaints of sexual misconduct, or requirements of access to church records of thehandling of such complaints.  Several courts have recognized the constitutional significance ofremedies in cases involving clergy or other leaders of religious organizations.  See Bollard v.California Province of the Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 949-50 (9th Cir. 1999) (contrastingconstitutional implications of remedies of reinstatement and back pay); McKelvey v. Pierce, 173N.J. 26, 45-49, 800 A.2d 840, 852-54 (2002) (same).123
should not be dictating or involving itself in such arrangements.  If we are correct thatconstitutional limits on state competence are implicated by such arrangements, the state shouldbe forbidden from entering into them, whether or not the religious entity is willing to make sucha deal.  However tempting such an arrangement may be, violations of the Establishment Clausemay not be waived.  Remedial arrangements, no less than substantive norms or proceduralmechanisms, are subject to the constitutional prohibition on state interference in matters ofinternal church governance.310
ConclusionA proper understanding of the First Amendment leads to the conclusion that religiousinstitutions have no sweeping immunities from any body of law, civil or criminal, dealing withsexual misconduct or any other kind.  In most circumstances, such institutions and their agentsshould be treated identically with their secular counterparts.   In some highly particularized legalcontexts, however, the First Amendment may indeed limit the state’s decision making bodies. The state may not impose unique legal responsibilities on religious bodies, nor expose suchentities to an unreasonable risk of jury discrimination against them.  Nor may the state adjudicatethe answers to questions that are internal to a religious community, including the crucial questionof who may serve as a spokesperson for the faith.  
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These First Amendment limitations leave the state with ample room to act when itsconcern is the protection of those who are especially vulnerable to sexual exploitation.  It mayimpose responsibilities upon religious organizations, comparable to those borne by analogoussecular entities, to take appropriate precautions in assigning leaders to roles involving the risk ofsuch sexual exploitation; to report wrongdoing, unless knowledge of it arrives from aconstitutionally protected relationship; and to refrain from taking advantage of those who havereposed special trust and confidence in the organization’s leaders.  When the state does impose such responsibilities, however, it must rely exclusively onorganizational characteristics that find analogies in the secular world.  Just as some judges maybe tempted to over-immunize religious institutions, others will be inclined to hold religiousentities to unique duties of care and loyalty.  The Constitution counsels resistance to such biasesin either direction.  That humans are forever over-expecting qualities of virtue in their religiousleaders and institutions should lead us neither to confer upon them distinctive rights, nor toimpose upon them distinctive legal responsibilities.  In this recognition of the thoroughlyundistinctive fallibility of all human institutions lies a measure of wisdom, constitutional andotherwise.
